

**Ḥaqq in the Qur'an as a Fitting Existential Position: An Ontological
Introduction to Re-reading the Qur'anic Moral Order on the
Basis of the Theory of Existential Fittingness***



Mohammad Ali Mobini 

Associate Professor, Department of Ethics, Research Center for Islamic Philosophy and Theology,
Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy, Qom, Iran.
ma.mobini@isca.ac.ir

Abstract

This study seeks to elucidate the ontological foundations of ethics in the Qur'an through a re-reading of the central concept of Ḥaqq in light of the Theory of Existential Fittingness. Formulated in response to the challenge of grounding moral value while avoiding reductionist approaches, this theory conceives value as an objective reality arising from a fitting existential relationship among beings—one in which each being occupies its proper place. In this perspective, ethics may be understood as the extension of the wise order of being into the sphere of human voluntary action. The central question of the article is whether the Qur'anic concept of Ḥaqq can be understood as expressing this existential worthiness and as articulating the principle that regulates the

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relations constitutive of the world. Adopting a descriptive–analytical method, the study employs the Theory of Existential Fittingness not as an a priori interpretive presupposition but as a posteriori explanatory framework for understanding Qur’anic data. Following a semantic analysis of Ḥaqq, the article examines its Qur’anic usages across three horizons: creation, becoming (takwīn), and resurrection (qiyāmah). The findings indicate that in the Qur’anic logic Ḥaqq extends beyond mere propositional truth and denotes existential worthiness. In the horizon of creation, Ḥaqq signifies the principle of the wise establishment of the world and the negation of futility. In the horizon of becoming (takwīn), it functions as the criterion of endurance and perishing, such that Bāṭil represents an unfitting realization destined to vanish. In the horizon of resurrection, Ḥaqq is manifested in the weighing of deeds, where the value of each human action is measured according to the degree of existential fittingness it embodies. Ultimately, the study argues that this re-reading presents the Qur’anic moral order not as a merely conventional construct but as the reflection of an ontological law rooted in the objective structure of reality. By bridging the is–ought gap, this approach provides a robust framework for resisting moral relativism within the Qur’anic paradigm.

Keywords

Qur’an, Ḥaqq, Theory of Existential Fittingness, ethical theory, ontological foundations of ethics, Qur’anic moral order.

1. Introduction

One of the most fundamental and at the same time most contested questions in moral philosophy concerns the grounding of moral value: why certain actions, independently of beneficial consequences or personal desirability, possess moral value and deserve praise or blame. The difficulty of this question lies in the fact that moral value is regarded, on the one hand, as something objective and discoverable, and on the other hand, as inseparably connected to the sphere of human motivation, inclination, and practical commitment. Theorizing in this field has continually oscillated between reducing moral value to such notions as pleasure, utility, or desirability, and defending its independence and reality.

In response to this challenge, the author has formulated the Theory of Existential Fittingness as an ontological theory of moral value through a series of independent studies and a gradual process that ultimately received endorsement in scholarly theory-development forums. Avoiding reductionist approaches, the theory emphasizes the independence and irreducibility of moral value and understands ethics not as something merely conventional or instrumental, but as the extension of the objective and aesthetic order of being into the sphere of human voluntary action. According to this theory, the source of value and beauty, whether in the order of *takwīn* or in the domain of human acts, is the fitting existential relation among beings—a relation in which each being occupies its proper existential position and its due is rendered.

On this basis, a moral act is one that, through the agent's free choice, contributes to the establishment or strengthening of existential fittingness among oneself, others, the world, and ultimately God; an immoral act, by contrast, is a form of disproportion, excess, or deficiency within this same existential network. Within this framework,

moral value is neither reduced to the pleasurable or beneficial consequences of an act nor confined to mere conformity with external rules; rather, it is rooted in the existential worthiness of an act to be situated within the overall order of being. For this reason, the Theory of Existential Fittingness is not a semantic or psychological theory, but an ontological framework for explaining the reality of moral value.

It should be noted that, since discussion of the Theory of Existential Fittingness has already been presented in a number of previous studies (e.g., Mobini 2013; 2020; 2022a; 2022b; 2023; 2024; in press), the present study, in order to avoid unnecessary repetition and preserve the coherence of the text, refrains from devoting a lengthy and separate section to its theoretical foundations and confines itself to a brief indication. Nevertheless, because the approach adopted in this article is applicative and analytical, the central dimensions and key components of the theory will become clear in practice through the ontological analysis of the concept of Ḥaqq throughout the text, so that the reader, in the very process of analyzing the verses, may grasp the internal logic and function of the theory in an organic way.

One of the central concepts in this theory is the concept of Ḥaqq. In this conceptual framework, Ḥaqq does not merely mean a true proposition, a valid claim, or a normative judgment; rather, it signifies the existential worthiness of a thing for endurance, stability, and the fulfillment of its role within the overall order of being. A thing is Ḥaqq when it occupies its fitting existential position and is compatible with the total order of creation; that which is Bāṭil, even if it has objective and phenomenal realization, lacks this worthiness and is, from an ontological point of view, destined to perish.

The present article seeks to examine the possibility of a Qur'anic articulation of this understanding of Ḥaqq. Its aim is neither

to impose the Theory of Existential Fittingness upon the Qur'anic text nor to offer an ideological reading of the verses; rather, it seeks to assess whether the internal logic of the concept of Ḥaqq in the Qur'an itself possesses an ontological structure that can, at the level of a posteriori explanation, converge with the Theory of Existential Fittingness. The central research question is therefore this: can the Qur'anic concept of Ḥaqq be understood as expressing existential worthiness and a fitting position within the order of being? And accordingly, how does Ḥaqq move beyond the level of a merely descriptive or normative concept and rise to the level of an ontological mechanism?

