تحلیل سه سطحی نظریه های خیریه: مطالعه موردی دیگردوستی مؤثر (مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
درجه علمی: نشریه علمی (وزارت علوم)
آرشیو
چکیده
دیدگاه ها درباره خیریه در سطوحی متفاوت طرح می شوند و یا می شود یک دیدگاه را در سطوح متفاوت فهمید. پیشنهاد می شود دیدگاه خیریه را می توان در یکی از این سه سطح یا ترکیبی از آنها فهمید: موضع نظری، رویکرد و جنبش. سپس، از «دیگردوستی مؤثر» به عنوان نمونه استفاده می کنیم و بررسی می کنیم چگونه می توان آن را در سه سطح متفاوت فهمید. چه بسا بدون تفکیک این سطوح نتوانیم تصویری درست از سرشت و وجوه تمایز این جریان خیریه داشته باشیم. همچنین، جنس نقدها به این جریان را می توان متناسب با سطوح مختلف در نظر گرفت و به شکلی متناسب با آنها مواجه شد. در نهایت، این تفکیک از آن رو مهم است که بسته به نقش ما در زیست بوم خیریه، ممکن است یک دیدگاه در بعضی از سطوح برای ما اهمیت بیشتر یا کمتری داشته باشد. در نتیجه، این تفکیک ها کمک می کند ارزیابی بهتری از نظریه های خیریه داشته باشیم، نقدها به نظریه ها را بهتر ارزیابی کنیم و به این ترتیب، تصمیم های فردی، سازمانی و سیاستی پذیرفتنی تری را اتخاذ کنیم.Three-Level Analysis of Charity Theories: The Case of Effective Altruism
Introduction I propose a three-level analysis to understand charity theories – i.e., theories about how charities should be run. As a case study, “Effective Altruism” (EA) is explored on all three levels. I suggest that taking the three-level analysis helps to better understand EA itself. Furthermore, such an analysis provides a better framework to evaluate the common criticisms against EA. Here is the plan for what follows. In Section 2, I introduce Effective Altruism and its roots. In Section 3, I apply the three-level analysis to EA. Next, in Section 4, I review the main criticisms against EA and explain how the three-level analysis helps address and evaluate them. The last section is for review and conclusion. Effective Altruism To better know EA, we start with its theoretical roots, then move to it’s becoming an organization as it is now. Effective Altruism has its theoretical roots in moral philosophy. Specifically, one inspiring point is Peter Singer’s “Famine, affluence, and morality” (1972). Singer has contributed hugely to the formation of EA by his later work, including The life you can save (2009) and The most good you can do (2015). In the initiating 1972 paper, Singer presents a simple argument. The simplicity of the argument is in its attempt to be independent of specific ethical theories. The thought is that some intuitive judgment, which may be justified using a variety of ethical theories, leads to radical conclusions about the ethics of charity. The main argument there comes with two premises. First, the axiological premise is about how bad the state of the world is. The second, more crucial premise is the deontological one: “[If] it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it” (1972: 231). The first premise is not controversial – there are many evils to be prevented. But why should we accept the second premise? The Pond Example is supposed to push us to accept this premise. Consider a simple case where a child is drowning in a pond, and one is passing by. There is no one else around. The child may be saved with a bit of sacrifice, say, one’s clothes getting wet. Intuitively, one has to save the child in this case. The judgment is explained by the second premise mentioned above. The same line of reasoning results in our many (altruistic) duties to others, at least as long as no serious sacrifice is required. So far, there are good arguments to accept “altruism”, that there are duties to others. However, Effective Altruism emphasizes another aspect of charity as well: effectiveness. The thought is that for the same reasons that we have to help others, the help must be effective too. The point of charity is to help people. Therefore, we should be careful not to go for the kinds of charities or activities that may make us feel good but do not provide real help compared with other alternatives. Putting these two ideas together, Giving What We Can was founded at Oxford University and then found its way to other universities in the UK and the US. William McAskill (2015, 2022) and Toby Ord, both Oxford philosophers, are the main figures to make these moves happen. This is the first step to put the theoretical ideas into practice and make organizations and movements based on them. This and similar projects, such as 80.000 Hours and then The Center for Effective Altruism, made “Effective Altruism” official beyond the already known theoretical ideas, but as specific organizations and social movements. Evaluating Effective Altruism on Three Levels Considering the formation of EA, including its roots and current situation, there are three ways to understand what EA amounts to. That is, consider whether you either agree or disagree with EA. What is it exactly that is agreed upon or disagreed upon? There are three levels to consider EA: as a theoretical position, as a practical approach, or as a concrete movement. This distinction helps to make sense of the distinctness of EA. As noted, EA as a theoretical position is rather familiar among moral philosophers. What makes EA distinct is how it is put to work as a practical approach to charity (see Temkin, 2021): to emphasize that charity requires serious empirical research, considering that studying effectiveness requires relying on a variety of academic disciplines, beyond moral philosophy. Finally, the EA as it is now is tied to specific figures and organizations. Imagine that some fraudulent practice is identified in some of these organizations. This would affect EA organizations as they are now, but the theoretical position and the practical approach may remain intact. Thus, the three levels on which EA may be understood are distinct. Considering this distinction, criticisms against EA may be better evaluated and addressed. First, some of the concrete advice of EA is challenged by the opponents. For example, opponents argue that the individualistic approach of EA does not work. In many such cases, it seems that the proponents of EA as a theoretical position and practical approach would reply that the more effective way is to be taken. That some advice is not the most effective one is not a challenge to the very idea, but the concrete organizations of EA as they are now (see McMahan, 2016; Chappell, 2024). Second, there are worries about EA that go deeper. For example, opponents may emphasize that some aspects of EA are not developed enough to enable it to deal with real-world problems. For example, the conception of well-being at work in calculations of effectiveness matters substantially for decision-making. Such criticisms, if they work, target EA as a practical approach as well as a theoretical positio. (For another line of argument based on development economics, see Deaton, 2013; Temkin, 2021.) The point is that different criticisms against EA may be evaluated differently, relying on the three-level analysis. This helps to bring about the more interesting lessons of EA and keep it distinct from some other aspects of it. Conclusion The Three-Level Analysis helps understand various charity theories. It helps both in presenting the theories themselves and evaluating criticisms against them. Meanwhile, there may be limits to such an analysis. It is not claimed that we can always keep the three levels distinct. There are some connections between the theoretical position and the practical approach. Furthermore, it would be problematic to defend a practical approach by dismissing any criticisms as criticisms of the concrete movement and not the general approach itself. Such possible limits must be acknowledged. I have attempted to show that this is compatible with the fruitfulness of the Three-Level Analysis.
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