رقابت در بازار محصول، قدرت مدیرعامل و خوانایی گزارش های مالی (مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
درجه علمی: نشریه علمی (وزارت علوم)
آرشیو
چکیده
شرایط بازار محصول یکی از عوامل مهم تأثیرگذار بر توازن منافع و هزینه های قدرت مدیرعامل است. از یک سو، به عنوان یک مکانیسم خارجی راهبری شرکتی، می تواند احتمال اینکه مدیر از قدرت خود در راستای رفتارهای فرصت طلبانه استفاده کند و بر خوانایی گزارش های مالی اثر گذارد را کاهش دهد. از سوی دیگر، افزایش هزینه افشای اطلاعات در شرایط رقابتی بازار، حفظ موقعیت رقابتی و منافع شخصی ممکن است انگیزه هایی را برای مدیران قدرتمند ایجاد کند تا گزارش های مالی را پیچیده تر و با قابلیت خوانایی کمتری افشا کنند؛ از این رو، هدف پژوهش حاضر بررسی تأثیر رقابت در بازار محصول بر ارتباط بین قدرت مدیرعامل و خوانایی گزارش های مالی است. فرضیه های پژوهش برای 105 شرکت پذیرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران در بازه زمانی 1395 تا 1401 آزمون شدند. نتایج نشان می دهد بین قدرت مدیرعامل و خوانایی گزارشگری مالی رابطه ای مثبت و معنادار وجود دارد. همچنین، رقابت در بازار محصول بر ارتباط بین قدرت مدیرعامل و خوانایی گزارشگری مالی اثر تعدیل کننده کاهشی دارد.Competition in the product market, CEO's power, and readability of financial reports
Product market conditions are an important factor that affects the balance of benefits and costs associated with CEO power. On the one hand, competition in the product market serves as an external mechanism of corporate governance, which can reduce the likelihood of management engaging in opportunistic behavior and enhance the clarity of the company's financial reports. On the other hand, increased costs associated with information disclosure in competitive market conditions, coupled with the need to maintain a competitive edge and individual interests, may incentivize powerful managers to present financial reports that are more complex and less transparent. Therefore, the purpose of this research is to investigate the effect of competition in the product market on the relationship between CEO power and the readability of financial reports. Research hypotheses were tested using data from 105 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange between 2016 and 2022. The results indicate a positive and significant relationship between CEO power and the readability of financial reporting. Furthermore, competition in the product market has a diminishing moderating effect on the relationship between CEO power and the readability of financial reports.
Introduction
The readability of annual reports is an important tool for communication between companies and various stakeholders, including investors, creditors, and financial analysts. Recent studies have shown that the readability of financial reports is influenced by the power of managers. There is no clear consensus regarding the effect of CEO power on company outcomes. On the one hand, it is assumed that as CEOs' power increases, their ability to pursue personal interests also grows. In this view, managers may use their power to obfuscate financial reports, reducing their readability. This perspective aligns with certain economic research. On the other hand, opponents of this view argue that increased CEO power may enhance the monitoring of the company's processes and financial reporting. Factors such as adherence to laws and regulations, motivation to maintain a positive reputation, and superior management skills may lead powerful managers to adopt better strategies for company operations, thus promoting transparency and safeguarding the interests of all stakeholder groups. Consequently, powerful CEOs may produce more readable financial reports, consistent with findings in organizational research. Furthermore, product market conditions significantly impact the balance of benefits and costs associated with CEO power. On the one hand, competition in the product market acts as an external mechanism of corporate governance, potentially diminishing the likelihood that management will exploit their power for opportunistic behavior, which could enhance the readability of financial reports. On the other hand, high disclosure costs in competitive markets, coupled with the need to maintain a competitive edge and personal interests, may incentivize powerful managers to create financial reports that are more complex and less readable. In light of these considerations, the purpose of this research is to investigate the effect of competition in the product market on the relationship between CEO power and the readability of financial reports.
Methods & Material
The current research is based on applied results. In terms of its goals, it is analytical, quasi-experimental, and correlational. Regarding the time dimension of the data, it is retrospective and post-event. To achieve the objectives of the research, 105 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange were examined for the period from 2016 to 2022. The power of the CEO was measured using the principal component analysis method, which considered criteria such as CEO duality, the percentage of independent directors on the board, CEO tenure, and CEO ownership percentage. Additionally, the readability of financial reports was assessed using the Fog index, and competition in the product market was measured using the Lerner index. To collect research data, the Rahavard Novin database and reports published on the Codal website were utilized. For data review and analysis, EViews software was employed, and regression analysis with panel data was used to estimate the research models.
Findings
The results indicate a positive and significant relationship between the CEO's power and the readability of financial reporting. In other words, as the CEO's power increases, the readability level of financial reporting also improves. Additionally, competition in the product market has a diminishing moderating effect on the relationship between CEO power and the readability of financial reporting.
Conclusion & Results
The results, consistent with organizational theory, show that powerful CEOs positively influence the readability of financial reports by enhancing company performance, motivating the maintenance of their reputation, building a strong personal and professional network for better access to crucial (including private) information, and implementing valuable practices such as superior management techniques and social responsibility initiatives. However, in competitive environments, powerful managers may present more complex and less readable financial reports to prevent competitors from accessing company information and maintaining a competitive advantage, which aligns with the ambiguous management hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, managers' motivations can obscure and conceal information through less transparent disclosures. They may hide information they do not wish to disclose, making it challenging for investors to comprehend financial reporting.
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