Accordingly, the article begins not with theory, but with the Qur'anic text. The method of the study is qualitative and analytical and is organized in three steps. First, the semantics of the term Ḥaqq in classical lexical and exegetical sources and in contemporary studies is examined in order to extract its semantic components and ontological import. Second, the Qur'anic usages of Ḥaqq are analyzed across the three horizons of creation, takwīn, and qiyāmah in order to show how Ḥaqq functions as a description of divine creation, the criterion of endurance and the negation of Bāṭil, and the measure for evaluating deeds and destinies. Finally, by means of a convergent arrangement of these findings, the unified logic governing the concept of Ḥaqq is reconstructed, and only at this stage is the Theory of Existential Fittingness introduced, as an explanatory framework, to interpret the coherence, stability, and teleological orientation of this logic.

The working hypothesis of this article is that, within the logic of the Qur'an, Ḥaqq refers to existential worthiness: whatever stands in fitting relation to the overall structure of reality and the wise divine order is Ḥaqq and partakes of stability and endurance, whereas

whatever loses this fittingness, even if it attains phenomenal realization, is Bāṭil and destined to perish. On this basis, Qur’anic ethics is grounded in discovering, preserving, and committing oneself to this existential fittingness, and the present study seeks to bring this ontological foundation to light through an analysis of the concept of Ḥaqq. This study will show that rereading the concept of Ḥaqq on the basis of the Theory of Existential Fittingness is not merely a lexical discussion; rather, it can help unravel major problems in moral philosophy within the Qur’anic paradigm—such as the relation between is and ought and release from relativism—and show that, in this intellectual system, ethics is the extension of takwīn.

2. Semantics of Ḥaqq

Both lexical sources and recent scholarship have discussed the meaning of Ḥaqq in detail. What follows is a synthetic summary of these sources.

Under the root ḥ-q-q, Ibn Fāris explicitly states that this word has a single root that denotes “the firmness and correctness of a thing”: “a single root, and it indicates the firmness of a thing and its correctness” (aṣlun wāḥid, wa-huwa yadullu ‘alā iḥkām al-shay’ wa-ṣiḥḥatih). He regards Ḥaqq as the opposite of Bāṭil and takes ḥaqqā al-shay’ to mean “it became necessary” (wajaba) (Ibn Fāris, 1984, vol. 2, p. 15). Ibn Manẓūr likewise defines Ḥaqq as the “opposite of Bāṭil” and as signifying “stability” and “necessity” (Ibn Manẓūr, 1994, vol. 10, p. 49). Other lexical works have also mentioned the meaning of necessity for Ḥaqq (Farāhīdī, 1989, vol. 3, p. 6; Fayyūmī, 1994, vol. 1, p. 144). On this basis, when we say that something is Ḥaqq, we mean that it is something that ought to be, and that its existence is firm and sound.

Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī takes the root meaning of Ḥaqq to be correspondence and conformity, and gives the example of the hinge-

pin of a door fitting into its proper socket so that it may rotate upright: “The root of al-Ḥaqq is correspondence and conformity, like the fitting of the door’s hinge-pin into its socket so that it may rotate upright” (aṣl al-ḥaqq: al-muṭābaqah wa-l-muwāfaqah, ka-muṭābaqat rijl al-bāb fī ḥaqqih li-dawarānih ‘alā istiḳāmah). On this basis, he calls belief in something Ḥaqq when it corresponds to the reality of that thing. Likewise, with respect to an act and the one who brings it about, he maintains that when an act is produced in accordance with wisdom, both the act and its producer may be called Ḥaqq. From another perspective, he holds that every act or statement that is issued in the proper measure, at the proper time, and in the proper manner is called an act or statement of Ḥaqq (Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, 1992, p. 246).

‘Allāmah Muṣṭafawī, by synthesizing the lexical roots, likewise identifies the single underlying meaning of this root as stability accompanied by correspondence to reality. He takes the use of Ḥaqq in some Qur’anic verses to stand in opposition to Bāṭil and misguidance. Bāṭil is that which has no stability, while misguidance is that which has departed from its proper course and deviated from it (Muṣṭafawī, 2009, vol. 2, pp. 306–307).

In al-Mīzān, in his commentary on Q 13:17, ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī regards the two opposing attributes of Ḥaqq and Bāṭil as originally pertaining to belief, and then, by extension, as being applied to things other than belief. According to him, the Bāṭil-ness of a thing means that one assumes for it a kind of existence and reality, while this assumption does not correspond to what exists externally. By contrast, Ḥaqq is that whose assumption corresponds to external reality. Thus, the statement that the sky is above us is Ḥaqq, because it corresponds to what exists externally. Likewise, an act is Ḥaqq if it is suitable for realizing the result intended for it and actually brings that result about; and it is Bāṭil if it is not suitable for realizing the intended result and

does not bring it about. Similarly, a thing that exists externally is called Ḥaqq because it exists just as we believe it to exist. By contrast, something that does not exist, although we believe in its existence, is Bāṭil. Likewise, if a being, such as the human being, exists externally, but we ascribe to it attributes such as essential independence and permanence that it does not in fact possess, this assumption too is an instance of Bāṭil, because it does not correspond to the existential reality of that being (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 1973, vol. 11, p. 335).

Other meanings have also been mentioned for Ḥaqq. For example, Ibn Manẓūr points to the association of Ḥaqq with “share” and “portion,” and takes the meaning of Ḥaqq in the expression “to give someone his right” to refer to the share and portion that is necessary and obligatory for that person and must be given to him (Ibn Manẓūr, 1994, vol. 10, p. 51).

