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This paper analyses social cognition by considering the analytic philosophy of mind, neurophenomenology and social neuroscience. Many social neuroscientists rely unconsciously on different philosophical answers to the question "how do we understand each other?". Consequently, we will compare the principal philosophical and experimental approaches to social cognition that have been proposed so far and join them in an integrationist account by taking into consideration the direct embeddedness of social interactors. First, the "theory theory" (T.T.) affirms that mindreading consists in inferring the other's mental state by observing his behaviour from a third-person perspective. A neural network called the "mentalizing system" (M.E.N.S.) underlies mindreading activities.Second, the Simulation Theory (S.T.) assumes that social cognition involves simulating the mental states of the other. The neural substrate for the simulatory activities is the "mirror neurons system" (i.e., M.N.S.). Both TT and S.T. are fastened to the "observer paradigm" since the experimental set-ups involve detecting the brain's activity of a participant observing or simulating someone else's movement, and intersubjective dynamics are not at play. Finally, the 2nd person approach invites to consider the other as the one who is directly intervening on our perception and is responsible for the meaning we assign to his mental states (cf. Schillbach et al., 2013). Consequently, Schilbach et al. (2013) have established an experimental setting that is "minimalist and naturalistic" because it focuses on basic kinds of embedded interactions such as mutual gaze. This paper argues that the philosophical theories underlying those approaches do not conflict with each other, but they highlight different moments of social interaction in real life. Indeed, their neural substrates partially overlap. Hence, we want to establish in which order these three moments of social interaction occur. We hold that a realistic phenomenology must consider second-person interactions as the beginning of a realistic phenomenology.

Considering the fact that the words in the intra-religious attitude are considered in two ways, the first is towards jurisprudential words and the second is a rational and conceptual view focusing on their meanings. we have tried to deal with one of the most important issues of intra-religious attitude with a rational approach by descriptive and analytical method, which is the category of "hermeneutic interpretation" of words, especially the most influential idea of interpretation & that is the view of the "spirit of meaning" of Ghazali. After Ghazali, Ibn Arabi used this theory of Ghazali regarding the development of meaning in creating his new idea, and by re-reading Ghazali's idea with a mystical approach, he presented his own theory regarding the expansion of meaning. While accepting the argument of the focal point of the theory of the spirit of meaning, he removes it from the exclusivity to the "linear", and for this purpose, he brought up arguments as well as the Conditions of Hermeneutic Interpretation in this regard. Ibn Arabi's arguments on transversal interpretation include new formulations in the argument, which after him, this theory was favored and accepted by Mulla Sadra, and then it was accepted by his students.

This paper examines the work of Immanuel Kant in the light of a new theory on the nature of truth, knowledge and falsehood (the Inversion Theory of Truth). Kant’s idea that knowledge could be absolutely certain, and that its truth must correspond with reality, is discredited by a dissection of the Correspondence Theory of Truth. This examination of the nature of truth, as well as knowledge and falsehood, is conducted with reference to Sir Karl Popper’s writings on regulative ideas, the criterion of demarcation and the principle of falsifiability. It is argued that if truth is to be regarded as certain, it should be used to describe objects and events in the objective (noumenal) state, and that subjective knowledge must contain (and is improved by) falsehood. Perceptions and knowledge are obtained by the biological and evolutionary process of Active Subjectivism. Ideas we have knowledge of can be metaphysical or scientific, according to Popper’s Criterion of Demarcation. Kant’s “Copernican revolution” claim that our intellect imposes absolutely true laws on nature could not allow for the possibility that ideas might be constructed from fallible perceptions, and hence that all knowledge is uncertain. Instead, he developed a Critique of Practical Reason in which religion, though not provable through logical reasoning, could be proved by our innate moral sense, giving us a Categorical Imperative that could lead to perverse results. By rejecting the absolute certainty of a priori knowledge, and admitting a degree of essential falsehood, we arrive at a more reasonable grounding for moral behavior.

Regarding the way of facing the West and modernity, Ahmed Fardid is among the thinkers who, by adopting a philosophical and judgmental approach, rejects modernity, philosophy, and western civilization in its entirety. Fardid considers modernity and the West to have an inherent crisis and considers any attempt to patch up modernity with Eastern religions or cultures futile. Fardid, who is the creator of the word “ Gharbzadegi (Westoxification)”, considers human sciences and Western civilization to be nothing more than the inciting soul vanities and blasphemy. By adopting an essentialist and negative approach towards the modern world, he calls for a complete break from the subjectivism and humanism associated with the modern world and a return to Islamic-oriented philosophy (Hekmat-e Onsi). Seyyed Hossein Nasr, as a traditionalist thinker, rejects Western civilization and modernity as a unified whole. He wants to incorporate modern science and reason and take perennial philosophy. In this paper, via a comparative analysis method, this hypothesis is examined that although Fardid and Nasr are sympathizers in the complete negation and rejection of the modern world, Fardid confronts modernity and its consequent subjectivism using Heidegger’s western thought. This is when Nasr confronts modernity from the perspective of a traditionalist thinker who believes in the foundations of tradition. Nasr considers the return to the perennial philosophy to solve confronting the Western world and modernity, but Fardid faced with the modern world, emphasizes that although modernity is the exposure of self-fulfillment, one must strive to overcome it. It is difficult to return to the past.

Notwithstanding Karl Popper’s deep admiration for ancient Greece and his affection for modern Greece, his work has been mostly viewed with caution by Greek scholars who, until relatively recently, often chose to either ignore or downplay it. This stance can be partially attributed to the novel approach of Popper’s critique to Plato which did not fare well with the foundational biases of modern Greek academic tradition and the prevailing intellectual inclinations of Greek scholars in the fields of the methodology of science and political theory. Although this bias has begun to recede during the last decades, there remains a lot to be done to fully integrate Popper’s work into the Greek intellectual and social discourse. Nevertheless, the establishment of the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at Athens University, along with the efforts of academics and public intellectuals, particularly during the Greek financial crisis of the last decade, have played a pivotal role in generating a broader interest in critical rationalism and popularizing Popper’s ideas among a wider audience. This paper examines the evolution of the reception of Popper’s ideas in Greece, both in scholarly circles and in public life, from the time of publication of his seminal work “The Open Society and its Enemies” until today, highlighting the efforts to foster a more comprehensive understanding of his important contributions

The paper offers a distinctive reading of Popper’s work, suggesting that his Logic of Scientific Discovery (LScD) might be re-interpreted in the light of his Open Society. Indeed, Popper can be interpreted as criticising certain aspects of his first book, and as a result improving upon them, in his second. It suggests translating what Popper says about ‘conventions’ into his later vocabulary of ‘social institutions’. Looking back, I believe that Popper never intended the language of conventions and decisions to be read individualistically. I remain unsure whether Popper was himself quite as clear about this as he could have been.  My reading makes Popper a pioneer in the sociology of science. Scientific institutions are arenas of political power; but Popper did not discuss the structure and inter-relations of the social institutions of science, or offer a politics of science in the context of his methodology. What is missing from the skeletal sociology of LScD is the politics. We could put it in Popperian terms this way: scientific institutions are both open and closed. They are closed, firmly, to the inexpert, to the non-members; supposedly they are open to the qualified, provided the prerogatives of seniority and leadership are acknowledged. Despite these shortcomings, Popper’s critical and rational approach and his insistence on openness and intellectual honesty are still important today.