مطالب

This study employed a concurrent triangulation mixed-methods design to examine the impact of backward design (BD), central design (CD), and forward design (FD) on the speaking proficiency and engagement of 75 intermediate-level Iranian EFL learners, aged 18–21, selected through convenience sampling at Arak University, Iran. Participants attended nine weekly 105-minute sessions over one semester, with intermediate proficiency verified by the Oxford Quick Placement Test. Pre-tests established baseline speaking abilities, and participants were divided into three groups of 25: BD group (BDG), CD group (CDG), and FD group (FDG). Data were gathered using IELTS speaking pre- and post-tests, a student engagement scale (SES), and semi-structured interviews. The BDG focused on defining learning outcomes and using assessments such as observations and recorded speeches to track progress and adjust instruction. The FDG prioritized structured activities targeting specific speaking skills, using formative and summative assessments to evaluate mastery. The CDG adopted a learner-centric approach, incorporating personas, scenarios, and open educational resources to create collaborative, engaging activities emphasizing social context and emotional growth. Post-intervention results revealed CD as the most effective in enhancing speaking proficiency and engagement, followed by BD, with FD being the least effective. These findings underscore CD’s strength in fostering interactive, meaningful learning experiences for Iranian EFL learners. The study suggests that curriculum developers and educators should prioritize learner-centered approaches, such as CD, to improve EFL speaking outcomes and engagement.

To date, the world has witnessed five instances of the use of force against States' nuclear programs: the U.S. response to the Cuban missile crisis (1962), Israel's attack on Iraq’s Osirak reactor (1981), the coalition States’ military strike on Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction program (2003), Israel’s attack on the Al-Kibar in Syria (2007), and most recently, the June 2025 Israeli attack—carried out in cooperation with the United States—on Iran’s nuclear facilities. The attacking States claimed that their actions were justified on the basis that the nuclear programs of the targeted States, having allegedly deviated toward military purposes, had become an existential threat. Regardless of the accuracy of such claims, can the deviation of a State’s nuclear program from peaceful purposes—and even the acquisition of nuclear weapons—be considered per se a threat to international peace and security, capable of justifying a preemptive attack aimed at destroying or halting that program? This article examines existing State practice and, the ICJ’s case law to conclude that although the formerly consistent State practice rejecting such attacks has fragmented, the current divergence among States does not yet permit the emergence of a new exception to the peremptory norm of the prohibition of the use of force.

In June 2025, the U.S and Israel took extensive military action against Iran which resulted in inflicting severe damage on country’s infrastructure. The primary question of the research is, from the standpoint of international law, whether the actions of Israel and United States of America were legitimate, and what legal response does Iran have. The hypothesis of the research is based on the premise that the aforementioned attacks are illegal and constitute multiple violations of international law, neither falling within the framework of legitimate self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter nor within the framework of anticipatory self-defense. According to the Caroline doctrine, Iran was not planning to attack at any level whether at initial stages or other levels therefore the imminence of self-defense would lose its function and there was no practical and immediate threat against Israel. Therefore, Israel's attack in the form of preventive self-defense also lacked legal legitimacy and constituted military aggression. This research was conducted using a descriptive-analytical method and library document review. The findings indicate the attacks constitute a clear violation of Article 56 of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions 1977, which prohibits attacks on installations containing dangerous materials, Articles 35 and 55 regarding prohibition of environmental destruction, Article 85(3)(c) which considers such attacks as war crimes, violation of the principle of distinction between military and civilian targets by attacking targets such as the Evin Prison and numerous hospitals, Article 8(2)(b)(4) of the Rome Statute, and Article 2 of the UN Charter regarding peaceful settlement of disputes, while Iran was engaged in negotiations. The article's findings prove that Iran can file complaints based on violations of established principles of international law if the U.S and Israel accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, and can also pursue justice through Declaration under Article 12(3) of the ICC and other legal remedies, as the practice of the ICC shows that its judicial policy regarding issuing arrest warrants for heads of state has undergone significant developments