As is evident, lexicographers and exegetes have generally tried, by moving beyond the multiplicity of usages, to treat Ḥaqq as having a common underlying meaning and to trace it back to a single principle. Some have taken this single principle to be “firmness and correctness,” while others have identified “correspondence to reality” as its fundamental root. Nevertheless, some researchers maintain that the breadth of the usage of Ḥaqq in cases such as property or bribery makes it difficult to accept a common underlying meaning in all instances (Nabavian, 2010, p. 176). Some contemporary studies have spoken of the semantic components of Ḥaqq and have undertaken a componential analysis of the concept (Seyed Khorasani & Fathi, 2019, p. 117). According to this analysis, stability, firmness, and correspondence to reality are among the most important semantic components of Ḥaqq, and Ḥaqq has been defined as “a stable thing corresponding to reality” (Fathi, Qasempour, & Seyed Khorasani, 2019, p. 178).

In lexical analyses, in addition to expressions such as firm,

correct, existent, stable, corresponding to reality, and corresponding to wisdom, terms such as “necessary” and “ought-to-be” have also been used, and these seem to point to an important semantic component in Ḥaqq. Examination of its usages shows that Ḥaqq always carries a positive evaluative and normative force and refers to something whose existence is “necessary,” “worthy,” or at least “permissible.” For example, applying the name Ḥaqq to God, exalted be He, points to the necessity of His existence; and describing concepts such as justice, self-sacrifice, or beneficence as matters of Ḥaqq expresses their worthiness and deservingness. Even in the epistemological domain, there is a subtle difference between ṣidq and Ḥaqq: whereas ṣidq merely refers to the correspondence of a proposition to reality, Ḥaqq, in addition to indicating reality, also points to the aspect of justification and the worthiness of belief. When it is said that a belief is Ḥaqq, this means that, because it corresponds to reality, it is worthy of being preserved and accepted. Likewise, in legal contexts, such as “the right of divorce” or “the right of retaliation,” although there may not necessarily be a semantic burden of moral virtue, there is still an implicit normative judgment concerning permissibility and legitimacy. On this basis, it may be said that, from the normative point of view, the concept of Ḥaqq has a gradational nature and admits of degrees: it begins at the level of permissibility, such as the right of divorce; reaches the level of worthiness, such as the virtue of pardon, which is more Ḥaqq than retaliation; and ultimately culminates in the level of necessity and obligation, such as the existence of the Necessary Being. This gradation of meaning is also reflected in the Qur’an through the expression aḥaqq: “and God is more worthy that you should fear Him” (wa-Allāhu aḥaqqu an takhshāhu; Q 33:37).

By contrast, Bāṭil carries a negative normative force and indicates a lack of worthiness for endurance. Consequently, not

everything that is realized may be called Ḥaqq merely because it exists. Something may exist externally, yet because it is not worthy of that existence, it may be called Bāṭil. From this point, the subtle and fundamental difference between Ḥaqq and ḥaqīqah also becomes clear: every existing thing is a ḥaqīqah in the sense of external realization, but it is Ḥaqq only when it possesses worthiness of existence. On this basis, the occurrence of oppression and injustice in the world, although an undeniable reality, is never Ḥaqq, because it lacks that existential fittingness and existential worthiness and, in the logic of the Qur'an, is destined to vanish.

3. Ḥaqq in the Horizon of Creation

The Qur'an repeatedly describes the creation of the heavens and the earth with the qualification of Ḥaqq and places this qualification in explicit contrast with "play" (la'ib), "diversion" (lahw), and Bāṭil. Verses such as "He created the heavens and the earth in Ḥaqq" (khalaqa al-samāwāt wa-l-arḍ bi-l-ḥaqq) (Q 6:73; Q 14:19; Q 16:3; Q 39:5; Q 64:3), "God created the heavens and the earth in Ḥaqq" (khalaqa Allāhu al-samāwāt wa-l-arḍ bi-l-ḥaqq) (Q 29:44; Q 45:22), and "God did not create the heavens and the earth and what is between them except in Ḥaqq" (mā khalaqa Allāhu al-samāwāt wa-l-arḍ wa-mā baynahumā illā bi-l-ḥaqq) (Q 30:8), together with verses that explicitly negate play and Bāṭil in creation (Q 21:16; Q 38:27), form a coherent constellation of Qur'anic expressions in which Ḥaqq functions as a primary description of the divine act of creation.

In his exegetical account of these verses, Ṭabarī interprets bi-l-ḥaqq as "truly and rightly" (ḥaqqan wa-ṣawāban) and sets it in opposition to Bāṭil and error. In reporting additional views, he also takes bi-l-ḥaqq to refer to the divine "word" and connects it with God's command and creative speech (Ṭabarī, 2001, vol. 9, pp. 335–336).

Zamakhsharī explicitly interprets bi-l-ḥaqq as “with a sound end” (bi-l-gharaḍ al-ṣaḥīḥ) and places it in direct contrast with play and Bāṭil. In his view, divine creation is free from futility because it is endowed with a sound purpose (Zamakhsharī, 1987, vol. 3, p. 455).

Similarly, Ṭabarsī, in **Jawāmi‘ al-jāmi‘**, explains bi-l-ḥaqq as “with a sound end that is Ḥaqq” (ay bi-l-gharaḍ al-ṣaḥīḥ alladhī huwa ḥaqq), and then enumerates specific instances of this end: that the heavens and the earth serve as dwellings for God’s servants, as a source of admonition for those who reflect, and as indications for monotheists of God’s oneness and the perfection of His power (Ṭabarsī, 1992, vol. 3, p. 248). On this basis, Ḥaqq in creation refers to a sound purpose that is realized through forms such as dwelling, admonition, and indication of divine oneness and perfect power.

