درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

The main issue of the present paper is: What exactly is the relationship between our Iranian culture and thought and Western philosophy and thought? Most discussions raised in Iran regarding tradition and modernity have considered this relationship to be self-evident and obvious. However, contrary to appearances, it seems this relationship is not so obvious and clear. The mere fact that we study books and sources of Western philosophy, or write texts and articles about it in the form of various research projects, does not mean that we, who have been situated and grown within a different historical and intellectual framework, have a relationship with the intellectual tradition of the West. It must be acknowledged that the historical and intellectual course of modern Western thought, considering its roots and origins, has its own requirements and characteristics that do not necessarily align with the historical and intellectual framework in Iran. Therefore, the absolute extension of its precepts and concepts to this framework does not seem entirely acceptable. This very issue must be subjected to a serious question; that is, we must understand what the aforementioned relationship actually is and what characteristics it can possess. Hence, this seemingly clear relationship must itself become a subject for serious reflection and scrutiny. Finally, this paper proposes that instead of taking our relationship with modern Western thought for granted, we must begin an effort to discover the various dimensions of the internal logic of Iranian thought and reflection.

The epistemic legitimacy of religious belief, as defended within the framework of Reformed Epistemology (RE), has been the subject of sustained scrutiny since Alvin Plantinga introduced the notion of a sensus divinitatis as a properly basic source of theistic belief. While the model purports to secure warrant without evidential support, its normative adequacy becomes contentious when considered in light of recent developments in the epistemology of disagreement. Persistent epistemic parity between dissenting interlocutors, particularly among intellectually and morally serious peers, presents a form of higher-order evidence that cannot be easily deflected by appeals to internal proper function alone. Furthermore, RE’s structural exclusion of dissenting perspectives – by regarding them as the product of cognitive malfunction or noetic effects of sin – risks epistemic insularity and violates principles of epistemic humility and testimonial justice. The analysis draws on debates concerning epistemic responsibility, the asymmetry of religious deference, and the fragility of internalist warrant under conditions of deep disagreement. In pluralistic contexts where dialogical symmetry is morally and epistemically required, the RE model struggles to sustain its claim to epistemic privilege without collapsing into circularity or dogmatism.