Mulla Sadra

Subscribing to the principles of logically valid reasoning and parsimony of presuppositions in the framework of a religion that hinges on a revealed eschatological message, the medieval Islamic philosophers were bound to interpret the Qurʾānic account of the afterlife in ways that may have compromised at least some of its literal meanings. However, to what extent precisely do these interpretations go against the grain of Revelation has to be determined separately in each particular case. Wholesale statements regarding the alleged coherence or incoherence of general types of philosophical theories with Revelation risk neglecting important variations between theories, and thereby rendering us blind to the scope of possibilities in the concepts involved. From this perspective, I will consider the eschatological implications of the psychological theories of Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā, who both subscribe to a dualistic view of human being and consequently claim that the afterlife does not concern one's body. Two questions will then emerge as especially central to dualistic accounts of the afterlife. (1) How do we make sense of the kind of first-personality that must be an irreducible constituent of existence in the hereafter, provided that the latter fulfills the eschatological promise given in the Revelation? For in order to be a justified reward or punishment for my acts in this life, the afterlife must be in an equally strong sense mine. In the Arabic Peripatetic tradition, many of the central doctrines of which Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā subscribe to, individuality entails materiality, which seems to suggest that human being can have a distinctly first-personal existence only when some kind of connection is preserved to the body as the necessary condition of one's individuation. (2) How do we account for the emphatically sensual descriptions of the hereafter in the Revelation? Again, in the Peripatetic tradition all cognitive acts that involve objects with sensible characteristics require bodily instruments of cognition, in the absence of which the revealed account is in danger of becoming a mere metaphor. In the light of these two questions, I will argue that Avicenna's dualism ends up with a rather narrow conception of the afterlife. He does try to give an account of a genuinely first-personal afterlife, and thereby presents a carefully argued departure from the Peripatetic tradition. But because of the way in which Avicenna separates the soul from the body, Avicennian afterlife is bound to remain exclusively intellectual. Thus, with regard to the second question Avicenna seems forced to interpret the Revelation in almost exclusively metaphorical terms. On the other hand, while following Avicenna in the first question, Mullā Ṣadrā conceives of the separate existence of the human soul in much broader terms than his predecessor. By means of the concepts of mental existence ( wujud dhihniyy ) and the world of images ( 'ālam al-mithāl ), he ends up with a conception of human afterlife that is rich in terms of experiential content, and thereby potentially more coherent with the revealed account.

Muslim philosophers and theologians have disputed over the animal afterlife. Most Muslim scholars hold that the Quran, Islamic narrations and rational arguments affirm the resurrection of animals in the afterlife, though there is a dispute concerning how they will be resurrected and whether they will be rewarded or punished as humans will. Beside the controversies and disputes, several reasons suggest that they have their own afterlife. To prove the animal afterlife, it is necessary to prove primarily that they have soul. Mulla Sadra has attempted to prove that animals have soul, based on the immateriality of the faculty of imagination ( al-Khayal ). Likewise, most of the reasons provided for the immateriality of human soul could be employed for the animal afterlife. The second stage is to explain the purpose of animal afterlife. Two goals could be mentioned regarding this issue: first, the compensation of evils harming them requires the afterlife. Second, some Quranic verses and Islamic narrations establish the fact that at least some animals have the intellectual faculty and thus have responsibly for their actions. Though these Quranic verses and Islamic narrations are not explicit, they can be a probable evidence for the animal afterlife. Finally, two points must be noted: first, though there are several arguments in favor of animal afterlife, there is no general agreement on it in the Islamic world. Second, the above arguments are not general, but they include merely those animals that have the faculty of sensation and have been inflicted by evils.

Predication is one of the significant issues in Islamic philosophical logic. “Essential Primary Predication” (al-ḥaml al-awwalī al-dhātī) is a new type of predication found mainly in late Islamic philosophers. The historical background of this predication is one of the controversial topics among post-Ṣadrīan thinkers, but it seems that it must be sought in Avicenna’s discussions on the meaning of predication. To show this, I will focus on two fragments in which Avicenna talks about the meaning of predication; one in al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt (Pointers and Reminders) and the other in Manṭiq al-Mashriqīyyīn (The Logic of the Easterners). In Ishārāt, we read that in a proposition like “A is B”, what we mean is that “What is A is B”, not that “The ḥaqīqa of A is the ḥaqīqa of B”.