Zuḥaylī likewise emphasizes that the description bi-l-ḥaqq negates diversion, play, and futility from creation. He regards the creation of the heavens and the earth as manifesting God’s immense power and accompanied by the bestowal of good, wisdoms, and religious and worldly benefits (Zuḥaylī, 1998, vol. 20, p. 247).

‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī, in commenting on verses that describe creation as bi-l-ḥaqq, also stresses the conceptual opposition between Ḥaqq, on the one hand, and play and Bāṭil, on the other. In his view, Ḥaqq is the description of an act that possesses a real and determinate end; hence creation is called Ḥaqq because every being within it is directed toward a particular end, and the order of creation rests upon the connection of ends and the causal arrangement of beings. Referring to verses such as “We did not create the heavens and the earth and what is between them in play; We created them only in Ḥaqq” (Q 44:38–39) and “We did not create the heaven and the earth and what is between them in Bāṭil” (Q 38:27), he explains that if the

divine act lacked such an end, creation would revert to play or Bāṭil. In contrast, the world is founded upon an ordered system in which some beings serve as premises and conditions for the realization of the ends of others. On this basis, creation is not a collection of aimless acts, but a firm act grounded in truth and culminating in a stable and meaningful world. Ṭabāṭabā'ī also states that the particle *bā'* in *bi-l-ḥaqq* is the *bā'* of accompaniment; that is, divine creation is consociated with and inseparable from Ḥaqq throughout, rather than Ḥaqq being merely its cause or instrument (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 1973, vol. 12, pp. 41–42).

Ibn 'Āshūr likewise understands *bi-l-ḥaqq* as indicating that the heavens and the earth were created in a perfected manner and in fidelity to the end assigned to them. He explains that Bāṭil is that in which a thing fails to fulfill its purpose; therefore, creation in Ḥaqq is a sign of God's oneness and of the wisdom of His acts (Ibn 'Āshūr, 1999, vol. 20, pp. 176–177).

Taken together, these exegetical reports show that, in interpreting the verses on “creation in Ḥaqq” (*khalq bi-l-ḥaqq*), Ḥaqq is consistently placed against Bāṭil, play, and futility and is treated as a foundational description of the divine act of creation. Within this framework, exegetes enumerate multiple ends and functions of creation, including the realization of a sound purpose, the firmness and perfection of creation, the world's serving as a dwelling place for human beings, its providing admonition for those who take heed, its indicating divine oneness and perfect power, the bestowal of good, and, in some commentaries, the connection of creation with the final return of beings to God. Collectively, these expressions depict creation as an act characterized essentially by Ḥaqq and as a negation of play and Bāṭil.

3.1. Rethinking the End of Creation through the Theory of Existential Fittingness

As observed, one of the key concepts in the Qur'anic account of creation is the description of the divine act as Ḥaqq and the negation of play and futility from creation. Qur'anic exegetes have generally understood the being-Ḥaqq of creation as meaning that it possesses a sound end or desirable purpose. Yet the fundamental question begins precisely here: what exactly is this desirable purpose? In exegetical works, matters such as worship, trial, admonition, knowledge of divine power and oneness, attainment of otherworldly reward, or enjoyment of worldly benefits have been introduced as the end of creation, without it being made clear whether these are themselves the final end or serve a higher end. In other words, in many of these analyses, no clear distinction is drawn between intermediate ends and the ultimate end; consequently, the purposiveness of creation often remains at the level of functions and outcomes.

If the ultimate end of creation were matters such as worldly welfare, otherworldly reward, or everlasting pleasure in paradise, a fundamental question would arise: why did God not place the human being in that desirable state from the very beginning? Why did He choose the complex path of this world, interwoven with suffering and trial? This question shows that pleasure, reward, and even paradise cannot be the ultimate end, for all of them are the fruit and consequence of a certain existential condition, not that condition itself. Paradise answers the question of what awaits a human being who possesses a particular condition; it does not answer why creation itself occurred.

The Theory of Existential Fittingness opens a different horizon for understanding the end of creation. According to this theory, the ultimate end is neither a psychological state such as pleasure, nor a

spatial location such as paradise, nor merely the performance of a set of devotional acts, but existence itself; not every mode of existence, however, but an existence that is fitting, harmonious, and well-proportioned, whose relation to other beings has been properly ordered. In other words, the end of creation is that every being should occupy its proper place. In this sense, the end of creation is the realization of worthy and beautiful modes of existence: beings that properly know their relation to the origin of being, to their own reality, and to other beings, and act accordingly.

A beautiful existence is an existence in which relations have not been distorted. This fittingness is realized, first and foremost, in the relation between God and the human being. If the end of creation is the realization of fitting existence, this fittingness must be established on both sides of the relation. On God's side, this fittingness is realized in the form of mercy: "except those upon whom your Lord has mercy; and for that He created them" (illā man raḥima rabbuka wa-li-dhālika khalaqahum; Q 11:119). Divine lordship, ownership, sustenance, guidance, and forgiveness are all manifestations of this same mercy; that is, the manner in which divine bestowal reaches the creature in a measured and wise way and places the relation between Creator and creature in a fitting condition.

In response to this mercy and lordship, fittingness on the human side is realized through the acceptance of the station of servanthood: "I did not create jinn and human beings except that they may worship Me" (wa-mā khalaqtu al-jinna wa-l-insa illā li-ya'budūn; Q 51:56). By virtue of his created condition, the human being is neither the Necessary Being, nor the true owner, nor independent, nor self-subsisting; therefore, his fittingness in relation to God consists in not making an unfitting existential self-assertion and not placing himself in a position that does not belong to him. Servanthood, in this sense, is

not merely the performance of devotional acts; rather, it is the conscious expression of the existential reality of the human being: that he is servant, not Lord.

