قاعده منع جانبداری در حقوق اداری انگلستان (مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
درجه علمی: نشریه علمی (وزارت علوم)
آرشیو
چکیده
در حقوق اداری، "قاعده منع جانبداری" از فروعات اصول "انصاف رویه ای" و مکمل نظریه "حکمرانی خوب" است. سوگیری های شخصی، شناختی، سازمانی- نهادی، مشارکت و مداخله قبلی، نظرات از پیش تعیین شده، پیش داوری و تمایل قبلی، از مهمترین زمینه های جانبداری بوده و می توانند بر فرآیندهای تصمیم گیری تأثیرگذار باشد. علی رغم اهمیت قاعده مذکور در تضمین انصاف، بی طرفی و شفافیت در فرآیندهای تصمیم گیری، کمتر به مبانی و وجوه آن در حقوق اداری پرداخته شده و عمده مباحث مطروحه معطوف به بی طرفی قضایی است. با توجه به جایگاه حقوق خارجی در حوزه حقوق اداری، این نوشتار با استفاده از روش تحلیل محتوا درصدد بررسی ماهیت، عناصر و کاربرد قاعده منع جانبداری در حقوق اداری انگلستان است. به نظر می رسد رویکرد نظام حقوقی انگلستان به قاعده یادشده پیچیده و پراکنده است و با استانداردهای مختلف اعمال می شود. همچنین ضمانت اجرای نقض قاعده منع جانبداری در رویه قضایی انگلستان، عدم صلاحیت مقام اداری است که نتیجه آن از بطلان تا قابلیت ابطال تصمیم جانبدارانه در نوسان است. اگرچه برخی نگرانی های قابل تأمل در مورد عدم انعطاف قاعده منع جانبداری به خصوص در موضوعات پیچیده، فنی و تخصصی اداری وجود دارد، با این حال ایجاد تعادل بین نگرانی های رقیب ضروری است.The Rule Against Bias in U.K. Administrative Law
Introduction In administrative law, the rule against bias constitutes a key component of principles of procedural fairness and complements the theory of good governance. Various forms of bias (e.g., personal, cognitive, organizational–institutional, previous involvement, preconceived opinions, predispositions, or prejudgments) can significantly influence decision-making processes. Despite the importance of the rule, its foundations and dimensions have received relatively limited attention within administrative law, with most discussions focusing primarily on judicial impartiality. Given the role of comparative law in administrative law, the present study adopted a descriptive–analytical approach to explore the nature, elements, and application of the rule against bias in British administrative law. Currently, the British legal system’s approach to the rule against bias appears fragmented and inconsistently applied, with varying standards. Any violation of this rule may render the administrative authority incompetent, with consequences ranging from the decision being void to merely voidable. While concerns persist regarding the rule’s rigidity—particularly in technically complex or specialized administrative matters—there remains a pressing need to balance between competing concerns. Literature Review The general applicability of the rule against bias, as the second principle of procedural justice, is addressed in a chapter in the Persian-language book titled Comparative Administrative Law: Procedural Justice (Fallahzadeh, 2015). Aside from Fallahzadeh’s work, which serves as a key reference for the present study, the existing Persian-language literature lacks an independent and comprehensive analysis of this topic. It seems that the literature on the principles underlying the rule against bias and the related judicial procedures remains limited. Thus, the present study can be considered a novel contribution in its focus on the legal status of biased administrative decisions, as well as the criticisms and challenges associated with the application of the rule against bias. Materials and Methods This study adopted a descriptive–analytical approach, drawing on the data collected through a library research method and a review of library sources. Results and Discussion According to the findings, the rule against bias plays a central role in upholding procedural fairness and legitimacy within the U.K. administrative legal system. The British courts have gradually moved away from rigid, formalistic distinctions—such as that between judicial and administrative functions—toward a more flexible, context-sensitive approach. This shift reflects a growing recognition that all decision-makers, regardless of their institutional position, are bound by the fundamental obligation to act impartially. The analysis identified three doctrinal categories of bias—actual, presumptive, and apparent—each with its own criteria and evidentiary standards. Although this categorization allows for nuanced application, it leads to a fragmented framework. Courts have thus far refrained from adopting a unified test, resulting in inconsistencies in application and interpretative uncertainty. Nevertheless, the current analysis supported the emerging scholarly and judicial view that a single, objective standard of apparent bias—centered on maintaining public confidence—could offer a more coherent and accessible doctrine. Moreover, the legal consequences of bias in administrative decisions—ranging from voidness to voidability—highlight a lack of consistency in available remedies. Outcomes often depend on judicial discretion and the nature of the administrative act, creating ambiguity that may undermine the predictability of the legal system. Despite these challenges, the British courts have consistently emphasized the need to balance procedural safeguards with practical considerations, particularly in specialized or technical administrative contexts. Finally, this research underscored the rule against bias as both a normative and functional safeguard. It serves not only to ensure the integrity of individual decisions but also to reinforce the broader legitimacy of administrative governance. The continued evolution of this doctrine in the U.K. law reflects an ongoing effort to reconcile formal legal principles with the imperatives of effective, accountable, and transparent public administration. Conclusion The rule against bias remains a fundamental principle of procedural fairness in the U.K. administrative law. Although the British courts have adopted a more flexible, context-sensitive approach—moving away from outdated distinctions between judicial and administrative functions—the absence of a unified standard for identifying bias continues to result in inconsistency. The tripartite framework of bias offers analytical clarity but complicates the predictability. The growing recognition of both material and immaterial interests as grounds for disqualification reflects the expansive scope of the rule, yet also underscores the need for a coherent, objective test grounded in public confidence. While breaches of the rule may render decisions void or voidable, the courts strive to balance this with practical considerations, such as administrative efficiency and expertise. Ultimately, the rule against bias is evolving from a rigid, formalistic safeguard into a dynamic mechanism for ensuring fairness, legitimacy, and accountability in public decision-making.
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