use of force

Conducting a special military operation in Ukraine has created a crisis in legal and geopolitical order. Political documents such as ``On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians`` and ``on conducting a special military operation`` cannot be truly re-read except by re-interpreting the geopolitico-theological texts of the Heideggerian theoreticians of the Russian Katechonic identity. By re-visiting the theory of Katechon, this article aims to examine the so-called Katechontic identity of Russia in the geopolitics of crisis and the dimensions of the Russian mindset in intervention in legal rule making in the global state of war. In fact, the main question of this article is how the Katechonic identity of Russia is defined in apocalyptic geopolitics, and theories such as neo-Eurasianism and National Bolshevism, based on theological and philosophical foundations, have worked to prepare an anti-legal order beyond the international legal order? The Russo-Ukrainian War is the main case. This article is in the framework of radical political theology, critical theory in international law and critical geopolitics.

This article examines the application of Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter in relation to Israel’s claim of sovereignty over the Golan Heights. Israel has cited historical Jewish rule and invoked “defensive conquest” to justify its position. However, this interpretation misrepresents the non-use of force principle. The article references relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and treaty interpretation rules, emphasizing a strict application of international law, which Israel has overlooked. The UN Charter’s main purpose of maintaining international peace supports this strict interpretation. Consequently, the notion of defensive conquest violates Article 2(4) and customary international law. Additionally, the article discusses the 2024 International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion, which reaffirmed the illegality of Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights and highlighted the prohibition of acquiring territory by force, as established by the UN Charter.

This article examines the legality of Israel’s claim to a right of preemptive self-defense against Iran within the framework of international law. It argues that such a claim lacks any valid legal foundation and stands in stark contrast to the fundamental principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations as well as established international jurisprudence. According to Article 51 of the UN Charter, the use of force in self-defense is only permissible in response to an actual and verifiable armed attack. Any military action based solely on the anticipation or assumption of an imminent threat does not meet the legal threshold and is not recognized by the international legal order. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in landmark cases such as Nicaragua (1986), the Advisory Opinion on the Wall (2004), and Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda (2005), has consistently adopted a narrow interpretation of self-defense, explicitly rejecting the doctrine of preemptive force. Israel’s assertion of facing a permanent threat from Iran, absent concrete evidence of an imminent armed attack, cannot serve as a lawful justification for the use of force. Such actions not only contravene the prohibition on the use of force and the principle of state sovereignty but may also constitute a breach of peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens) and amount to an act of aggression. Furthermore, acceptance of such a precedent poses serious challenges to the maintenance of international peace and security and risks undermining the credibility of the global legal order. Drawing on authoritative sources, international instruments, and comparative legal analysis, the article concludes that Israel’s invocation of preemptive self-defense is legally unfounded and incompatible with contemporary international law.

In the classical system of international law, states have largely used religion as an instrument in their reciprocal relations. This “instrumental” interpretation of religion was often a reason of conflict rather the ground of religious freedom. Since its origins, yet, the international legal system has changed and it is reasonable to ask what role religion plays at present day in international relations.  The present article aims at suggesting that religion – or more exactly “religiosity” – can be an element of diplomacy. Taking the transformation from International to “global law” into account, this article promotes a constructive, not-more instrumental, role of religion, useful to prevent the States from the use of force. In so doing, it offers some insights into the differences between “religion” and “religiosity” in the contemporary human rights’ discourse; analyzes the recent involvement of religious leaders in global law; presents the emergence of a new methodology, called “Religious Diplomacy”. This methodology is supported by the increased number of international provisions encouraging a major engagement of religious actors into diplomacy. As a result, international community could enhance human religiosity as a factor of diplomacy. International organizations such as United Nations, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and European Union should use their convening power to initiate new, multi-layered frameworks of engagement, inclusive of the representatives of global religions. This could make multilateralism more fit for purpose and have a major impact over time on the global peaceful relations among states and international actors.

The claim of Russia’s humanitarian intervention in Ukraine serves as a legal justification for theuse of force. However, there is no evidence supporting allegations of genocide in the Donetskor Luhansk regions. While the majority of states oppose Russia’s invasion, this does not justifyoverlooking the rule of law, particularly the law of neutrality. In Ukraine’s struggle againstRussian aggression, the United States and its allies have provided weapons and military trainingto Ukrainian forces. This unprecedented support violates the prohibition of the use of force andthe law of neutrality. According to the Thirteenth Hague Convention of 1907, neutral countriescannot supply “war material of any kind” to belligerent powers. Consequently, Russia holdsthe right to take countermeasures against governments violating neutrality. Furthermore, underArticle 52 of the First Protocol to the Geneva Convention of 1949, Russia may target weaponsin Ukraine’s possession. However, if Russia targets these weapons before they are actively usedby Ukraine, such an attack could violate jus ad bellum, as the transfer of weapons alone cannotbe classified as an armed attack against Russia.