تفسیر لاگلین از اندیشه اوکشات در حقوق عمومی؛ با تأکید بر مفهوم سنت و رویه (مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
درجه علمی: نشریه علمی (وزارت علوم)
آرشیو
چکیده
جریان پیوند لاگلین و اوکشات از نگاه بومی، غیرهنجاری و عمل گرایانه به قانون اساسی شروع می شود. از نظر لاگلین، روند شکل گیری و تغییر قانون اساسی را با تفسیر رویه های حکومت و از منظر غیرهنجاری، متناسب با نظام سیاسی و حقوقی، باید پی گرفت. لاگلین، اوکشات را به عنوان مهمترین نماینده مکتب محافظه کاری در نظر می گیرد. از نظر او، اندیشه های اوکشات نظریه ای نظام مند از رفتار و سیاست انسانی است و لاگلین انتقادات اوکشات بر عقل گرایی و تأکید او بر دانش عملی یا سنتی را برجسته می کند و از اندیشه او در باب سیاست به عنوان یک سنت رفتار وام می گیرد. آنچه در این نوشتار مورد تأکید است توجه لاگلین به خوانش خاص اوکشات از مفهوم سنت و رویه است که به گمان نویسندگان، همین خوانش، الهام بخش طرح نظریه «حقوق عمومی به مثابه سنت» از جانب لاگلین است. لاگلین با توجه به دریافتی که اندیشه اوکشات دارد، حقوق عمومی را یک سنت می داند که در بستر خاص زمان و مکان شکل می گیرد و گویای فرهنگ خاص یک جامعه سیاسی است. بر این اساس تاکید لاگلین بر رویه حکومت و جریان انطباق تدریجی ترتیبات حقوق عمومی مطابق با تغییرات شرایط اجتماعی و سیاسی، بی آنکه متأثر از هنجارها باشد، به شدت یادآور تأکید اوکشات بر سیاست به عنوان یک سنت رفتار است.Loughlin’s Interpretation of Oakeshott’s Thought in Public Law: The Concepts of Tradition and Practice
Introduction The link between Martin Loughlin and Michael Oakeshott goes back to their native, non-normative, and pragmatic view on the constitution. According to Loughlin, the formation and evolution of a constitution should be understood by analyzing governmental practices from a non-normative standpoint, shaped within the context of each political and legal system. Considering Oakeshott as the foremost representative of conservatism, Loughlin explores the defining characteristics of Oakeshott’s philosophy as a systematic theory of human behavior and politics, as well as the particular form of conservatism it embodies. Loughlin emphasizes Oakeshott’s critique of rationalism and his emphasis on practical or traditional knowledge, drawing from his conception of politics as a tradition of behavior. The present study aimed to examine Loughlin’s engagement with Oakeshott’s distinctive reading of tradition and practice, which directly influenced Loughlin’s theory of public law as practice. On the basis of his reading of Oakeshott, Loughlin conceptualizes public law as a native system and a tradition shaped within a specific spatiotemporal context, reflecting the unique characteristics of a given society and political order. Accordingly, Loughlin’s emphasis on governance practices and the gradual adaptation of public law in response to social and political conditions—without being strictly dictated by normative principles—closely aligns with Oakeshott’s notion of politics as a practice of conduct. The study tried to answer the following research questions: How does Loughlin interpret Oakeshott’s political thought? And where does this interpretation manifest in Loughlin’s theory? Literature Review Loughlin and Oakeshott have generally been regarded as independent thinkers, despite Loughlin frequently referencing Oakeshott’s ideas in his works. Notably, Oakeshott’s political thought is examined in Loughlin’s Public Law and Political Theory (1992). The current research examined both thinkers, particularly in relation to key approaches in public law, analyzing the influences Loughlin has drawn from Oakeshott’s thought. Materials and Methods This study examined the writings of Loughlin and Oakeshott to describe their ideas and provide a thorough analysis of their perspectives on public law, the constitution, conservatism, politics, tradition, and practice. The objective was to determine how Oakeshott’s thought influenced Loughlin’s theory. Results and Discussion Michael Oakeshott was one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century, making significant contributions to political philosophy and the development of conservative and liberal theories. In his conservative perspective, he presented the concept of practice that governs conduct and is shaped by the specific historical and geographical context of its time and place. He rejected the notion of a universal reason that provides a single solution to political, economic, moral, and social issues across all times and places. Understanding Oakeshott’s thought is particularly relevant in the Iranian context. In this respect, the current study first defined public law from Loughlin’s perspective to clarify his approach to the subject. Then, two major styles governing Loughlin’s theory of public law were introduced, namely normativism and functionalism—each of which has its own ideal-typic models. The two ideal-typic models within the normative style are conservatism and liberalism, with the latter being the concern of this study. Loughlin presents Oakeshott’s thought as representative of the ideal-typic model of conservatism. He explores key aspects of Oakeshott’s philosophy, including its epistemological foundations, his critique of rationalism in politics, and central concepts such as government, law, and conservatism. Finally, Loughlin also evaluates Oakeshott’s political theory. He emphasizes Oakeshott’s critique of rationalism and his focus on practical or traditional knowledge, seemingly drawing from Oakeshott’s view of politics as a practice of conduct. According to the findings, Oakeshott’s ideas significantly influenced Loughlin, shaping the core foundations of his theories. In formulating his theory of public law as practice, Loughlin seems to adopt Oakeshott’s concept of practice as a guiding principle. Conclusion The findings helped provide a comprehensive understanding of Oakeshott’s and Loughlin’s approaches to public law and its relationship with politics. Moreover, the analysis identified the specific ways in which Oakeshott’s thought influenced Loughlin’s theory.
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