تعاملات غیررسمی و مشروط شهردار تهران؛ پژوهشی کیفی در نظام مدیریت شهری ایران (مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
درجه علمی: نشریه علمی (وزارت علوم)
آرشیو
چکیده
شهردار، نقش و وظایف مهم و متنوعی در نظام مدیریت شهری دارد. یکی از مهم ترینِ این نقش ها، نقش رهبری است. نقش شهردار در تعامل با سایر کنشگران شهری معنا پیدا می کند. در نظام مدیریت شهری کشور کنشگران متعددی با مسائل شهری سروکار دارند و کنشگرانی که شهردار با آنها در تعامل است طیف گسترده ای را شامل می شود، لذا بهبود مجموعه مدیریت شهری نیازمند همکاری و تعامل موثر میان این کنشگران است. بنابراین هدف این پژوهش شناسایی ساختارهای پنهان تأثیرگذار بر تعاملات شهردار تهران در سطوح مختلف و نیز راهبردهای سازگاری در شرایط مختلف و برای مدیریت تعاملات در این سطوح است. رویکرد این پژوهش کیفی و مبتنی بر روش نظریه زمینه ای است. برای گردآوری داده ها از شیوه مصاحبه نیمه ساختاریافته با مدیران ارشد و میانی شهر تهران بهره گرفته شده است. یافته های پژوهش تببین کننده تعاملات غیررسمی و مشروط شهردار تهران در نتیجه تعاملات نامتوازن است. این تعاملات نامتوازن نشأت گرفته از ناکارآمدی قانون، تمرکزگرایی ساختار اداری- سازمانی، شیوه انتخاب شهردار و مدیران ارشد و سیاست زدگی زنجیره وار در انتخاب ارکان مدیریت شهری است. در پی تعاملات نامتوازن، راهبرد اصلی شهرداران برای حفظ تعاملات و جبران تعاملات ازدست رفته، روی آوردن به تعاملات مشروط و غیررسمی است.Informal and conditional interactions of the mayor of Tehran; A qualitative study in the urban management system of Iran
The mayor plays an important and multifaceted role in the urban management system, with leadership being one of the most significant responsibilities. The leadership role gains meaning particularly through the mayor’s interactions with other urban actors. In the urban management system of Iran, numerous actors deal with urban issues and the mayor must engage with a wide array of them, as such improving the urban management collection requires effective cooperation and interaction among these actors. This study’s purpose purpose is to uncover hidden structures influencing mayoral interactions at various levels and to develop adaptive strategies for managing these interactions under different circumstances. The research adopts a qualitative approach based on grounded theory methodology. From an internal perspective, it is descriptive-exploratory, while externally, it is considered practical.Semi-structured interviews were employed to collect data. Participants included Tehran's mayors, deputy mayors, district mayors, city council members, researchers, and urban experts. These participants were selected purposefully, using techniques such as snowball sampling with a total of 26 individuals determined upon reaching theoretical saturation. The interview data were analyzed through three stages of coding (open, axial, and selective) and through analytical methods such as comparison and questioning of data, facilitated by ATLAS.ti 9 software. The research findings elucidate that the informal and conditional interactions of the Mayor of Tehran are the result of teeter interactions. These teeter interactions stem from the inefficiency of the law, the centralization of the administrative-organizational structure, the method of selecting the mayor and senior managers in the municipality, and the chain politicization in the selection of urban management members. The inefficiency of laws and the centralization of the administrative-organizational structure lead to a reduction in the mayor's interactions. Chain politicization in the selection of urban management authorities results in politicized interactions. Moreover, the method of selecting the mayor and senior managers contributes to the imbalance and instability of the mayor's interactions. In response to the mayor’s teeter interactions, his strategy to maintain engagements and compensate for lost interactions is to turn to conditional and informal engagements. In essence, urban management authorities attempt to preserve their interactions across various levels through informal interactions, which occur conditionally and under specific circumstances. The consequences of such informal and conditional interactions include weakened performance and managerial instability for the mayor. Informal interactions pave the way for the personalization of these interactions, leading to the corruption of the urban management structure. Imbalanced and conditional interactions ultimately weaken the mayor's interactions and performance, resulting in the instability of their managerial tenure. Essentially, the inability of the mayor to persuade other institutions in interactions leads to unstable management, a phenomenon exemplified by the short tenures of mayors in previous periods. More precisely, informal interactions lead to the personalization of relationships, prioritizing personal interests. This ultimately results in the corruption of the urban management structure. Additionally, the imbalance and conditional nature of interactions weaken the mayor's performance and engagement with others.
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