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The Model of Participatory Security in West Asia with Emphasis on the Arab NATO

Arezoo Zare Askari¹, Ebrahim Anoosheh^{2*}, Mahmood Babae³

^{1, 2*}Department of Political Science, Rafsanjan Branch, Islamic Azad University, Rafsanjan, Iran

³Department of Political Science, Kerman Branch, Shahid Bahonar University, Kerman, Iran

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Abstract

Despite benefiting from abundant resources and energy, countries in Western Asia have created a situation for the region that, in addition to the presence of major powers, interference in regional affairs, and insecurity, the formation of an effective and successful security system in the region fails. In this regard, the Arab NATO plan can be pointed out. In this research, in the framework of Barry Buzan's theory of regional collective security, with an emphasis on the Arab NATO, the patterns of participatory security in the West Asia region were examined and analyzed. The researchers of this study believe that the participatory security model in West Asia has not been successful for several reasons. For this reason, alliances such as the Arab NATO will not be successful if formed.

Keywords: Security, Participatory Security, Regional Collective Security, West Asia.

*Corresponding Author's Email: a_anooshin@yahoo.com

Introduction

Undoubtedly, West Asia has great potential for global influence. On the one hand, this region is the main source of energy reserves in the world, and on the other hand, it is the main communication route of the world. These two categories alone have led to the strategic nature of the region and, of course, to the policies of the world superpowers. The long presence of colonial countries in the West Asian region is one of the main reasons for considering this region important, which has led to a more complicated situation in the West Asian region. This issue is still visible today and has turned the scene of today's West Asia into a turbulent and crisis scene. The crisis centers of Iraq, Syria, and Yemen have become the focus of attention, and most of the signs of a critical atmosphere can be seen in the political atmosphere of the Persian Gulf geopolitical area. The region continues to face a wide range of instability and insecurity. Despite the success of the major regions of the international community and regional countries in establishing a comprehensive and sustainable security system, and despite some efforts, there are still no serious signs of the establishment of such a security system in the region. Due to the internal conditions and the structure of the international system, the countries of this region face comprehensive and comprehensive insecurity and cannot ignore the influence of the international system on their foreign policy orientations and policies. On the other hand, the manner and role of the West Asian powers in establishing stability and security must also be considered. Applying an appropriate and desirable strategy to reduce tensions is one of the necessities that are very important for effective and constructive interaction with countries in the region. In this regard, the present

study with emphasis on the level of regional analysis and without any generalization analyzed regional security and analyzed patterns of participatory security in the West Asian region with an emphasis on the Arab NATO.

First speech: Theoretical framework of research

The theoretical foundation of this research is based on the theory of collective security in Buzan, which is considered as one of the models of Buzan regional security. Bari Bozan first proposed the theory of a regional security complex. After the Cold War, the Copenhagen School has played a significant role in the conceptual and theoretical rethinking of security studies over the past two decades by providing a broad and multidimensional definition of security, separating security studies from strategic studies during the Cold War, and paying attention to the level of the regional analysis. The most important achievement of the Copenhagen School can be considered the presentation of the theory of security set by Barry Buzan, who proposed a new approach due to the failure of traditional studies of security studies. This school was developed due to the security plan and in converting one-dimensional security to five-dimensional security, it has tried to explain the goals of the security reference in each section. To achieve this, the scholars of this school (1) added economic, political, social and environmental issues to the field of security; (2) rebuilt security as a multilevel concept; (3) proposed the theory of interconnected regional security; And (4) introduced the concepts of "securitization" and "Desecuritization" to analyze and explain security.

One of the most important issues for the Copenhagen school is the concept of securitization, which has been further explored by Bozan and Weaver. This theory primarily considers security as a verbal act. This is because the Copenhagen school considers language to be functional. Security has a functional meaning. The concept of securitization has been used by a number of thinkers at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute as a theoretical framework to answer the question, "Who can give security to what under what circumstances?". This is the main concern of the Copenhageners. "Every sector can be the most important focus of threats, vulnerabilities, and defense at any given time," says Eli Weaver. In such a case, the logic of security can be extended without losing its specificity. The mechanism that accepts this development and makes it possible is to recognize security with the logic of existential threats and the utmost necessity and urgency (Bouzan, Weaver, Wilde;1998:24).

