Formalities

Historically, formalities and diplomatic protocols, as one of the pillars of successful international diplomacy, have played a crucial role in shaping the political currents of the time. This study examines and studies the role and effect of British-Russian rivalries regarding the inefficiency of the Iranian formality system, as well as analyzing the function of these formalities in the relations of this power triangle during the Qajar era, and by means of a historical method and a descriptive-analytical view which is based on documents, travelogues and historical resources of the Qajar era, it seeks to answer the questions of to what extent diplomatic rituals and ceremonies have been effective in the rivalry and emulation of Russian and British governments in Iran? What were the factors that led to the structural weakness of Iran's formalities and its becoming a buffer state in the great game between Russia and Britain? What role did the performance of the Russian and British ambassadors play in Iran's formality relations? It seems that factors such as imitation and competition of the British and Russian ambassadors for Formalities respect caused the role of Formalities in Iran's relations with the Russian and British governments to be not positive and effective. Meanwhile, the performance of the Russian and British ambassadors, the establishment of Formality agreements and the negligence of the Iranian government were not ineffective in shaping formality actions and reactions between the governments

Iran’s Law on International Commercial Arbitration (LICA), inspired by the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Arbitration, was enacted in 1997 with the aim of modernizing the country’s approach to international commercial disputes. Employing a descriptive- analytical methodology, this paper analyzes LICA’s strengths and weaknesses with a focus on the Iranian Constitution which- as the country’s Supreme Law - has seemingly eclipsed the arbitration process. Specifically, this research zeroes in on the potential conflict between Article 139 of the Constitution, which mandates parliamentary approval for foreign disputes involving state assets, and the inherently expeditious nature of arbitration. This study argues that these constitutional formalities - while safeguarding national interests - should be reduced as they may hamper the efficiency and expeditiousness typically associated with arbitration. The author proposes that - as arbitration is intertwined with less formality - the Guardian Council can invoke its constitutional powers to curtail these formalities and create an environment conducive to a standard arbitration process. This analysis maintains that the Iranian Constitution does not necessarily supersede arbitration provisions, and proposes that the Council has the authority to streamline arbitral procedures within the legal framework of the Islamic Republic of Iran.