Yet existential fittingness is not limited to this vertical relation. Once the relation between servant and Lord has been established, the ordering of the human being's relation to other beings comes into view, and it is here that the notion of "becoming like God" acquires its meaning. In relation to others, the human being does not occupy the station of lordship, but the station of a moral agent, and he must act in a way that is consonant with the divine attributes. Mercy, justice, beneficence, and grace are among the attributes that the human being can actualize in interaction with others. Thus, the talk of resemblance to God in philosophical and mystical traditions becomes meaningful not in relation to God Himself, but in relation to creatures.

On this basis, a beautiful and worthy existence is one in which the human being is, before God, the least God-like of beings, and before others, the most God-like of moral agents. This apparently paradoxical conjunction in fact reveals the essence of existential fittingness. The ultimate end of creation is the realization of such a condition of existence: a condition in which everything occupies its own place and relations are properly ordered. In this horizon, Ḥaqq is not merely a description of the divine act, but the realization of worthy existence within being; an existence whose worthiness consists precisely in fittingness and in each thing's occupying its own existential position.

4. The Relation between Ḥaqq and Bāṭil in the Horizon of Becoming (*takwīn*)

Before entering into the Qur'anic analysis of the relation between Ḥaqq and Bāṭil, a fundamental distinction must be noted—one that the

Qur'an establishes between "creation" and "becoming" (takwīn). At first glance, this distinction may appear concealed, yet it plays a decisive role in understanding the ontological meaning of the verses. In the Qur'an, "creation" refers to the original bringing-forth and initial production of being: a level at which creation is ordered on the basis of divine knowledge, wisdom, and measure, and for that reason its very constitution is grounded in Ḥaqq. At this level, Ḥaqq signifies the principle of firmness and establishment: the bringing of a thing into its divinely determined and fitting position, without conflicting relations and without the possibility of Bāṭil.

By contrast, "becoming" (takwīn) denotes the flowing forth and actualization of being within the context of multiplicity, time, and interaction. In this horizon, beings appear not merely as fixed creatures, but as realities in motion—acting and being acted upon, and open to multiple possibilities. It is precisely in this domain that the ground for the emergence of Bāṭil appears: not Bāṭil in the sense of pure nonexistence or sheer nothingness, but as a mode of unstable, superficial, and lacking existential authenticity. From this perspective, Bāṭil in the Qur'an "appears," but it does not "abide"; it "stands out," but it does not endure.

On this basis, it may be said that creation is the scene of the "establishment of Ḥaqq," whereas becoming is the field of the "distinction between Ḥaqq and Bāṭil." In the horizon of creation, Ḥaqq is fixed as the foundation and ordering of being; but in the horizon of becoming, this very foundation discloses itself, within the process of the becoming of beings, in relation to that which lacks existential rootedness—namely, Bāṭil. For this reason, many Qur'anic verses formulate the relation between Ḥaqq and Bāṭil not at the level of creation, but within the expanse of becoming, and in order to explain this dynamic relation they turn to images and parables that render

visible the logic of endurance and perishing, rootedness and rootlessness.

One of the most foundational examples of this takwīnī mode of expression is Q 13:17: “He sends down water from the sky, and valleys flow according to their measure ... As for the foam, it passes away as scum, but that which benefits people remains in the earth” (Q 13:17).

This parable gives form to the conflict between two “modes of realization”: al-zabad (“foam”)—a phenomenon that appears, swells, and becomes conspicuous, yet lacks depth and rootedness; and “that which benefits people” (mā yanfa‘u al-nās)—a reality that is genuine, beneficial, and enduring.

In his commentary on the parable in Sūrat al-Ra‘d, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī first explains the natural structure of flowing water: water settles in low-lying valleys according to their capacity, and with the force of the current, foam appears on its surface—a light, superadded, and rootless phenomenon that surges briefly but is eventually scattered and destroyed, while pure water remains. The same logic, he argues, is repeated in the smelting of metals: when a metal is melted, it expels worthless accretions and surface froth while preserving its pure substance. For al-Rāzī, the result of this natural process points to a takwīnī law: in everything that appears, that which is genuine and possesses substance “remains” (yamkuthu), whereas that which is parasitic and devoid of reality, even if it becomes prominent and dense upon the surface, ultimately “passes away as scum” (yadhhabu jufā’an) and perishes (Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, 1999, vol. 19, pp. 29–31).

‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī, in his analysis of the parable in Sūrat al-Ra‘d, explains Ḥaqq and Bāṭil on the basis of “stability” and “instability,” and shows that the verse seeks to articulate the takwīnī law governing the emergence and destiny of the two. The clear water that flows in each valley according to its capacity and ultimately

remains is the manifestation of a reality that truly exists and whose inner stability is preserved. By contrast, the foam upon the water—which outwardly appears voluminous and striking—does not endure because of its lack of substance and quickly disappears. The same holds in the smelting of metals: the substance of the metal remains, while superficial accretions vanish. Ṭabāṭabā'ī concludes that the divine sunnah is such that whatever corresponds to reality and possesses substance remains in the world, whereas that which has only an outward and reality-disconnected existence, even if it displays itself at the outset, is ultimately effaced (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 1973, vol. 11, pp. 334–337).

