The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense: A Legal Assessment of Israel’s Use of Force Against Iran
منبع:
فلسفه حقوق سال ۴ بهار و تابستان ۱۴۰۴ شماره ۱ (پیاپی ۷)
160 - 139
حوزههای تخصصی:
This article examines the legality of Israel’s claim to a right of preemptive self-defense against Iran within the framework of international law. It argues that such a claim lacks any valid legal foundation and stands in stark contrast to the fundamental principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations as well as established international jurisprudence. According to Article 51 of the UN Charter, the use of force in self-defense is only permissible in response to an actual and verifiable armed attack. Any military action based solely on the anticipation or assumption of an imminent threat does not meet the legal threshold and is not recognized by the international legal order. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in landmark cases such as Nicaragua (1986), the Advisory Opinion on the Wall (2004), and Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda (2005), has consistently adopted a narrow interpretation of self-defense, explicitly rejecting the doctrine of preemptive force. Israel’s assertion of facing a permanent threat from Iran, absent concrete evidence of an imminent armed attack, cannot serve as a lawful justification for the use of force. Such actions not only contravene the prohibition on the use of force and the principle of state sovereignty but may also constitute a breach of peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens) and amount to an act of aggression. Furthermore, acceptance of such a precedent poses serious challenges to the maintenance of international peace and security and risks undermining the credibility of the global legal order. Drawing on authoritative sources, international instruments, and comparative legal analysis, the article concludes that Israel’s invocation of preemptive self-defense is legally unfounded and incompatible with contemporary international law.