انوش نادری

This article critically evaluates the legality of pre-emptive self-defence under contemporary international law, focusing specifically on Israel’s June 2025 airstrikes against Iran. By analyzing the legal framework established by Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter, the central argument contends that pre-emptive force remains unlawful absent an actual armed attack. However, an incremental accumulation of scholarships and national military manuals, primarily limited to certain western States, has fostered a self-referential cycle. This cycle projects the misleading appearance of an emerging customary norm authorizing pre-emptive or preventive use of force. This doctrinal ‘snowball effect’, whereby successive publications uncritically cite and amplify predecessors, generates an artificial sense of legal evolution. Nevertheless, rigorous analysis drawing on doctrine, International Court of Justice jurisprudence, general practice of States and even the Caroline criteria itself, often invoked by States justifying pre-emptive self-defence, reveals a clear distinction: lawful self-defence is strictly confined by necessity and proportionality, while anticipatory or preventive self-defence falls outside accepted legal boundaries. The article concludes that Israel’s justification, based on non-imminent and speculative threats, fails to meet even the lower threshold of the Caroline doctrine for pre-emptory self-defence – let alone the stricter contemporary jus ad bellum standards under the UN Charter. Recognizing a unilateral right to pre-emption would gravely undermine the jus cogens character of Article 2(4), erode the UN’s collective security system, and incentivize destabilizing unilateral initiatives and resorts to force. Consequently, absent Security Council authorization or a manifest armed attack, pre-emptive self-defence remains fundamentally incompatible with the current international legal order.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) often faces criticism for allegedly exceeding its mandateby engaging in what some perceive as lawmaking. This debate, though not new, continues tospark significant scholarly discourse and is even echoed by some of its own judges. Althoughthe ICJ consistently denies having a lawmaking function, its practices demonstrate its role in thedevelopment of international law. This raises the question: How can the Court contribute to thedevelopment of international law, particularly in addressing gaps, if it lacks formal lawmakingcapacities? Are the criticisms of the Court exceeding its mandate valid? Existing literatureoften conflates ‘judicial legislation’ with ‘lawmaking’, creating a bottleneck in reasoning whichcausing scholars to necessarily conclude that the ICJ inevitably exceeds its judiciary mandate andengages in creating new laws. However, understanding the ICJ’s role in developing internationallaw and addressing gaps, despite its statutory limitations, requires distinguishing between ‘judicial legislation’ and ‘lawmaking’. While the latter involves creating new laws, ‘judiciallegislation’ refers to a method of interpretation for adapting existing laws and establishing newlegal relationships to address emerging legal requirements. This article goes further to identifywhich types of interpretation are most effective for such judicial legislation. By examining theapproaches of the UN International Law Commission (ILC), the article highlights ‘evolutiveinterpretation’ as a particularly suitable method. Evolutive interpretation enables the Court torejuvenate existing laws, clarify ambiguities, and develop legal frameworks for unregulatedissues – all while staying within its adjudicative-only mandate and avoiding lawmaking.