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Contemplation and theoretical reflections on the "tongue under control" and how it operates, or the reasons and factors that prevent humans from exercising control, are among the most important topics studied by Islamic scholars. This research seeks to elucidate the philosophical foundations of "tongue under control" with an emphasis on the viewpoint of Allameh Javadi Amoli, using a descriptive-analytical approach and through a library method and referencing their numerous works. Based on such an approach, Allameh Javadi considers the fundamental factor in "tongue under control" to be the spiritual faculties(habits). The novelty of this research lies in the enumeration and explanation of the philosophical foundations of the discussion. Therefore, by employing Quranic verses and the principles of Sadra'i wisdom, such as substantial motion, bodily manifestation of the soul, and the explanation of the embodiment and manifestation of actions on the Day of Resurrection; he has identified the repetition and continuity of actions and their transformation into "habits" as the fundamental factor in the issue of "tongue under control"; in fact, "tongue" is not in our control, but rather in the control of the "habits" Therefore, if piety governs human actions, humans can to a large extent take control of their tongue in the world and in a wakeful state. However, in the world of dreams, near death, and also on the Day of Resurrection, the "tongue" is under the control of habits and temperaments, not us. 

The architectonic is key for situating Kant’s understanding of science in the coming century. For Kant the faculty of reason turns to ideas to form a complete system. The coherence of the system rests on these ideas. In contrast to technical unity which can be abstracted a posteriori, architectonic ideas are the source of a priori unity for the system of reason because they connect our reasonable pursuit to essential human ends. Given Kant’s focus on mathematics, in the architectonic and his critical philosophy more generally, we must have some sense of the architectonic idea of mathematics. In this paper, I argue for the key principles of the architectonic idea of mathematics: 1) because mathematics is grounded in a priori intuition, it is a peculiarly human activity; 2) the method of mathematics is one of a priori construction, a method only mathematics can employ and: 3) the objects of mathematics are extensive magnitudes. Given these principles, we can use the architectonic idea to have some clarity about how mathematics has dealt with historical development.

The experience of our conscience belongs in the same category as feeling, thinking and wanting. However, it has a special aspect, namely the presence of other human beings as absolute entities. The process of experience is concerned with the way to best promote your own interests, with how far you will go in actualising your essential characteristics as an absolute entity. The discussion of our urge for survival shows that we can go quite far in that respect, and that to actualise that urge, there are in fact no boundaries; everything is permitted. The same can be said about actualising our other essential characteristics, but the difference is that our need to do so is perhaps less cogently present; it is not our life, or at least not our continued material existence, that is at stake. Nonetheless, we can and may even choose to go to extremes in this respect and thus to give ourselves priority over others. Respect for the interests of others is based on self-respect, which may lead you to decide to subject your dealings with other people to a set of standards for yourself. Here we enter the area of morals and ethics, to which we can attach a complete moral philosophy and on the basis of a belief, a moral theology. At the end of this road is total love of yourself and others, because you have come to realise that it is the only way that can lead to the fourth essential characteristic of human beings as absolute entities, namely self-fulfilment. You will then have developed in a way that allows you to give yourself and others the scope we need as absolute entities (compassion, solidarity). Self-fulfilment is achieved through self-development, i.e. discovering and honing our gifts and talents and thus finding our own identity (development), a process by which the lives of human beings as absolute entities acquire purpose (the search for meaning). Self-fulfilment is self-actualisation, the state that results from the realisation of the essential characteristics of human beings as absolute entities, and it leads to satisfaction derived from ourselves or our activities, a sense of being satisfied with what we have accomplished.

The paper concentrates on the philosophical discourses of four thinkers – Soren Kierkegaard, M. K. Gandhi, R. D. Ranade and B. R. Ambedkar on Ethics and Religion. Soren Kierkegaard, whose journey in philosophy made him pass through the aesthetic stage to ethical stage and ultimately religious stage landing in the realm of “faith”; where an individual arrives at without any rational commitment. M. K. Gandhi, whose journey in life encompassed politics, economics, and social realms where the underlying paradigm has always been religion. He did not consider ‘truth’ and therefore ‘morality’ as segregated from religion. R. D. Ranade, while mentioning the criteria of mystical experience, very empathetically mentions that a mystic (a saint) has the element of universality, is intellectual, emotional, has the intuitive experience of ‘spiritual realization’ and cannot be devoid of morality. B. R. Ambedkar, instead of accepting Christianity or Islam, consecrated into Buddhism; that befitted Indian contextual situation critiquing the popular Brahmanism, believed that religion must be in amalgamation and consonance with reason and scientific temperament. And this criterion was fulfilled by Buddhism (indeed with other criteria).  His adopting Buddhism was more of a political movement rather than spiritual; therefore, his Buddhism in the transformed format, is called Neo-Buddhism. The research article concludes by comparing these masters’ views and ideologies in the context of ‘a possibility of ethical religion’ that has appealed my conscience. 