The upshot of these exegetical analyses is that the Qur'anic parable in Sūrat al-Ra'd portrays two kinds of realization within the domain of becoming: an original and enduring realization that is the ground of persistence and benefit, and an accidental and unstable realization that appears like foam upon the surface of water and quickly vanishes. From this perspective, Ḥaqq within the process of becoming is linked to stability, authenticity, and the capacity for endurance, whereas Bāṭil is a transient, rootless form lacking the capacity to remain.

4.1. Rethinking the Relation between Ḥaqq and Bāṭil on the Basis of the Theory of Existential Fittingness

The exegetical account of the verses and the analyses of the commentators have shown that, in the logic of the Qur'an, Ḥaqq and Bāṭil are not merely two evaluative or epistemic positions; rather, they are two modes of realization within the order of being: one original, stable, and beneficial, and the other derivative, unstable, and perishable. The Theory of Existential Fittingness elevates this distinction from the level of exegetical description to the level of ontological explanation.

Within the horizon of this theory, Ḥaqq means that each being stands in its proper existential position and in harmony with the totality of the order of being. Bāṭil, by contrast, is not pure nonexistence, but a mode of being whose relations have been disrupted and which has departed from its fitting position. Accordingly, the endurance and stability of Ḥaqq and the perishing of Bāṭil are not the result of a merely conventional reward and punishment, but the natural effect of existential fittingness or existential unfittingness.

The parable of water and foam in Sūrat al-Raʿd, within this framework, offers a clear image of the mechanism of fittingness: whatever is in harmony with the overall structure of the flow remains, while whatever is superadded, discordant, and devoid of existential function falls away of itself. This vanishing does not mean a negation of divine origination; rather, it means the negation of worthiness for endurance. In this sense, Bāṭil may appear within the domain of becoming, but it lacks the capacity for abiding and establishment.

From the perspective of the Theory of Existential Fittingness, it may be said that Ḥaqq and Bāṭil are two “existential states,” not two merely conventional labels. Ḥaqq is the fitting existential state, and Bāṭil is the unfitting existential state. This also explains why instances of Ḥaqq do not conflict with one another: all of them stand in proper relation to the whole. By contrast, instances of Bāṭil—even if they temporarily spread—carry within themselves the possibility of vanishing precisely because they lack inner fittingness.

In this horizon, the Theory of Existential Fittingness does not claim to offer a new definition of Ḥaqq; rather, it shows that what the Qurʾan reports concerning the stability of Ḥaqq and the vanishing of Bāṭil is rooted in the structure of being itself. Ḥaqq, in this sense, appears as the concrete realization of worthy existence within being—an existence whose worthiness consists precisely in fittingness and in

each thing's occupying its own existential position.

Even so, although in the horizon of becoming one may speak of the endurance and vanishing of Ḥaqq and Bāṭil, this horizon is still not the domain of the full and final manifestation of existential relations. Many fitting and unfitting relations, in the course of the world, are realized gradually, diffusely, and at times incompletely. For this reason, the Qur'anic logic of Ḥaqq requires that another horizon be opened for the final and complete disclosure of existential worthiness—a horizon in which what has taken shape in becoming is brought to the test of manifestation directly, beyond the veils of time and possibility. This horizon is precisely the horizon of resurrection (qiyāmah) and the weighing of deeds.

5. Ḥaqq in the Horizon of Resurrection and the Weighing of Deeds

Qur'anic eschatology is the domain of the final manifestation of Ḥaqq and the disclosure of relations concealed within earthly life. In this horizon, the verse “The weighing on that Day is truly Ḥaqq” (wa-l-waznu yawma'idhin al-ḥaqq; Q 7:8, al-A'rāf) occupies a central position and reveals the bond among truth, justice, and the objective reality of human actions. This verse follows upon verses that speak of questioning (su'āl), reckoning (ḥisāb), and the all-encompassing knowledge of God over human actions (Q 7:6–7). The commentators have emphasized that the conjunction of this sentence with the preceding verses serves as an explanation of the “objective manifestation of divine knowledge”—that is, the absolute knowledge of God concerning the actions of His servants is manifested in resurrection in the form of an order of weighing that gives to each action a recompense proportionate to its existential truth, without the least wrongdoing (Ibn 'Āshūr, 1999, vol. 8, p. 23).

In his explanation of what this “weighing” is, al-Shaykh al-Ṭabarsī, in *Majmaʿ al-bayān*, reports three views. First, “the weighing” signifies God’s absolute justice, a justice that removes every injustice and wrong in resurrection. Second, it is “the setting up of a real balance,” an instrument with pans and a tongue used for weighing good deeds (ḥasanāt) and evil deeds (sayyiʾāt), though there is disagreement concerning the manner of the weighing: some understand it as weighing the scrolls of deeds, others as the embodiment of good and evil deeds in corresponding forms. Third, it is “the manifestation of the real value of human beings and their actions,” as the verse “And We shall not place for them, on the Day of Resurrection, any weight” (falā nuqīma lahum yawm al-qiyāmat waznan; Q 18:105) reports the worthlessness of the deniers and the loss of their existential truth. Relying upon the Arabic term mawzūn as an idiom for precision, moderation, and uprightness, al-Ṭabarsī regards the “justice” interpretation as superior: for in this station, “the weighing” is not a mere instrument, but the concrete realization of Ḥaqq and the exact execution of divine justice with respect to actions (Ṭabarsī, 1988, vol. 4, p. 616).

ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī, relying upon the totality of verses that speak of the “heaviness” (thiqal) and “lightness” (khiffah) of scales, holds that the weighing in resurrection has an objective reality, and that good deeds truly cause the scales to become heavy, while evil deeds cause them to become light. In his view, in the weighing of actions, the unit of measure is Ḥaqq itself: that is, each action has weight to the extent that it contains Ḥaqq. Just as, in ordinary measurements, a thing is measured against a fixed standard, so in resurrection actions are measured against Ḥaqq. Therefore, good deeds, being possessed of truth and stability, possess heaviness, while evil deeds, being empty of Ḥaqq and containing Bāṭil, have no weight.

