Theosophia Islamica

This study seeks to elucidate the ontological foundations of ethics in the Qur’an through a re‑reading of the central concept of Ḥaqq in light of the Theory of Existential Fittingness. Formulated in response to the challenge of grounding moral value while avoiding reductionist approaches, this theory conceives value as an objective reality arising from a fitting existential relationship among beings—one in which each being occupies its proper place. In this perspective, ethics may be understood as the extension of the wise order of being into the sphere of human voluntary action. The central question of the article is whether the Qur’anic concept of Ḥaqq can be understood as expressing this existential worthiness and as articulating the principle that regulates the relations constitutive of the world. Adopting a descriptive–analytical method, the study employs the Theory of Existential Fittingness not as an a priori interpretive presupposition but as a posteriori explanatory framework for understanding Qur’anic data. Following a semantic analysis of Ḥaqq, the article examines its Qur’anic usages across three horizons: creation, becoming (takwīn), and resurrection (qiyāmah). The findings indicate that in the Qur’anic logic Ḥaqq extends beyond mere propositional truth and denotes existential worthiness. In the horizon of creation, Ḥaqq signifies the principle of the wise establishment of the world and the negation of futility. In the horizon of becoming (takwīn), it functions as the criterion of endurance and perishing, such that Bāṭil represents an unfitting realization destined to vanish. In the horizon of resurrection, Ḥaqq is manifested in the weighing of deeds, where the value of each human action is measured according to the degree of existential fittingness it embodies. Ultimately, the study argues that this re‑reading presents the Qur’anic moral order not as a merely conventional construct but as the reflection of an ontological law rooted in the objective structure of reality. By bridging the is–ought gap, this approach provides a robust framework for resisting moral relativism within the Qur’anic paradigm.

Traditional paradigms of public administration often rely on rational-actor models, assuming that policy formulation is a purely objective, logical process. This paper challenges that assumption by examining governance through the lens of Cognitive Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Utilizing Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), this study argues that the foundational architecture of public policy is intrinsically metaphorical (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Metaphors are not mere rhetorical embellishments; rather, they constitute the cognitive infrastructure that dictates problem definition, constrains epistemological horizons, and limits the spectrum of viable policy solutions (Kövecses, 2010; Lakoff, 2004). By analyzing cross-cultural linguistic mappings, embodied cognition, and dominant policy frames, this paper explores how “Grand Metaphors” covertly structure macro-level political decision-making in domains such as environmental crisis management, macroeconomics, and international relations. Ultimately, the paper advocates for “metaphorical literacy” among policymakers, arguing that the deliberate reframing of governance paradigms—shifting from militaristic and control-based metaphors to ecological and systemic ones—is an essential prerequisite for sustainable public administration.

The concept of "freedom" is one of the most fundamental issues in various philosophical traditions; however, its perception differs fundamentally in modern Western philosophy and Islamic wisdom. In modern philosophy, freedom is primarily understood in relation to the subject, will, and the right to choose, whereas in Mulla Sadra's Transcendent Wisdom as well as in Martin Heidegger's ontological thought, freedom has an ontological status rather than being a psychological or political matter. Relying on the principles of "primacy of existence", "gradation of existence" , and "substantial motion" , Mulla Sadra interprets freedom as the process of human existential transcendence and his gradual liberation from the lower levels of being; a process that ultimately leads to abstraction, intensity of existence, and divine proximity. In contrast, Heidegger understands freedom not as voluntary agency, but as a mode of Dasein’s openness to the truth of Being; an openness that liberates man from falling into everydayness and the reification of beings. The present study, using an analytical-comparative method, seeks to re-read the relationship between the "primacy of existence" in Sadrian wisdom and "authentic freedom" in Heideggerian philosophy, and to demonstrate that despite fundamental metaphysical and theological differences, both thinkers interpret freedom in connection with the human mode of relation to the truth of Being. The innovation of this article lies in analyzing freedom as an ontological structure in two different philosophical traditions and demonstrating the capacity for dialogue between Islamic wisdom and contemporary Western philosophy. Keywords Existential Freedom, Mulla Sadra, Heidegger, Primacy of Existence, Ontology, Substantial Motion, Openness to Being.  