The afterlife (also the world to come) has been one of the major humans’ concerns throughout history. Although heavenly religions and Islamic philosophy have recognized the very foundation of the Hereafter, there are questions surrounding the existence and characteristics of that world. In the meantime, there is a myriad of theories about it, and Mulla Sadra’s view is a key theory here. This research analyzes the philosophical basics of Mulla Sadra’s views to distinguish his perspective from those of others and to portray a different aspect of the world-to-come observations. The findings suggested that Mulla Sadra argues that man achieves actualization over time and transfers to the world to come by abandoning the matter. In that world, there are no objects for man to observe; rather, he will create all his observations by himself, with every human creating a more transcendental world made of imaginary perceptions which, unlike imaginary observations in this world, assumes an external reality which is also formed in the existence and life of the human psyche.

SUBJECT & OBJECTIVES: Moral realism means that moral values are real regardless of feelings and emotions, collective agreement, and the orders of anyone. This article aims to explain the relationship between Mulla Ṣadrā's viewpoint and moral realism, as well as the influence of his thoughts on our lives.   METHOD & FINDING: The research benefitted from an analytical-descriptive method. At first, by referring to all the works of Mulla Ṣadrā, his moral ontological foundations were deduced, and based on his statements and foundations, it was analyzed in an integrated manner and finally, its effect on pure life has been explained. We have concluded that based on Mulla Ṣadrā's idea, he is a realist. We can enumerate the following shreds of evidence to prove this claim: 1) The reality of the moral criterion, 2) The criticism of divine command theory, 3) The real basis of moral judgments, 4) The consequences of moral judgments, and 5) The manifestation of inner attributes. Additionally, we have demonstrated that action based on the realistic foundations of Mulla Ṣadrā will direct life towards a divine life with true happiness and will suggest a different way of life.CONCLUSION: Action based on the realistic principles of Mulla Ṣadrā will guide life towards a divine life with true happiness and will suggest a different way of life.

Das Konzept, göttlich zu werden, verwurzelt im philosophischen Rahmen von Plotin, hat Diskussionen in der Geschichte inspiriert und schwingt in den Werken nachfolgender Denker wie Mulla Sadra nach. Plotin postuliert, dass das ultimative Ziel der Menschheit in der Vereinigung mit dem Einen liegt, die durch die Nachahmung göttlicher Tugenden erreicht wird. Dies wirft jedoch komplexe Fragen zur Natur der Tugenden und ihrer Anwendbarkeit auf sowohl für die Menschheit als auch für die Göttlichkeit. Während Plotin mit diesen Dilemmas ringt, bieten Gelehrte wie Mulla Sadra neuartige Interpretationen desselben Konzepts, jedoch verankert im Prinzip der Vorrangigkeit des Seins. Diese Arbeit erforscht Plotins Vision einer göttlichen Vereinigung und die Herausforderungen, die sie für ethische und existenzielle Untersuchungen darstellt. Darüber hinaus geht sie auf die Rezeption von Plotins Ideen durch Mulla Sadra ein, der neuartige Einblicke in das Konzept der Göttlichkeit bietet. Durch Sadras Perspektive werden Tugenden als dynamische Manifestationen göttlichen Seins verstanden, was zu einem tieferen Verständnis der existenziellen Reise der Menschheit hin zur göttlichen Vereinigung führt.

This article examines the theory of mind proposed by the esteemed Islamic philosopher, Mulla Sadra Shirazi, through a phenomenological lens. We specifically focus on how Mulla Sadra’s framework addresses the question of the individual human mind and its intricate relationship with the body. While Mulla Sadra presents concepts that resonate with some of Husserl’s ‘monadological-phenomenological’ reflections, we argue that strict adherence to phenomenological methodology precludes acceptance of the metaphysical implications he draws concerning the individual mind’s connection to the totality of existence, including a presumed divine reality. Nonetheless, our comparative analysis with Mulla Sadra’s thought illuminates key aspects of Husserlian monadology and highlights the limitations of a rigorously phenomenological approach to purely metaphysical inquiries.

