حمیدرضا خادمی

Discussions on the works of lesser-known philosophers in history can illuminate various issues, helping to establish historical connections between various thinkers. One such philosopher is Abū al-Hasan Kāshānī (d. 1558), a 16th-century figure whose views have not yet been thoroughly studied. He authored numerous works in the field of philosophy and logic, many of which remain unpublished or unedited. His treatise on mental existence (al-wujūd al-dhihnī) contains detailed and profound contributions. Mullā Ṣadrā (c. 1571-1635/40 AD) authored several works on mental existence based on Kāshānī’s views. For example, it was Kāshānī who first used the distinction between primary predication (al-ḥaml al-awwalī) and common technical predication (al-ḥaml al-shāyiʿ al-ṣanāʿī) in solving the puzzle of mental existence. Mullā Ṣadrā adopted Kāshānī’s terminology in his magnum opus Al-Asfār al-Arbaʿah. We demonstrate Kāshānī’s influence on Mullā Ṣadrā’s account of mental existence, utilizing a comparative and descriptive methodology. The material of this research includes Kāshānī’s manuscript on mental existence as well as Mullā Ṣadrā’s works on this issue. The authors edited and revised Kāshānī’s manuscript and during the editing realized this important influence by comparing it with Mullā Ṣadrā's works.

The nature and existence of time is a major issue in Islamic philosophy. Avicenna is a philosopher who presented various discussions of the problem in different works, trying to explain the problem of time and its relation with other things such as motion and distance ( masāfat ). In his major philosophical books, Remarks and Admonitions(al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt) , The Book of Healing (al-Shifāʾ) , and The Book of Salvation(al-Najāt) , Avicenna examines and explains the nature and manner of existence of time, but he does not isolate the theological consequences of his account. An account of such consequences can reveal his view of the matter. In fact, it is essential to see how definitions of time would affect views of theological problems, as it can clarify the intellectual-philosophical system of philosophers. In this article, I draw on the analytic-descriptive method to offer an accurate picture of the nature and existence of time in Avicenna’s view, and then explicate the consequences of that definition for theological problems. I argue that Avicenna’s account of time has four consequences: (1) time’s pre-eternity is evidence of God’s pre-eternity, (2) time’s post-eternity is evidence of the post-eternity of the necessary existence, (3) the relation between God and time is possible only through the existence of intermediaries, and (4) the essential incipience of time implies the eternality of God’s grace.