درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

This article presents documents on the aftermath of a diplomatic affair from 1705, which was engineered by Safavid Iran’s grand vizier Muhammad Mumin Shamlu and which was the last of his undertakings to reorient relations with the Ottoman Empire. It was a part of his policy played out as several faits This article presents documents on the aftermath of a diplomatic affair from 1705, which was engineered by Safavid Iran’s grand vizier Muhammad Mumin Shamlu and which was the last of his undertakings to reorient relations with the Ottoman Empire. It was a part of his policy played out as several faits accomplis unfolding at the same time and aiming to embitter Ottoman-Safavid relations, which had reached a formal alliance over the last decade. Starting out under the guise of a religious gift-giving, this initiative from the Iranian capital Isfahan to Prophet Muhammad’s shrine in Ottoman-controlled Medina first slighted the Ottomans’ lordship rights in the Hejaz and therefore became blocked by the Ottoman authorities in Medina as well as the digninaties in Constantinople. But soon, it grew into a subject of diplomatic correspondenceand thenbecame entangled in a robbery reaching out to Mecca and Baghdad, whose prosecution spread further to Constantinople, Cairo, Damascus, and the eastern Mediterranean waters. Even after the affair was put to rest, Ottoman-Safavid dealings did not heal from the harm done by Muhammad Mumin Shamlu’s succesive thrusts to undermine the cooperation of the 1690s.The peace outlived Beygdilli-Shamlu’s term as grand vizier, but he succeeded in downgrading it from an official brotherhood to a bare state of nonaggression. accomplis unfolding at the same time and aiming to embitter Ottoman- Safavid relations, which had reached a formal alliance over the last decade. Starting out under the guise of a religious gift-giving, this initiative from the Iranian capital Isfahan to Prophet Muhammad’s shrine in Ottoman-controlled Medina first slighted the Ottomans’ lordship rights in the Hejaz and therefore became blocked by the Ottoman authorities in Medina as well as the digninaties in Constantinople. But soon, it grew into a subject of diplomatic correspondenceand thenbecame entangled in a robbery reaching out to Mecca and Baghdad, whose prosecution spread further to Constantinople, Cairo, Damascus, and the eastern Mediterranean waters. Even after the affair was put to rest, Ottoman-Safavid dealings did not heal from the harm done by Muhammad Mumin Shamlu’s succesive thrusts to undermine the cooperation of the 1690s.The peace outlived Beygdilli-Shamlu’s term as grand vizier, but he succeeded in downgrading it from an official brotherhood to a bare state of nonaggression.

In the sixteenth century, the strategic region of the Caucasus had a set of political, economic, transportation, and religious benefits for both the Safavid and Ottoman governments that led the two powers to compete for profound influence and attention in the region. During this period, when some weak and unstable kings such as Ismail II and Muhammad Khudābanda came to power, lack of strength and better performance caused the Ottoman government to grasp the most of the opportunity to extend their influence over the Caucasus. This study aims at investigating the geographical location of the Caucasus considering the Safavid diplomatic policies and the challenges between the Safavids and the Ottoman Empire through analyzing historical data and library studies. Descriptive data analysis has been considered as the method utilized for this research. The research findings indicate that the ineffectiveness of Safavid foreign policy at this time and the consequence of this policy would have an inevitably negative impact on maintaining and controlling the Caucasus. As a result, this policy would provoke the Ottoman invasions, leading to the occupation of some parts of the Caucasus.