The concept of human perfection is a universal concern that has occupied thinkers from various schools of thought, including Mulla Sadra. This study employs a descriptive-analytical and library-based methodology to examine Mulla Sadra's perspective on the perfect human being. The analysis reveals that humans are inherently driven towards perfection, and Mulla Sadra's philosophy emphasizes instructing how individuals can progress toward this ultimate state. From Mulla Sadra's perspective, human being   is the pinnacle of existence, possessing inherent dignity. However, to realize this, humans must embark on a path of perfection. This perfection lies in the development of their rational faculty, which sets them apart from other beings. Human intellect has two aspects: theoretical and practical. The complete development of both these facets is essential for human perfection.

Moral virtue is a concept that has its roots in ancient Greek philosophy and refers to characteristics or habits considered good and ethical behaviors. Greek philosophers like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle extensively discussed moral virtue. Aristotle defines virtue as a "golden mean" between two vices; for example, courage is the middle ground between recklessness and cowardice. Plato considers the soul to be composed of three parts: rational, spirited(or irascible), and appetitive. He believes that only the rational part is simple and immortal, while the other two parts are added when the soul attaches to the body, making them material and perishable. Mulla Sadra, on the other hand, views the soul as possessing faculties, which are the soul's degrees and stations. Due to its inherent simplicity, the soul encompasses all of these faculties. Both Plato and Mulla Sadra consider the principal virtues of the soul to be the four cardinal virtues: wisdom, courage, temperance (self-control), and justice. This article employs a descriptive-comparative method to examine and contrast the viewpoints of Plato and Mulla Sadra regarding virtue and moral dispositions, and their role in human happiness. It demonstrates that both philosophers, firstly, view the soul as having parts or faculties and enumerate wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice as the soul's main virtues. Secondly, it shows that Mulla Sadra's ideas concerning the soul and ethics are influenced by Plato's views.

This article provides a philosophical analysis of identity within the context of artificial intelligence, from the perspective of Transcendent Philosophy (especially the views of Mulla Sadra) and contemporary philosophy. With the rapid advancements in artificial intelligence as one of the most significant innovations in computer science, issues such as the reconstruction of human identity and its comparison with natural intelligence have come to the fore. The paper examines the philosophical capacities and limitations of this phenomenon, exploring the perspectives of Mulla Sadra and John Searle, and offers a comparative analysis of their views on identity and consciousness in machines and artificial intelligence. According to the views of these two thinkers, artificial intelligence, despite its advancements, cannot achieve human identity, as it lacks essential characteristics such as consciousness, intentionality, and abstraction. Searle argues that artificial systems will never be able to attain genuine consciousness because understanding meaning and consciousness are intrinsic to the human brain and mind, qualities that cannot be attributed to machines. He consistently supports this belief through the Chinese Room experiment and various critiques of artificial systems.

The connection between the soul and the body has always been acknowledged by philosophers, as seeing, hearing, remembering, recalling, thinking, experiencing joy and sadness, and enjoying, while being psychological phenomena, are deeply influenced by the body. Without the nervous, glandular, and muscular effects, these psychological events cannot occur. Similarly, psychological states have a significant impact on the body and human organism, a point often highlighted by psychologists and philosophers. This study, using a descriptive-analytical and comparative method, aims to examine Plato's and Mullā Ṣadrā's views on the soul and its relationship with the body. Based on the findings, Plato makes a distinction between the soul and the body, but believes in their reciprocal influence on one another. He identifies the soul with the essence of humanity and views the body as a foreign entity after death. Mullā Ṣadrā, however, sees the relationship between the soul and the body as a union, where each represents a stage in the existence of a single reality called "human." He believes that the soul and the body mutually affect each other, and in its initial emergence, the soul is corporeal, later reaching the state of abstraction through substantial motion. The soul's attachment to the body is intrinsic, and the soul remains a soul only while connected to the body. Overall, this study shows that although Mullā Ṣadrā has been influenced by Plato in some aspects, he also presents his unique perspectives in this area.