On this basis, the meaning of “The weighing on that Day is Ḥaqq” is that the measure of the weighing of actions on that Day is Ḥaqq, and the value of each action reverts to the degree of its correspondence to Ḥaqq (Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1973, vol. 8, p. 12).

Thus, in the horizon of resurrection, Ḥaqq appears as the final criterion for the weighing of actions. The verse “The weighing on that Day is Ḥaqq” shows that on that day “the weighing” is identical with Ḥaqq and justice; that is, the measurement is grounded not in human conventions, but in the intrinsic reality of actions. Al-Ṭabarsī regards “the weighing” in this station as an idiom for the objective realization of divine justice: a justice in whose light the truth of human beings and the real value of their actions become manifest. ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī likewise stresses the objectivity of the weighing in resurrection and affirms that the heaviness of the scales belongs to those actions that are bearers of truth and stability, whereas the lightness of the scales belongs to actions that are empty of Ḥaqq and based upon Bāṭil. In this horizon, the “heaviness” and “lightness” of the scales are the Qur’anic ontological language for expressing the same existential relation of actions to Ḥaqq: the more an action accords with Ḥaqq, the weightier it is; and the more distant it is from Ḥaqq, the lighter and the more devoid of truth.

5.1. Rethinking the Truth of the “Weighing of Ḥaqq” on the Basis of the Theory of Existential Fittingness

In the two preceding stages it was established that, on the one hand, the Qur’an describes creation as “in Ḥaqq,” and on the other hand, in the structure of becoming, it traces the distinction between Ḥaqq and Bāṭil as a distinction in the modes and degrees of being. In the logic of the Theory of Existential Fittingness, these two conceptions converge upon a single general principle: whatever in being is rooted in

existential fittingness is Ḥaqq; and whatever loses this fittingness becomes empty of ḥaqqiyyah. Resurrection, in this horizon, is the final scene of the manifestation of this very law.

The verse “The weighing on that Day is Ḥaqq” is in fact the point of convergence of these two currents: creation, which is grounded “in Ḥaqq,” and the continuous separating of Ḥaqq from Bāṭil in becoming, reach their consummation in resurrection. What flows in the world in a relative and gradual manner is realized in resurrection in a final and manifest form, because resurrection is the moment of the complete disclosure of the existential condition of each thing.

From the perspective of the Theory of Existential Fittingness, “the weighing” in this verse must be understood as an existential language: an expression of the degree of fittingness or disharmony of actions and souls with the truth of being. Every human action, in its essence, is a mode of being; and this being is either in harmony with the overall structure of truth (and thus becomes Ḥaqq and “heavy”), or is distant from it (and thus becomes Bāṭil and “light”). The verse “The weighing on that Day is Ḥaqq” expresses precisely this ontological mechanism: the value of actions arises directly from their own level of being, not from external judgment or moral convention.

On the basis of what was clarified concerning “creation in Ḥaqq” (khalq bi-l-ḥaqq), every true action possesses within it a sound end; that is, it is in harmony with an aim proportionate to the total order of creation. But many human actions, in the sphere of voluntary choice, possess ends that are either discordant with the structure of creation or whose relation to it is disrupted. In the world, on account of outward coverings and social conventions, the confusion of Ḥaqq and Bāṭil is possible; but in resurrection, when the veils fall, only the truth of the action remains, and this disclosed truth is precisely what the Qur’an calls “the weighing.”

In other words, if creation in the divine logic is “in Ḥaqq,” the judgment of resurrection is also “in Ḥaqq,” with the difference that in creation God creates Ḥaqq, whereas in resurrection He discloses that very real Ḥaqq. At this stage, Ḥaqq is not an attribute of the divine act, but the form of the manifested reality of human beings and their actions. Human actions either possess a real share in the total structure of being (and consequently become heavy), or lack such a share (and become weightless).

From the perspective of the Theory of Existential Fittingness, the heaviness and lightness of the scales in resurrection mean a difference in the “degree of existential fittingness” of human beings. Those who in earthly life have harmonized their existential directions with the direction of creation will, in the state of resurrection, acquire weights that are noble and stable, for their existence shares in the substance and orientation of the truth of being. By contrast, those who have made themselves Bāṭil—that is, have severed their intrinsic fittingness with the truth of being—will in resurrection be not only weightless, but out of place and unsettled. The Qur’anic expression of “losing the soul” (khusrān al-naḥs) points precisely to this emptiness of fittingness: the loss of one’s existential position and severance from the order of being.

In this manner, the “weighing of Ḥaqq” in resurrection may be understood as the final point of the current of “the being-Ḥaqq of creation” and the “vanishing of Bāṭil.” Creation begins in Ḥaqq; the history of becoming continues through the constant refining of Ḥaqq from Bāṭil; and resurrection is the very moment at which this refining reaches its term and every being stands in its true position. On that day, no thing will be measured by appearances or conventions; rather, the reality of the existence of human beings itself will speak.

For this reason, in the logic of the Theory of Existential

Fittingness, resurrection can be understood not as a moral court, but as an ontological field in which the truth that is in harmony or disharmony with Ḥaqq acquires its own weight. The weighing of resurrection reflects the same eternal rule that holds in creation and becoming: al-ḥaqq bāqin li-dhātih—Ḥaqq endures by itself because it is in fittingness with the order of existence; and al-bāṭil zā'ilun li-dhātih—Bāṭil vanishes by itself because its relation to that order is severed.

