درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

Protecting shareholders’ rights today is considered a practical competitive function at the level of capital markets, which is based on transparent and coherent actions within the framework of laws and regulations. In other words, the more the level of company operations is based on regulatory and legal procedures, the more level of protection of shareholders’ interests can be expected to be observed more uniformly by companies. This study aims to design a forensic accounting model focusing on protecting shareholders’ rights of petrochemical companies. The collection tool based on the analytical nature of the research consisted of two parts: evaluation checklist and matrix checklists. In fact, in order to promote the level of innovation in the relationship between forensic processes and quantitative accounting to collect data for the development of the forensic accounting model, through meta-synthesis and Delphi analysis, the components and propositions of forensic accounting were determined in the qualitative section, focusing on the protection of shareholders’ rights; then based on the matrix checklist, the most influential research propositions were determined through the analysis of fuzzy networks. The research results in the qualitative part indicate the existence of three components of structural mechanisms; it was the meta-structural and legalization of forensic accounting to protect shareholders’ rights, which was approved in the form of 18 statements. Further, the results in the quantitative part concerning the analysis of fuzzy networks were identified. The most effective component of forensic accounting in the protection of shareholders’ rights was structural mechanisms, and the most influential statements of forensic accounting in the protection of 

The present article aims to argue indirect expropriation in international petroleum agreements and to analyse the response of international arbitrations. In particular, international arbitral awards by the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, the Yukos case as an Energy Charter Treaty Arbitration and certain North American Free Trade Agreement cases have been examined. The recent trend shows that taking of foreign investors’ property may take place not only through legislation or nationalisation but also by indirect methods that can have the same effect as direct expropriation. Indirect expropriation does not necessarily require transfer of legal title from the international oil company to the host state. Hence, it is difficult to make a distinction between legitimate regulation and measures, which are tantamount to expropriation with the payment of compensation. The identification of an indirect expropriation is complex and depends upon the examination of the legitimate expectations of the investor concerning enjoyment of its investment. Host governments may employ different methods to achieve what amounts to direct taking, but without acknowledging it as such, to avoid legal consequences of expropriation and then payment of compensation.

Industrial investment in Iran, especially in the wake of sanctions’ intensification in the 2010s, decreased significantly. The government implemented fiscal policy which has been associated with uncertainty. In this paper, using a dynamic panel model and generalized method of moments, we examined the effect of fiscal policy uncertainty on investment in 24 industrial groups in Iran over the period 2002-2020. The results indicated that the growth of fiscal level shock,resulted in a low but positive effect on investment directly. However,the coefficient of cross effect between the growth of fiscal level shock and the fiscal policy uncertainty undermined the positive effect on industrial investment. The government has had two effects on industrial investment indirectly through the demand side shock. By creating demand, it has had a positive effect on industrial investment with the cross effect between the growth of the fiscal level shock and industrial sales. However, on the other hand, the growth of the fiscal level shock has been associated with the creation and growth of fiscal policy uncertainty, so that the cross effect between the growth of fiscal policy uncertainty and the growth of industrial sales on industrial investment shows a high negative coefficient. The results of these two effects suggest that due to high uncertainty,the indirect government effect on investment in 24 industrial groups is negative, which happens through the demand-side shock. Moreover, the growth of fiscal policy uncertainty, sanctions, and interest rates, respectively, have had the most adverse effect on investment in 24 industrial groups in Iran.