یونس نادمی

The recent surge of artificial-intelligence (AI) activity has sparked concern that large-scale model training, cloud inference, and data-centre expansion could accelerate national energy demand. We marshal a 21-year annual panel for the United States (2004–2024) that couples multiple AI proxies—technology-stock valuations and a ChatGPT-era dummy—with four aggregate energy series (fossil fuels, nuclear, renewables, total primary energy). A five-stage empirical protocol implemented in Python combines Engle–Granger cointegration testing, higher-order ADF stationarity checks, linear and nonlinear dependence diagnostics (Pearson, Dynamic Time Warping, mutual information), multicollinearity screening (variance-inflation factors), and out-of-sample forecasting with linear regression, decision trees, random forests, and support-vector machines augmented by SHAP explainability. Across all tests we find no evidence that AI developments imprint on national energy use: AI variables cointegrate only with one another, their short-run correlations with energy vanish once trends are removed, their mutual-information scores remain near zero, and their inclusion never improves predictive accuracy beyond a parsimonious macro model driven by GDP, inflation, and population. SHAP rankings confirm that AI features carry negligible explanatory weight relative to conventional fundamentals. We conclude that, to date, AI’s macro-level energy footprint is statistically invisible—any electricity it consumes is either too small or offset by efficiency gains within the wider economy. Policymakers should therefore continue to anchor long-range energy scenarios to established economic drivers while monitoring localised data-centre hotspots that national aggregates obscure.