Freedom, in Kant’s view, is a general concept that encompasses his three Critiques and many of his writings. He introduces freedom as the foundation of ethics and considers it a fundamental characteristic of the subject. In contrast, Mulla Sadra, while accepting the general necessity of causality, clearly explains free will within the scope of causality and as a positive (affirmative) matter, by citing the philosophical foundations of his Transcendent Wisdom. Despite believing in the unity of the identity of the soul and the body—considering them to be of one existence—Mulla Sadra considers the soul to be the true agent of moral behavior among the various causes and influential factors surrounding it, and describes the soul’s mode of agency regarding moral behaviors as a monophonic and radiative (emanationist) agency. From the perspective of Kant’s dual-aspect view, freedom exists in two senses: negative and positive. Of these two, Kant chooses the latter and makes it the basis of his thought. Although Mulla Sadra has a single-aspect anthropological foundation and Kant has a dual-aspect one, they share similarities in the analysis and explanation of free will. The present article has been compiled with the aim of describing and analyzing freedom in the thought of Kant and Mulla Sadra, pointing to some fundamental similarities and differences between these two prominent thinkers, using an analytical method. From the philosophical analysis of freedom in both perspectives, it was concluded that in Kant’s strategy, firstly, freedom is related to the noumenal (trans-phenomenal) realm and not the phenomenal and external realm; in the phenomenal, causal necessity reigns, but the noumenal realm is governed by the rules of pure reason. Secondly, freedom is the independence of the will from being determined by the laws of nature, and it also consists of its determination by unchanging laws of a special kind, the origin of which is within pure reason. Mulla Sadra agrees with Kant on the point that the soul’s agency is independent of the laws of nature for the issuance of moral behavior, as he considers the soul to be the true agent. However, unlike Kant, he does not remove the soul’s sphere of agency from the orbit of the laws of causality.

Within the confessional approach to comparative theology, epistemic recourse to engagement with other religious traditions aims at attaining a deeper understanding of the home tradition while maintaining fidelity to the boundaries of its orthodoxy and orthopraxy. In this framework, the religious data of other traditions are consulted, examined, and brought into comparison with those of one’s own tradition. From the standpoint of Islamic orthodoxy, however, such engagement requires theoretical justification. This foundational epistemological concern constitutes the central problem addressed in the present study. The guiding question is therefore: within Islamic comparative theology, how can engagement with and benefit from the religious data of other traditions be justified? The study employs a descriptive‑analytical and comparative method. Its findings suggest that the legitimacy of such engagement may be inferred through the cumulative force and mutual corroboration of evidences derived from the Qurʾan, the hadith, and reason. Elements of truth present in other religious traditions may be understood as vestiges of humanity’s historical and prehistorical encounters with the Sacred Source, as well as products of human reason and fiṭrah (the primordial human disposition). Such elements are dispersed across diverse times and places, yet remain accessible to discerning theological inquiry. Furthermore, interreligious learning is not limited to drawing upon the object of comparison—that is, appropriating religious data from another tradition. The act of comparison itself also possesses intrinsic epistemic fecundity. Accordingly, this study concentrates on establishing the justificatory grounds for such engagement, while leaving the systematic articulation of the methodological and inferential frameworks required for interreligious learning to future research.

The problem of moral self-deception has always been one of the complex puzzles in the philosophy of mind and ethics due to its entanglement with epistemic paradoxes—a phenomenon that seemingly requires the simultaneous acceptance of two incompatible cognitive states, meaning that the agent believes in a proposition while possessing strong evidence to the contrary. Focusing on the cognitive-analytic approach, this article demonstrates that within this framework, the problem transcends mere explanation of neurobiological mechanisms and centers on evaluating the logical possibility of self-deception and the endeavor to escape static and dynamic paradoxes. In the first step, while distinguishing self-deception from similar phenomena such as wishful thinking, the current research emphasizes the central role of motivational components in the formation of beliefs contrary to evidence. In the main section, two prominent models of this approach—the Canfield-Gustafson linguistic model and the Jeffrey Foss epistemological model—are formulated and critiqued. Examinations show that the former, despite attempting to dissolve the paradox through the dissection of ordinary language, falls into reductionism and reduces the phenomenon merely to a belief contrary to evidence. Furthermore, by applying thought experiments such as the swimmers' scenario, it is argued that the evidence-based criterion of Foss also leads to unreasonable and counter-intuitive epistemic consequences. The final conclusion of the article indicates that the cognitive-analytic approach, despite its conceptual precision and logical sensitivity, faces inherent limitations in providing a comprehensive explanation of moral self-deception; because resolving the paradox solely at the cognitive level, while neglecting the normative and phenomenological layers of the agent’s moral experience, leads to overlooking the fundamental dimensions of self-deception.

This study, drawing on Aristotelian essentialism the view that every being possesses an essence with intrinsic properties argues that the development and actualization of the human being, as one being among others in the world, are grounded in his essential nature, namely rationality. This essential nature inclines human beings toward the pursuit of the good, which is recognized as the final cause (telos) of the actualization of their essence. Moreover, human choices are not detached from the beings of the world. Rather, the objects of moral good and evil are the very entities and essences that exist in reality. Moral judgments, therefore, concern these concrete and real beings; they shape human actualization and take part in the causal order of the world. Therefore, since the actualization of beings is inseparable from their essences, the creator of the essences of the world and the legislator of moral laws must be one and the same. In the course of this study, we arrive at the conclusion that every doctrine other than religious moral realism ultimately confronts some form of relativism. Even moral relativism, insofar as it claims to endorse realism, is incapable of providing a foundation for an absolute and objective higher good. Accordingly, through rational inquiry and on the basis of Aristotelian essentialism, the possibility of discovering reality for human beings is established, along with the justification of moral realism and, ultimately, the compatibility of moral realism with the foundations of theistic monotheism.