Axioms are crucial to epistemic frameworks, as several schools of the history of science have recognized. The issue of the current research is that in the validation of axioms, what defects does the intuitive approach entail, and how can the intersubjective approach (based on the ideas of Islamic philosophers) be explained as an alternative, less-known system? The former is dedicated to clarifying and criticizing what is called the intuitive approach to validating axioms: this approach is attributed to classical philosophers and consists of assuming that axioms are propositions whose truth is immediately evident upon taking into account the terms they are based on. The latter focuses on clarifying the alternative approach, called the intersubjective approach of validating axioms (IAVA): this approach is attributed to a specific Islamic tradition, developed by Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā, and consists of assuming that axioms are propositions that cannot be rationally proved, denied, or doubted, without being already assumed. In this article, we present the intersubjective approach from a historical point of view.

Mullā Sadrā interprets “correspondence” in the correspondence theory of truth as the identity of quiddity (ʿayniyyat-e māhūwī) between mental existence (wujūd-i dhihnī) and external existence (wujūd-i khārijī) of a known object. However, this view conflicts with his principle of the primacy of existence (aṣālat al-wujūd), which posits that mental and external existences occupy distinct existential ranks, making identical quiddities impossible. To resolve this, Sadrā proposes the theory of correspondence of existential realms (tatābuq-i ʿawālim-i wujūdī), arguing that the quiddity of external existence is identical to that of mental existence, and their correspondence arises from the identity of their higher and specific existences. This article argues that while Sadrā clearly explains the identity of quiddity, his theory of existential correspondence fails to resolve the inconsistency. For true knowledge of an external object, the mental form must distinguish it from other objects in a conditioned (bi sharṭ-i lā) manner, not merely through indeterminate, unconditioned (lā bi sharṭ) knowledge of its qualities. Thus, knowing an object’s qualities abstractly does not equate to knowing the object itself, as distinguishing it requires specific, conditioned knowledge, undermining Sadrā’s resolution of the conflict between his theories.

Avicenna’s floating man thought experiment has been examined and criticized for over a thousand years from various philosophical perspectives. While traditional and modern criticisms exist, the latter primarily focus on the confusion between epistemology and ontology. The ontological dimensions have received significant attention, but the epistemological aspects remain underexplored. I propose a modern critique suggesting that if valid, the thought experiment may not support substance dualism. However, some modest versions could bolster modest dualism, which posits that mental properties are distinct from physical ones, without adhering to Cartesian concepts. I present seven versions of the thought experiment. The first differs from Avicenna’s original and focuses on the individuation of self and body, but is vulnerable to modern critiques due to its conflation of ontological and epistemic aspects. The remaining six versions avoid this issue and do not assert that the mind is an immaterial substance. The second version examines epistemic differences between basic self-knowledge and knowledge of the body. The third addresses self-referential and self-verifying aspects of self-knowledge. The fourth explores modal properties, while the fifth highlights the self's necessary relationship to self-knowledge. The sixth emphasizes the environmental neutrality of basic self-knowledge, and the final version utilizes the self as a critical reasoner. I also support and revise these six versions with eleven general remarks.

Discussions on the works of lesser-known philosophers in history can illuminate various issues, helping to establish historical connections between various thinkers. One such philosopher is Abū al-Hasan Kāshānī (d. 1558), a 16th-century figure whose views have not yet been thoroughly studied. He authored numerous works in the field of philosophy and logic, many of which remain unpublished or unedited. His treatise on mental existence (al-wujūd al-dhihnī) contains detailed and profound contributions. Mullā Ṣadrā (c. 1571-1635/40 AD) authored several works on mental existence based on Kāshānī’s views. For example, it was Kāshānī who first used the distinction between primary predication (al-ḥaml al-awwalī) and common technical predication (al-ḥaml al-shāyiʿ al-ṣanāʿī) in solving the puzzle of mental existence. Mullā Ṣadrā adopted Kāshānī’s terminology in his magnum opus Al-Asfār al-Arbaʿah. We demonstrate Kāshānī’s influence on Mullā Ṣadrā’s account of mental existence, utilizing a comparative and descriptive methodology. The material of this research includes Kāshānī’s manuscript on mental existence as well as Mullā Ṣadrā’s works on this issue. The authors edited and revised Kāshānī’s manuscript and during the editing realized this important influence by comparing it with Mullā Ṣadrā's works.