ارزیابی نظریات متفکرین معاصر در رابطه با علل توسعه نیافتگی ایران با تأکید بر حقوق مالکیت در چارچوب رهیافت های اقتصاد سیاسی (مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
درجه علمی: نشریه علمی (وزارت علوم)
آرشیو
چکیده
تا پیش از دهه 1990 نظریات اقتصاد سیاسی، امنیت حقوق مالکیت را مفروض پنداشته و به آن نپرداخته اند. اهمیت حقوق مالکیت به عنوان موتور محرکه رشد و توسعه اقتصادی، ابتدا توسط اقتصاددانان نهادگرا مورد توجه قرار گرفت و سپس بسط داده شد. در این مقاله که در چارچوب الگوی اقتصاد سیاسی نهادگرایی به روش کیفی توصیفی و با استفاده از داده های کتابخانه ای انجام شده، الگوهای نظری اقتصاد سیاسی مارکسیستی (فئودالیسم ایرانی و شیوه تولید آسیایی) و ایده مبتنی بر فردگرایی روش شناختی (آزادی خواهی نافرجام) که مورد استفاده محققین در تحلیل علل عدم توسعه نیافتگی ایران بوده با تأکید بر حقوق مالکیت مورد بررسی قرار گرفته است. نقطه ضعف این نظریات، عدم انطباق با سیر تحولات تاریخی ایران و عدم ارائه نظریه ای مستقل در رابطه با ناکارآمدی حقوق مالکیت در تاریخ ایران است. لذا استفاده از دستگاه نظری نهادگرایی که اصول آن بر شناخت تاریخ و نهادهای هر جامعه استوار است و توسعه نیافتگی حقوق مالکیت را بر مبنای توزیع قدرت و تحولات آن - و نه صرف تضاد طبقاتی- بررسی می کند، می تواند راهگشا باشد. برای ارائه تبیینی از اقتصاد سیاسی توسعه نیافتگی با استفاده از دستگاه نظری نهادگرایی لازم است در دو سطح نظریه پردازی شود: نظریه دولت و نظریه حقوق مالکیت. لذا پیشنهاد می شود با توجه به ویژگی های خاص ایران، بر موارد ذیل تمرکز شود: 1) تأثیر عوامل اقلیمی (کم آبی) بر شکل گیری زندگی کوچ نشینانه و دولت های قبیله ای و آثار آن بر نظامات اجتماعی و سیاسی ایران (نظریه دولت) 2) آثار شکل گیری این نظامات اجتماعی و سیاسی بر عدم توسعه یافتگی حقوق مالکیت (نظریه حقوق مالکیت).Evaluating Contemporary Thinkers’ Perspectives on the Causes of Underdevelopment in Iran: The Case of Property Rights Within Political Economy Approaches
Before the 1990s, political economy theories typically presumed the security of property rights. The significance of property rights as an underlying factor in economic growth and development was first recognized by new institutional economists and has since gained further attention. The current research examined Marxist and methodological individualism approaches within political economy that have been used by several scholars to explain the main causes of underdevelopment in Iran, with a particular focus on property rights. A common weakness of these approaches is their neglect of Iran’s unique historical context and their failure to present an independent theory addressing the inefficiency of property rights in Iran’s history. The present study suggested that the new institutional approach, which incorporates historical analysis and the study of societal institutions, could offer a more comprehensive understanding of the role of property rights in underdevelopment. Rather than simply analyzing a series of historical events and geographical features, the proposed approach emphasizes several specific aspects of Iran that must be considered. These include the country’s unique climatic conditions, particularly the scarcity of water, which has led to significant tensions. Additionally, the impact of these climate conditions on political and economic systems (the theory of government) has shaped nomadic and tribal lifestyles and contributed to the formation of tribal governments. This, in turn, has influenced the underdevelopment of property rights (the theory of property rights) in Iran. 1. Introduction Before the 1990s, political economy theories typically presumed the security of property rights. The significance of property rights as an underlying factor in economic growth and development was first recognized by new institutional economists and has since gained further attention. The current research examined Marxist and methodological individualism approaches within political economy that have been used by several scholars to explain the main causes of underdevelopment in Iran, with a particular focus on property rights. 2.Materials and Methods Drawing on the institutional political economy framework, the present study employed a descriptive–qualitative method and library research to examine the theoretical models of Marxist political economy and the ideas grounded in methodological individualism. The former is represented through Iranian feudalism and the Asian mode of production, while the latter is expressed through the concept of unsuccessful libertarianism. These models have been used by several scholars to analyze the causes of Iran’s underdevelopment, with a particular focus on property rights. 