Panentheism and pantheism represent one of the most profound, even startling parallels across the world’s great metaphysical traditions about which the present article seeks to explore and carry out a comparative study of certain Eastern and Western philosophers with special reference to the views of two chief exponents of Advaita Vedanta of Indian philosophy, Shankara and Ramanuja. Both these terms, touch on the relation of God and the universe with the difference that the former seems to be rigid, motionless, and abstract and lacks a kind of religious fervor in its approach, while the latter is presumed to be concrete and palpable and seeks to reconcile philosophical thinking with the demands of religious feelings as well. God in pantheism is compared to the God of Spinoza, the Neutrum of Schelling, and Shankara's concept of indeterminate Brahman. In contrast, in the West Hegelian Absolute, and Ramanuja's qualified Brahman in Indian tradition, both are accredited with panentheism in which a personal God, identity-in-and-through-difference, has all auspicious qualities. Though these philosophers are from totally different temperaments and cultures, their philosophical method has certain similarities that have been examined in this work.

Developing the empirical method based on observation and experiment, Alhazen is considered the greatest Muslim physicist and the most significant figure in the history of optics between antiquity and the seventeenth century. Inventing a camera obscura, Alhazen rebuilt our conception of eyesight. His theory of vision was enormously prominent and much of our understanding of optics and light is based upon his groundbreaking discoveries. He began his criticism of emission by describing what happens when people are exposed to bright lights. No matter what the light source, the effect of bright lights was always the same. What this indicates to Alhazen is that light entering into the eye from an external source had some serious function in eyesight. Respecting observation, experiment and empirical method, Suhrawardi, the father of Illumination School, argues all theories of vision and rejects them just by mere reasoning. Suhrawardi validates his own Illuminationist method by scientists’ empirical method. So, I will argue, he is not to deny empirical aspect of Alhazen’s theory of vision. In an allegory, I will use the camera, representing the whole process of a human vision, while I use “beyond camera” for the embodiment that allows for the unfolding of a human soul’s position in the process of vision. What Alhazen is speaking of, we might call the process within the camera; while what Suhrawardi is speaking of, we could name the process behind the camera.

Drawing upon the hermeneutic basis that understanding and interpretation of a text is conditioned by the reader’s preunderstanding, this article examines ʾAllamah Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s interpretive preunderstandings. In so doing, the article first, will explore ʾAllamah’s constitutive and non-constitutive preunderstandings. As the foundation of his Qur'anic interpretation, the constitutive category is divided into three subcategories: text-specific, interpreter-specific, and interpretation-specific. The non-constitutive category is studied under the following two subcategories: the imposed and non-imposed preunderstandings. Although the article studies ʾAllamah Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s interpretive preunderstandings, this categorization can be applied in studying any scriptural hermeneutic discourse. The contribution of this article to the field, is not limited to Allamah Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s interpretive preunderstandings. The method applied in this study can be used in the study of any scriptural hermeneutics.

Adopting a hermeneutic approach and horizontal and vertical interpretation methods, this study primarily explores the metaphysical concept of love-induced mystic intoxication in the Iranian polymath Mullā Muḥsin Fayḍ Kāshānī’s mystic poetry. Secondarily, it discusses the implications of mystic intoxication in the meaning of life. Furthermore, the paper briefly positions Fayḍ Kāshānī’s account in the contemporary categories of the meaning of life: supernaturalism, naturalism, and nihilism. Additionally, elucidating the perspectives of the contemporary philosopher John Cottingham, the paper examines Kāshānī’s view through Cottingham’s philosophy. Central to Kāshānī’s poetry, ignited by divine love, the spiritual seeker transcendends their self, getting absorbed into the Divine to the point where they become unaware of their self. This epistemic unawareness is mastī (intoxication) or bīkhudī (selflessness)—which, for Kāshānī, has profound implications on life’s meaning. Unlike the “extreme God-centric” view—which situates the purpose of life solely in fulfilling God’s purpose—Kāshānī’s “moderate God-soul-centric supernaturalist” view recognizes that while divine love, intoxication, and knowledge infuse more profound depth to the meaning of life, other aspects also add to the meaning in life—like the simpler forms of piety and everyday existence. A framework in which morality is instrumental. Similarly, for Cottingham, life has value and meaning beyond solely fulfilling God’s purpose. Nevertheless, while basic pleasures and desires might independently exist and have meaning, higher elements like moral virtue, crucial to life’s meaning, are contingent on God’s purpose.

The future of philosophy and the future of humankind-in-the-world are intimately related, not only (i) in the obvious sense that all philosophers are “human, all-too-human” animals—i.e., members of the biological species Homo sapiens, and also finite, fallible, and thoroughly normative imperfect in every other way too—hence the natural fate of all human animals is also the natural fate of all philosophers, but also (ii) in the more profound and subtle sense of what I’ll call philosophical futurism. Philosophical futurism is a critical, synoptic, and speculative reflection on the fate of humankind-in-the-world, with special attention paid not only to what humankind-in-the-world (including philosophy itself) will most likely be, if things continue to go along in more or less the same way as they have been and are now going, or could conceivably be, as in science fiction or other forms of imaginative projection, but also to what what humankind-in-the-world (including philosophy itself) ought to be, and therefore (assuming that “ought” entails “can”) can be, as the direct result of our individual and collective free agency, for the purpose of rationally guiding humankind in the near future. In my essay, I very briefly present, defend, and strongly recommend a version of philosophical futurism that I call Kantian futurism.