عیسی موسی زاده

Freedom, in Kant’s view, is a general concept that encompasses his three Critiques and many of his writings. He introduces freedom as the foundation of ethics and considers it a fundamental characteristic of the subject. In contrast, Mulla Sadra, while accepting the general necessity of causality, clearly explains free will within the scope of causality and as a positive (affirmative) matter, by citing the philosophical foundations of his Transcendent Wisdom. Despite believing in the unity of the identity of the soul and the body—considering them to be of one existence—Mulla Sadra considers the soul to be the true agent of moral behavior among the various causes and influential factors surrounding it, and describes the soul’s mode of agency regarding moral behaviors as a monophonic and radiative (emanationist) agency. From the perspective of Kant’s dual-aspect view, freedom exists in two senses: negative and positive. Of these two, Kant chooses the latter and makes it the basis of his thought. Although Mulla Sadra has a single-aspect anthropological foundation and Kant has a dual-aspect one, they share similarities in the analysis and explanation of free will. The present article has been compiled with the aim of describing and analyzing freedom in the thought of Kant and Mulla Sadra, pointing to some fundamental similarities and differences between these two prominent thinkers, using an analytical method. From the philosophical analysis of freedom in both perspectives, it was concluded that in Kant’s strategy, firstly, freedom is related to the noumenal (trans-phenomenal) realm and not the phenomenal and external realm; in the phenomenal, causal necessity reigns, but the noumenal realm is governed by the rules of pure reason. Secondly, freedom is the independence of the will from being determined by the laws of nature, and it also consists of its determination by unchanging laws of a special kind, the origin of which is within pure reason. Mulla Sadra agrees with Kant on the point that the soul’s agency is independent of the laws of nature for the issuance of moral behavior, as he considers the soul to be the true agent. However, unlike Kant, he does not remove the soul’s sphere of agency from the orbit of the laws of causality.

The connection between the soul and the body has always been acknowledged by philosophers, as seeing, hearing, remembering, recalling, thinking, experiencing joy and sadness, and enjoying, while being psychological phenomena, are deeply influenced by the body. Without the nervous, glandular, and muscular effects, these psychological events cannot occur. Similarly, psychological states have a significant impact on the body and human organism, a point often highlighted by psychologists and philosophers. This study, using a descriptive-analytical and comparative method, aims to examine Plato's and Mullā Ṣadrā's views on the soul and its relationship with the body. Based on the findings, Plato makes a distinction between the soul and the body, but believes in their reciprocal influence on one another. He identifies the soul with the essence of humanity and views the body as a foreign entity after death. Mullā Ṣadrā, however, sees the relationship between the soul and the body as a union, where each represents a stage in the existence of a single reality called "human." He believes that the soul and the body mutually affect each other, and in its initial emergence, the soul is corporeal, later reaching the state of abstraction through substantial motion. The soul's attachment to the body is intrinsic, and the soul remains a soul only while connected to the body. Overall, this study shows that although Mullā Ṣadrā has been influenced by Plato in some aspects, he also presents his unique perspectives in this area.

Descartes never explicitly discusses linguistics. We owe the very notion of "Descartes' linguistics" to the investigations of Noam Chomsky, an American philosopher of language. Chomsky infers from Descartes' direct and indirect references to language that, from Descartes' perspective, language is, firstly, innate, secondly, originates from the individual rather than society, and thirdly, is a creative, not mechanical, act. This paper, employing a descriptive-analytical method and framed as a critique, aims to clarify and analyze a specific facet of Cartesian thought. It concludes that language, as Descartes could have described it, is subjectivist, and this approach presupposes the possibility of a private language. In essence, the individual and subjective nature of language necessitates accepting a private language. However, a private language has self-destructive implications, providing grounds for serious critiques of Descartes' linguistic view (as extracted by Chomsky).

The concept of human perfection is a universal concern that has occupied thinkers from various schools of thought, including Mulla Sadra. This study employs a descriptive-analytical and library-based methodology to examine Mulla Sadra's perspective on the perfect human being. The analysis reveals that humans are inherently driven towards perfection, and Mulla Sadra's philosophy emphasizes instructing how individuals can progress toward this ultimate state. From Mulla Sadra's perspective, human being   is the pinnacle of existence, possessing inherent dignity. However, to realize this, humans must embark on a path of perfection. This perfection lies in the development of their rational faculty, which sets them apart from other beings. Human intellect has two aspects: theoretical and practical. The complete development of both these facets is essential for human perfection.

Moral virtue is a concept that has its roots in ancient Greek philosophy and refers to characteristics or habits considered good and ethical behaviors. Greek philosophers like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle extensively discussed moral virtue. Aristotle defines virtue as a "golden mean" between two vices; for example, courage is the middle ground between recklessness and cowardice. Plato considers the soul to be composed of three parts: rational, spirited(or irascible), and appetitive. He believes that only the rational part is simple and immortal, while the other two parts are added when the soul attaches to the body, making them material and perishable. Mulla Sadra, on the other hand, views the soul as possessing faculties, which are the soul's degrees and stations. Due to its inherent simplicity, the soul encompasses all of these faculties. Both Plato and Mulla Sadra consider the principal virtues of the soul to be the four cardinal virtues: wisdom, courage, temperance (self-control), and justice. This article employs a descriptive-comparative method to examine and contrast the viewpoints of Plato and Mulla Sadra regarding virtue and moral dispositions, and their role in human happiness. It demonstrates that both philosophers, firstly, view the soul as having parts or faculties and enumerate wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice as the soul's main virtues. Secondly, it shows that Mulla Sadra's ideas concerning the soul and ethics are influenced by Plato's views.

The contemporary world observes an increasing leaning from the thinkers in various intellectual and cultural spheres towards an approach to reality, interpreting reality as something in relationship to human beings and his goals and purposes, not independent of them. Richard Rorty is among the adherents of such a thought. The present article uses an analytical-critical method to show how Rorty has defended this view and to evaluate his view. According to the present study, it is clarified that Rorty adduces the features he considers for language to negate the possibility of accessing pure and naked reality; thus, he considers the available reality as made by ourselves in cooperation with others, which has a quite lingual structure. In my view, however, despite the fact that believing in lingual structure of reality places us in a better situation for defending concepts such as activity, freedom, self-consciousness, ownership, thinking and genuine life, Rorty’s emphasis on solidarity, instead of objectivity and truth, entails a dominion of culture over the rational sciences. Consequently, we observe a leaning towards the principality of ‘will’ (including both individual and social) according to which, philosophy turns into something a posteriori and relied on will.