درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

There is an urgent need for methods by which people and communities of faith peacebuilding and human rights development. This paper argues for a holistic understanding of peacebuilding that includes security of life, a guarantee of subsistence, and the pursuit of other fundamental human rights. This need is especially acute in countries of rising instability or post-conflict rebuilding. More and more countries face a downward spiral of instability even though many leaders and bodies seek to reverse this trend. Sadly, even among those countries that emerge from conflict, one-half revert to conflict within five years. Hence the question this paper addresses is, “How shall people and communities of religious conviction be effectively engaged in a peacebuilding and human rights process?” <br />This people factor is too little understood, even though the role of citizens in transitional states has long been acknowledged as essential for just and sustainable change. For peace accords and international conventions, in and of themselves, do not make peace or deliver human rights. Neither does the arrival of international peacekeepers nor the speeches of clerics and political leaders. While these developments are helpful stimuli, real human peace and security derives from community-based initiatives that create a “positive deviance” for peaceable, rights-oriented living vis-à-vis governments and other forces.  <br />Thus this paper will hypothesize a methodology whereby citizens engage religious institutions, governments (local and national), and international change agents to transform conflict into promising peace and rights. It will identify common peacebuilding principles operating across sectors of human development, security, and rights-oriented work. These sectors may include at least the following: health, conservation, education, security, labor, spirituality, and corporate social responsibility. <br />This paper also seeks to hone a typology of human rights and peacebuilding challenges facing countries of instability and post-conflict rebuilding. Categories may include at least the following: stages and types of conflict, fragile and failed states, overlooked populations, ethnic and racial discrimination, transnational politics and justice, natural resource and wealth distribution, and social capital.

The first mistaken conception is this. Some Muslim theorists argue that only God can proclaim what justice, right, and rights are; hence parliaments and other state institutions lack the sovereignty to create laws and to proclaim rights. They presume that Western states in their legislation and the UN in their Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 claim such sovereignty. Many Western theorists share their view, differing only in the evaluation. But human rights imply that states must follow them and lack the sovereignty for legislation incompatible with them. The German constitution is explicit on this lack of human sovereignty. It declares in Art.1: “The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary as directly applicable law.” Hence, the idea of human rights implies that human rights and basic principles of legislation are valid not because states have declared them but because of their inherent qualities. It also implies that states are legitimate only if they conform to such basic principles and excludes the idea that the principles are legitimate because states or mankind have accepted them. Therefore, Western and Islam conceptions of law and sovereignty are less different than they seem. Second, it is generally accepted in Islam and the West that there is a right and even the duty of every human being to fight for justice and the protection of human rights. But there are two conceptions of such a fight both in Islam and the West. The model of the fight for human rights in the centralist conception is a bureaucracy that imposes its rules on the cases it administers. The model in the autonomous conception is a scientific community that solves its differences by principles developed in the community itself.

The legitimacy debate between ‘universal’ human rights and its apparent conflict with the Islamic value system (broadly characterized as the ‘relativist’ challenge to ‘universal’ human rights) is still far from settled. My paper will reflect on this debate in terms of the current international treaty law. <br />The paper will consider this conflict in the light of the interaction of Islamic states with multilateral human rights regimes, starting from United Nations Charter, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the two covenants (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) and the stream of other international and regional human rights regimes. It will analyze through the ‘reservations’ clause of human rights regimes, the interaction between ‘universal’ human rights and Islamic law. <br />In particular, it will focus on how Islamic states have put forward what has come to be known as the “Islamic reservations”, and it will attempt to outline to what extent these reservations are contradictory to universal human rights, as noted in the objections to these reservations by various states parties to the treaties. An assessment will also be made of the extent to which the human rights to which the ‘Islamic reservations’ have been made, may actually be incorporated into the legal systems of the reserving Islamic countries. <br /><strong> </strong>

Contemporary Europe is undoubtedly a largely secular region where the notion that secularism and ‘progress’ are intertwined has long held sway. Religion in the public sphere is, for many Europeans, associated with emergent or conservative societies, whereas secularism is equated with modernism and seen as an indispensable component of modern governance. Recently, both domestic and European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case-law has highlighted the obvious tensions that arise in the manifestation of religion in the European public sphere. While Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights affords everyone the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (while allowing for certain limitations as imposed by domestic authorities), in matters related to religion, ECtHR has adopted a deferential attitude towards domestic authorities in the determination of the parameters of this right. This is reflected in the fact that it was not until 1993, some thirty-five years after the Court commenced operating, that a violation of Article 9 of the Convention was found. The Court’s jurisprudence on the Article is therefore somewhat troubling and nowhere is this more aptly illustrated than in the jurisprudence relating to the wearing of the Islamic headscarf. Recent case-law in fact suggests that in that the wearing of the headscarf is viewed both as being incompatible with the principle of gender equality and in direct opposition to the principle of secularism. Through the lens of recent Article 9 jurisprudence, this paper will assess the trends emerging in the European Court’s consideration of Islam. Discussion of relevant cases will include Dahlab v. Switzerland, Karaduman v. Turkey, Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey as well as analysis of cases occurring at the domestic level, most notably the Teacher Headscarf Case of the German Constitutional Court and the English decision of R (on the application of Begum (by her litigation friend, Rahman)) v. Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School. This paper also seeks to challenge the ECtHR reasoning in the area of expression of religion (and particularly where that religion is Islam) by analysing the question of religion in the public sphere in the broader European context. There is in fact increasing evidence to suggest that Europe is undergoing a period of de-secularisation, a reality routinely ignored by the European Court of Human Rights.