One of the critical topics in the field of theology is the relationship between religion and ethics. Under discussion of the relationship between religion and ethics, the relationship between the hereafter as an essential religious doctrine and ethics is considered one of the most important. If in religions, especially Abrahamic religions, theology is considered their point of difference, then ethics can be considered the common thread of all these religions. Of course, moral teachings in Islam and Christianity are more eminent than in other religions. What a Shia Muslim and a Catholic Christian have in common is, on the one hand, a set of moral teachings and, on the other hand, a belief in other teachings, including the hereafter. Just as there is a significant relationship between religion and morality, such a relationship can also be imagined between morality and the hereafter. When these two categories are placed together, they have a mutually influential relationship. The afterlife affects morality in several ways. The afterlife in Shia is indeed different from Christianity's in many ways. However, some things are shared between them, including the resurrection of the dead, judgment of actions, and reckoning. This leads us to commonalities in these two religions regarding the relationship between morality and the hereafter. Finally, what has been obtained from the research in this regard is that in both religions, the hereafter affects morality in three areas: giving meaning, giving motivation, and giving purpose. This article will investigate various aspects of this effect with an analytical and comparative method. Keywords  

The dilemma of the soul’s origination or pre‑eternity represents one of the most enduring problems in Islamic philosophy. Each side of this dilemma faces serious difficulties: proponents of the soul’s pre‑eternity struggle to explain its relation to the body, while advocates of origination confront the problem of the soul’s enduring subsistence after bodily death. In addressing this dilemma, Mullā Ṣadrā adopts a distinctive methodological approach. He first reconstructs and critically examines the views of earlier philosophers and theologians, distinguishing defensible insights from elements that generate theoretical difficulties within their own frameworks. He then reinterprets selected elements within a new metaphysical perspective grounded in the principles of the primacy of existence, gradation of existence, and substantial motion. Through this process, he formulates the theory of the soul’s “corporeal origination and spiritual subsistence.” This study argues that Ṣadrā’s procedure reflects a form of methodological pluralism without eclecticism and shows notable affinity with the integrative model of interdisciplinary inquiry. Using a conceptual‑analytical approach, the article offers a systematic reconstruction and critical evaluation of this methodological framework in Ṣadrā’s treatment of the problem of the soul.

Among conventional approaches to abortion, the conflict between the fetus's right to life and the woman's right to control her body is central to many ethical debates. In contrast, a novel approach in the ethics of pregnancy reexamines this issue through moral intimacy and interpersonal relationships. Margaret Olivia Little, in her influential article "Abortion, Intimacy, and the Duty of Pregnancy" (1999), offers a distinctive framework that moves beyond rights-based and utilitarian perspectives. She argues that pregnancy is not merely a biological process but a deep personal relationship. Therefore, moral duties toward the fetus cannot be understood independently of the pregnant woman's attitudes and assessment of that relationship. Little redefines abortion as a question of moral intimacy and the woman's evaluative authority. However, her theory faces serious criticisms: conditioning moral duty on individual assessment invites relativism; focusing on intimacy overlooks the role of causal responsibility in shaping moral duties; and it neglects the moral weight that secular and religious traditions assign to fetal life. This article acknowledges the value of Little's relationship-centered approach as an important corrective to overly abstract theories but aims to show that her perspective does not provide sufficient grounds for explaining the moral duties associated with pregnancy.

The concept of "major sin" stands as a central and structuring principle within the moral framework of the Abrahamic religions. Owing to its profound consequences in the existential domains of the human being—both individual and social—and in the Hereafter, it has always been at the heart of theological and ethical inquiry. Adopting an analytical-comparative approach, this article investigates the structure and nature of major sins within the two traditions of Islam and Christianity. While examining the criteria for distinguishing "major sins" (kabāʾir) from "minor sins" (ṣaghāʾir) in Islam and the distinction between "mortal" and "venial" sins in Christianity, this study demonstrates that despite foundational differences in the theological underpinnings and epistemic criteria governing each tradition, a striking and meaningful convergence is observable in their ultimate aims: moral cultivation, the preservation of human dignity, and the call to repentance and spiritual rectification. Ultimately, by elucidating the formative and spiritual implications of this doctrine, the article underscores its potential to foster a horizon for inter-religious dialogue in the field of ethics.

Water, a critical resource for human survival, holds profound theological significance in Islam and Christianity, symbolizing purification, divine grace, and communal responsibility. This comparative study examines the teachings of the Qur’an, Hadith (including Shiite traditions), and the Bible on water, analyzing their implications for conservation and sustainable management across theological, historical,and contemporary dimensions. Through textual analysis, historical review, and case studies from water-scarce regions like the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, the study highlights shared values of stewardship and equity, alongside divergent legal and sacramental approaches. Drawing on peer-reviewed literature and Shiite sources, it explores how these faiths inform modern water conservation strategies, addressing global scarcity challenges. The findings emphasize the potential of faith-based frameworks to complement Sustainable Development Goal, offering actionable insights for policymakers, religious leaders, and communities.