philosophy of mind

SUBJECT & OBJECTIVES : The psychological aspect of pure life is connected with mental health. Therefore, it is one of the important elements of a good life that contributes to meaningful living. One cannot live a happy life and use the all faculties of his soul unless acquires inner peace. This article proposes interdisciplinary research that contains educational psychology, logic, and philosophy. We will indicate how fuzzy logic could change the human view of mental health and pure life. METHOD & FINDING : In this research, the terms mind and health will be considered to shed light on the concept of mental health. Firstly, we argue in favor of the dichotomy between mind and body. Then, the definition of health is analyzed by concepts of normality and irritating mode. Also, utilizing educational psychology, fuzzy thinking, and philosophy of mind, a new definition of mental health will be proposed. In general, it will be indicated that by holding fuzzy approaches to mental states, the definition of health and illness and its subcategories have new interpretations. CONCLUSION : Fuzzy thinking creates a new viewpoint that sees the world and its events as an integration of contradictions such as health-illness and meaningful-meaningless life. The more mental states match health norms, the happier life will be. Therefore, the talk of the grades of inner peace and happy life is possible unless is fuzzy logic applied.

"Substance dualism" or the thesis that a person is an embodied nonphysical being (mind or soul) is systematically caricatured in philosophy of mind literature as involving an untenable bifurcation. Instead of such a splintered, divided concept of the person, I defend integrative dualism, the thesis that while a person is a nonphysical subject (and thus a being that can survive the death of the body), in this life he or she functions as a united, embodied being. Embodiment consists of six nonmoral goods (they are good but not as in "moral goods" such as justice and courage): the virtues of sensations, agency, causal constitution, cognitive power, intelligible coherence, and affective incorporation. This united concept of an embodied person places values at the heart of the philosophy of human nature. This value-oriented concept of embodiment can be a rich, common resource for Christian-Muslim dialogue. This value-oriented concept of embodiment can be a rich, common resource for Christian-Muslim dialogue.

Over the centuries, the concept of the self has remained a prominent subject of philosophical inquiry. However, recent years have witnessed a notable shift, with empirical investigations in fields such as psychology, neuroscience, and anthropology directing their focus toward unraveling the mysteries of the self. These multidisciplinary endeavors have yielded profound insights into the nature of the self, particularly its intricate connection to the physical body. This article centers on a prevailing theory in contemporary discourse: the concept of the embodied self. Central to this theory is the proposition that the self is not an abstract entity but is fundamentally constituted byand inseparably linked with the corporeal form. The article provides an analytical examination of the theoretical scaffolding supporting this theory, drawing substantiation from recent empirical studies spanning diverse disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. Additionally, it delves into the realm of phenomenology, briefly delving into Merleau-Ponty's philosophical contributions.

This article provides a philosophical analysis of identity within the context of artificial intelligence, from the perspective of Transcendent Philosophy (especially the views of Mulla Sadra) and contemporary philosophy. With the rapid advancements in artificial intelligence as one of the most significant innovations in computer science, issues such as the reconstruction of human identity and its comparison with natural intelligence have come to the fore. The paper examines the philosophical capacities and limitations of this phenomenon, exploring the perspectives of Mulla Sadra and John Searle, and offers a comparative analysis of their views on identity and consciousness in machines and artificial intelligence. According to the views of these two thinkers, artificial intelligence, despite its advancements, cannot achieve human identity, as it lacks essential characteristics such as consciousness, intentionality, and abstraction. Searle argues that artificial systems will never be able to attain genuine consciousness because understanding meaning and consciousness are intrinsic to the human brain and mind, qualities that cannot be attributed to machines. He consistently supports this belief through the Chinese Room experiment and various critiques of artificial systems.