3. Results and Discussion The analysis focused not only on the theoretical inconsistencies of the models, but also on their contradictions with the historical records of Iran’s economy, as outlined in the following table: Table 1. Characteristics of Political Economy Approaches Used to Explain Iran’s Underdevelopment Political economy approach Theory Thinker Most important features Position of property rights in theory Criticisms Marxism Feudalism Petrushevsky Nomani Vali The emergence of the autocratic government as the biggest owner The existence of the lord-serf system At the disposal of the royal family, nobles and dependents The absence of slavery in the history of Iran The existence of small ownership in the history of Iran The disproportion between the ownership of the state over the means of production and the ownership of the feudal lords over it The absence of stable legal relationship between different classes and the government in Iran The absence of aristocracy in Iran and the complete dependence of property on the monarchy The Asian mode of production Ashraf Katouzian Seif Emphasis on water scarcity and the unique role of the government to provide the needed resources Subjected ownership to the will of the autocratic government Lack of formation /independence of social classes Lack of market exchanges The slow growth rate of productive forces At the disposal of the king Failure to pay attention to the complexities and special conditions of each society Incompatibility of the hypothesis of self-sufficient villages with autocratic government The existence of other forms of ownership (private and endowment) in the history of Iran No historical record of government investment in water projects in Iran Methodological individualism Unsuccessful libertarianism Tabibian, Ghaninejad, Abbasi Emphasis on individual freedoms as the basis of property rights and intellectuals’ historical lack of attention to it Repeated emergence of tribal and patriarchal tyranny as the dominant model of all the events of contemporary Iranian history Harmony between individual desires or interests The emergence of interventionist state due to the continuity of traditional tribal values and its affinity with socialist collectivist ideals Intellectuals’ lack of attention to the importance of the issue and repression by the interventionist government Neglect of the role of history and institutions on the decision-making of agents Limited rationality, incomplete information and uncertainty about the future Existence of transaction costs Failure to establish the assumption of a neutral contractual government and the history of the tribal government in form and content until the early Qajar period (the plundering government) The lack of application of neoclassical models in non-competitive conditions that form the major part of economic history Source: Research results Based on the theoretical models reviewed in the table above, several key theoretical flaws in were identified in the theories. First, given the existence of private ownership and endowment, state ownership has not been dominant throughout Iran’s history. Second, the models failed to consider the impact of Iran’s dry, water-scarce climate, which played a crucial role in shaping tribal life, collective agricultural cooperation, and the subsequent underdevelopment of private property. Third, these models overlooked the persistently tribal nature of government in Iran, which has influenced the political and economic landscape. Another significant flaw is the predatory nature of the government in Iran, which has historically focused on maximizing rents and self-preservation rather than investing in productive inputs. Finally, the models failed to address the lack of a stable and consistent relationship between different social classes and the government, as well as the absence of secure property rights for all classes. Table 2. A Comparison of Political Economy Theories Concerning Iran’s Underdevelopment Theory Water scarcity and the dispersion of villages Supremacy of collective/state ownership The use of lands for rent distribution The existence of private property and endowment Tyranny and irregular relations between the government and social strata Failure to secure property rights Shareholding system in agriculture Tribal structure of the political power Feudalism * * The Asian mode of production * * * * Unsuccessful libertarianism * * * * Source: Research results 4. Conclusion A key weakness of these approaches is their failure to account for Iran’s unique historical context and their inability to present an independent theory explaining the inefficiency of property rights in Iran’s history. To address this gap, the new institutional approach, which emphasizes historical analysis and the study of societal institutions, can provide a more comprehensive understanding of the role of property rights in underdevelopment by going beyond simply examining a series of historical events and geographical features. The present analysis suggests focusing on specific aspects of Iran, such as its unique climatic conditions, particularly the scarcity of water, which has been a major source of tension. Additionally, the impact of these climatic conditions on the political and economic systems (the theory of government) has shaped nomadic and tribal lifestyles, as well as tribal governments. Finally, the influence of these political and economic structures on the underdevelopment of property rights (the theory of property rights) should also be considered.
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