محمدمهدی منادی

SUBJECT & OBJECTIVES:  Contemporary societies confront multifaceted ethical challenges—including information warfare, genetic editing, and environmental crises—for which traditional ethical frameworks frequently prove inadequate. This study examines the “Theory of Nominal Equilibrium” (iʿtidāl al-asmāʾī), which draws upon the foundations of Islamic mysticism (ʿirfān) and Quranic ontology to offer an alternative framework for addressing and managing ethical conflicts. METHOD & FINDING:  Employing an analytical-interpretive method, this research investigates the system of Divine Names in Islamic mysticism through reference to the Quran, Hadith, and the works of prominent mystics such as Ibn ʿArabī. It then compares this system with materialist approaches grounded in sustainable development. The study further explores the theory’s application to natural resource management as a practical case study. According to the theory, the roots of ethical conflicts lie in the dynamic manifestations of seemingly opposing Divine Names (e.g., al-Bāsiṭ [the Expander] and al-Qābiḍ [the Constrictor]). These are harmonized and brought into equilibrium under the governance of the all-encompassing Name Allāh, mediated through the role of the Perfect Human (the Divine Vicegerent). The theory attributes intrinsic rights to all existents—not in an axiological or contractual sense, but as ontological manifestations of the Divine Names. In this respect, it diverges significantly from Western anthropocentric models that treat natural resources primarily as property. CONCLUSION:  By incorporating conceptually quantifiable tools inspired by the Divine Names al-Muḥṣī (the Reckoner) and al-Ḥasīb (the Accounter), operationalizable in policy analysis, the Theory of Nominal Equilibrium integrates mystical principles into a coherent framework. This approach offers a distinctive and integrative response to contemporary ethical dilemmas.

SUBJECT & OBJECTIVES: Ontological inquiry constitutes one of the central concerns of metaethics. Within this field, theories are commonly divided into two main categories: realist and non-realist. While this primary distinction is well established, the secondary classifications and internal variations within realism have received comparatively little attention. Many of the enduring ambiguities in moral philosophy arise from the lack of a precise differentiation among realist positions. This study aims to address that gap by re-examining the ontological foundations and typological distinctions within moral realism. METHOD & FINDING: Using an analytical–descriptive method, this study differentiates between two distinct forms of moral realism—rationalist realism and sentimentalist realism—and explicates their respective implications. Representative approaches of sentimentalist realism include hedonism, Isaiah Berlin’s notion of negative liberty, Karl Popper’s reduction of suffering, and Benthamite utilitarianism. In contrast, MacIntyre’s virtue ethics, scientism, and perfectionism exemplify rationalist realism. The implications of rationalist realism can be summarized as follows: 1. The possibility of rational justification for moral judgments; 2. The dependence of moral values on ontological realities; 3. The possibility of moral preference in cases of ethical conflict based purely on ontological grounds; 4. The capacity to identify and prioritize the virtuous individual; 5. The derivability of “ought” from “is” on rational premises alone; 6. Monism is grounded in a single rational proposition; 7. Absolutism grounded in an absolute rational principle. CONCLUSION: While sentimentalist realism shares certain structural features with other realist frameworks, it diverges from rationalist realism in several essential respects, particularly regarding the role of sentiment, taste, and individual inclination in grounding moral value. This distinction underscores the need for a more nuanced typology of moral realism within contemporary metaethical discourse.