سید میلاد هاشمی مهنه

This study examines the interplay between deposit insurance, central bank supervision, and banking stability, emphasizing the mediating role of moral hazard. Deposit insurance, initially designed as a safeguard to prevent bank runs and protect depositors, may paradoxically undermine financial stability if implemented without adequate supervisory mechanisms. In such contexts, the assurance of depositor protection can encourage banks to engage in excessive risk-taking behavior, thereby increasing systemic vulnerability. Using a panel dataset of 118 countries over the period 1980-2004, the study employs a random-effects logistic regression model to evaluate how deposit insurance schemes, in interaction with credit expansion to the private sector (a proxy for moral hazard), influence the likelihood of banking instability. The analysis distinguishes between two types of instability, bank runs and bank insolvencies, to capture both liquidity-driven and solvency-driven crises. The findings reveal that deposit insurance alone does not have a statistically significant effect on banking stability; however, when combined with high levels of credit growth and weak regulatory oversight, it significantly increases the probability of banking crises. Moreover, the design features of deposit insurance, such as full coverage or government-funded mechanisms, exacerbate instability when central bank supervision is weak. The study concludes that effective coordination between deposit insurance systems and central bank oversight is essential to mitigate moral hazard and promote sustainable financial stability.

Purpose: This study aims to develop a regulatory governance model for investment policy in Iran’s social insurance funds, with a particular focus on the strategic and supervisory role of the Central Bank. Methodology: Employing a qualitative and exploratory research design, the study uses Grounded Theory methodology. Data were gathered through 15 semi-structured interviews with senior investment managers, financial regulators, policy advisors, and social insurance fund experts. The data were analyzed in three stages: open, axial, and selective coding. Findings: The study identifies four key institutional challenges: (1) overlapping roles between policy formulation and execution, (2) lack of integrated and effective regulatory oversight, (3) institutional conflicts of interest, and (4) absence of performance metrics linked to developmental outcomes. In response, a conceptual governance model is proposed, comprising four components: strategic policy formulation, integrated regulatory supervision, outcome-based accountability, and systemic alignment with the Central Bank. Originality: This paper presents an innovative institutional governance framework that bridges the gap between social policy investment and the monetary regulatory system. It contributes to the enhancement of transparency, efficiency, and legitimacy in long-term public fund management.