6. Conclusion

The present study set out to reread the concept of Ḥaqq in the Qur'an and to explain its ontological capacity for understanding the foundations of Qur'anic ethics. The central question of the article was whether Ḥaqq, within the logic of the Qur'an, can be understood as expressing existential worthiness and as a basis for regulating the relations of being. The semantic analysis of the term Ḥaqq in lexical and exegetical sources showed that, across its various usages, the term is associated with such elements as stability, firmness, correspondence to reality, necessity, and worthiness. From these elements, it becomes clear that Ḥaqq in the Qur'anic logic does not merely mean propositional truth or the correctness of a claim; rather, it points to a mode of stability and establishment that accords with reality and with the wisdom of creation.

The examination of the Qur'anic usages of this concept showed that Ḥaqq has a systematic presence in three horizons: creation, becoming, and resurrection. In the horizon of creation, the repeated description of creation as being "in Ḥaqq" (bi-l-ḥaqq) indicates that the order of creation is structured on the basis of a sound end and a wise order, and that it is free from every form of futility and Bāṭil. In the horizon of becoming, the relation between Ḥaqq and Bāṭil becomes

manifest in the form of the law of endurance and disappearance: that which possesses authenticity and a bond with existential reality remains stable, whereas that which lacks this bond, even if it appears temporarily, ultimately passes away. The Qur'anic parable of water and foam in Sūrat al-Ra'd is a clear instance of this logic of becoming, in which the beneficial and rooted truth remains, while the accidental and rootless element vanishes. In the horizon of resurrection, this same logic appears in the form of the weighing of deeds, where the "weight" of actions is determined on the basis of Ḥaqq, and the value of each action depends upon the extent to which it possesses truth and existential stability.

Rereading these three horizons in light of the Theory of Existential Fittingness shows that Ḥaqq in the Qur'an can be understood as expressing existential worthiness: that is, a state in which every being occupies its fitting position and existential relations are properly ordered. On this basis, creation "in Ḥaqq" means the establishment of a world structured around existential fittingness and harmony; the relation between Ḥaqq and Bāṭil in becoming expresses the process through which this fittingness is disclosed and refined in the flow of being; and the weighing of deeds in resurrection is the final manifestation of this same law at the level of human actions, where the value of actions is disclosed according to the degree of their correspondence with the true structure of being.

In this horizon, Ḥaqq is not merely an epistemic or normative concept; rather, it expresses an existential law within the structure of the world—a law according to which fitting relations possess stability and endurance, while unfitting relations, even if they are temporarily realized, lack the capacity to remain. Thus, the concept of Ḥaqq may be understood as the link between the structure of being and the moral

order of the Qur'an, showing that ethics in the Qur'anic logic is not merely a set of abstract obligations, but is rooted in the objective and wise order of being.

At the level of a broad philosophical analysis and within the horizon of ontology, formulating the concept of Ḥaqq on the basis of the Theory of Existential Fittingness opens new horizons for understanding the moral order of the Qur'an and yields fundamental epistemic consequences. This ontological reading can be explained along several essential axes.

First, this approach leads to the revival of the deep and historical bond between the two concepts of Ḥaqq and justice (ʿadl) within a teleological framework. In classical reason and Islamic philosophy, justice is defined by the well-known formula “placing each thing in its proper position” (waḍʿ kull shayʿ fī mawḍiʿih). This study shows that this “proper position” is neither an abstract nor a subjective concept; rather, it is derived precisely from the existential fittingness of each thing with the structure and end of its creation. On this basis, Ḥaqq consists in preserving this geometry and architecture of creation.

Second, explaining Ḥaqq as an “existential worthiness and fittingness” opens a firm path beyond one of the most serious challenges of moral philosophy—namely, the epistemic gap between “is” or facts and “ought” or values. The Theory of Existential Fittingness shows that, in the Qur'anic paradigm, the world of being is not a blind and purposeless machine, but an order created in Ḥaqq and structured around wisdom. According to this approach, moral values—the “oughts”—are not severed from takwīnī realities—the “is”; rather, moral and rightful action is precisely action that accords with the objective and generative fittingness of the world of being.

Third, this explanation is fully consistent with the lexical and

semantic roots of the term Ḥaqq, for in language Ḥaqq consistently signifies stability, necessity, and “correspondence to reality.” When an act or judgment arises from existential fittingness, it has in fact achieved complete correspondence with objective reality and thereby becomes worthy of the name Ḥaqq.

Finally, this reading stands against modern contractualist and subjectivist-existential approaches that regard rights and values as merely human, constructed, and conventional products of free human will. Reducing the concept of Ḥaqq to sheer conventions inevitably ends in moral relativism. Yet by rereading Ḥaqq through the scale of existential fittingness, this concept is released from contractualism and bound to an objective and prior truth. On this basis, the ḥaqqiyyah of an act or judgment in the Qur’an is rooted in its correspondence with the purposive structure of the world. This achievement provides a firm, objective, and relativism-resistant foundation for the moral order of the Qur’an and demonstrates that, in the Qur’anic worldview, ethics is the extension of takwīn into the sphere of human conduct.

The analysis offered in this article may be regarded as a first step toward reconstructing the moral order of the Qur’an on the basis of the Theory of Existential Fittingness. Within this framework, the concept of Ḥaqq was examined as expressing existential position; however, a complete account of this conceptual system requires further investigation of other concepts that, in the Qur’an, are related to the mechanism of regulating and realizing this fittingness. Accordingly, future studies may focus on concepts such as mīzān and qisṭ in order to clarify more fully the practical and normative dimensions of this existential logic in the domain of human action.

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