سهراب حقیقت

One of the contentious issues concerning Farabi's views is whether he asserts the immortality of souls or not, and, if the former, whether this immortality is personal (individual) or generic (of the species). This article, employing a descriptive-analytical method, argues that Farabi holds the view of personal immortality, though not for all humans, but only for certain individuals. The fundamental reason for the confusion and conflict in views regarding Farabi's stance on the issue of immortality stems from the failure to distinguish between the different souls in the various cities (societies) in his philosophy. Farabi's criterion for explaining immortality is the actualization of human intellect through connection with the Active Intellect. Based on this criterion, he considers only the inhabitants of the two types of cities—the Virtuous City and the Transgressing City—to be immortal, because only the intellect of these two groups of humans becomes actualized. The difference is that the inhabitants of the Virtuous City act upon their knowledge, whereas the inhabitants of the Transgressing City abstain from acting upon their knowledge. Humans in all other cities only experience worldly life, and their souls perish with the decay of the body due to the non-actualization of their intellect. Regarding the issue of immortality being personal or generic, a reflection on Farabi's works leads to the conclusion that he posits a specific connection between the body and the temperament on the one hand, and the temperament and the soul on the other, considering each soul specific to a body and vice-versa. Therefore, just as we encounter multiple and individuated souls in worldly life due to the multiplicity of bodies and temperaments, in the afterlife, souls will also be distinguished from one another and will continue their immortal life in an individuated and personalized manner due to the acquisition of multiple and different dispositions and habits.

Aristotle considers metaphysics a science that discusses being qua being (or "being insofar as it is being") and its essential attributes. Alongside "being qua being," he also speaks of absolute being. The multiple meanings of "being" in Aristotle's thought have led interpreters to diverse understandings of what Aristotle truly meant by "being qua being? "They would have disagreements. A disagreement that starts from ontology and impacts their theology. Among Muslim philosophers, Avicenna and Averroes (Ibn Rushd), and among Christian philosophers, Albert the Great(Albertus Magnus) and his student Thomas Aquinas, have commented on this matter. In Avicenna's view, what is meant by 'being qua being' is a universal concept that applies to all beings, including the Necessary Existent per se. Consequently, the Necessary Existent is part of the subject matter of philosophy. However, Averroes introduced the highest substance to explain "being qua being" and considered God the subject of philosophy. Consequently, he regarded the proof of God as part of the problems of natural science. In Albert the Great's view, "being qua being" is the simple existence as the first creation of God, and this simple existence is the subject of philosophy. In Thomas Aquinas's perspective, "being qua being," although the subject of philosophy, applies only to contingent beings, and God is the cause of this "being qua being." A comparative study of these disagreements and the reasons behind them forms the framework of this article.

With a rational reflection on possible beings, Farabi presents an analysis of the relationship between existence and essence, which requires a new philosophical system distinct from Greek philosophy. In his view, all possible beings are composed of two metaphysical aspects, i.e. existence and essence. By distinguishing constituents (muqawwamāt) from accidental things (‘araḍiyyāt) and using terms such as ‘āriḍ and lāzim, Farabi explores the structure of possible beings. In possible beings, existence is not the same or a part of essence; rather, it is an accident of essence, and since any accidental thing is subject to causality (mu‘allal), thus the possible things require something out of themselves for their existence. The main point is that the container of this distinction is not merely the world of the mind or the objective world; rather, it is the product of rational analysis. In other words, the distinction of existence and essence is neither a mental distinction nor a physical one; rather, it is a rational distinction which is called, in today’s metaphysics, metaphysical distinction. In metaphysical distinction, the existence and essence of the possible beings are two ontological principles and two metaphysical modes of the being that compose its identity. The metaphysical distinction designs the foundation of the non-Greek philosophical system based on which one can explain, from the theological viewpoint, proving the existence of the Necessary Being, the evolution of the ultimate causality, natural agency with the agentive causality and divine agency; from the cosmological viewpoint, proving the essential contingency of the universe and the philosophical explanation of the creation; from the ontological viewpoint, dividing beings into necessary and possible, and explaining the structure of possible beings; and from the epistemological viewpoint, evolution in dividing knowledge. This article is an applied study that attempts, by relying on the descriptive-analytical method with an exploration of the metaphysical distinction between existence and essence, to deal with applying that distinction in Farabi’s philosophical system and its products and results.