Regional security complex theory (RSCT)

Developments at the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the process of globalization, the elimination of major strategic rivalries during the Cold War, created a new space for the dynamics of the world. The first new space was that many areas that were under the heavy shadow of the ideological and rigid rivalries of the Cold War were placed in an anarchic atmosphere and then faced political and social crises and even civil and regional wars. Along with the negative Janus dimension of the regions in the post-Cold War world, new trends in regional regimes and cooperation emerged in the form of "new regionalism." Theorizing shifted to a more specific focus, known as the "regional security complex." Buzan describes

a regional security complex as a group of countries with a network of distinct and important security relations; that is, a group of countries whose primary and main security concerns are so interrelated that it is virtually impossible to conceive of their national security as distinct from one another. Therefore, the central and central element in an area is its security relations and the components of interdependence that are related to security. Buzan also defines these sets in terms of geography. Its members are located within a definite geographical area, although their boundaries may be blurred.

Adopting such a concept is to emphasize that regional security processes may have a life separate from the world system and reflect the impact of the world system in different ways (Morgan,2002:49). RSCT is a methodological theory with a regional level of analysis for international security analysis that reflects the conditions of the Cold War in which it has been expressed and developed (Abdullah Khani,2010:277). In the case of the Cold War, first of all, the existence of a powerful world system is assumed; Secondly, this system is governed by a conflict between superpowers that forces the superpowers to constantly infiltrate regional systems; And finally,

The powers seek to design and revive a new interpretation by understanding the dynamics of regional conflict within this larger paradigm. This rivalry between the superpowers that infiltrated an RSC was defined as a "cover" that arose from global conflicts and concerns behind the superpowers' foreign policy. The main function of the RSCT is to organize empirical studies of regional security within a framework. This theory says what to look for in the four levels of analysis and how

to relate them. These four levels are the internal level, i.e., within the government - the countries of the region whose internal vulnerabilities are the main criterion. In the second dimension, the region's interaction with neighboring regions and finally, the role of world powers in the region, which together form a security complex (Buzan and Weaver, 2009:62). David Lake, on the other hand, points to a regional group based on the concept of an external event.

David Lake defines a regional system as a set of countries that are influenced by at least one external, cross-border but local factor that arises from a particular geographical area. If a local external factor poses an actual or potential threat to the physical health and safety of individuals or governments in other countries, then a regional system or complex is created.

Foreign cross-border events create costs and benefits that affect only a small number of countries. Regional powers can only send and deploy forces at close range. They threaten their neighbors or perhaps the neighbors of their neighbors, but they are not able to threaten other countries that are beyond this distance. These external factors are the local security that creates a set of interacting countries that form a regional system. Such external factors are local security that creates a regional security complex. It is the limited scope and range of such external factors that distinguish regional systems from global systems and regional security complexes from security complexes (Lake, 2002: 82). Regional systems include local external factors that emit from a specific geographical location, but these external factors are not necessarily limited to a specific geographical neighborhood in terms of their impact on countries. As

Morgan points out, countries can be considered part of a regional security complex if they are severely affected by an external factor over a long period, even if they are not within the area from which the external factor originates. Thus, the United States is part of the Persian Gulf regional security complex.

The main components of a regional security complex

An issue that is very important about the regional security complex is the discussion of its components. This theory is based on a series of criteria. Buzan and Weaver have tried to identify these criteria using the constructivist and realist perspectives of the region on which the collection is based. Criteria such as security interdependence, patterns of friendship and enmity, proximity, the presence of at least two effective actors, and relative independence have been identified as criteria for the existence of a security complex. Through these criteria, we can understand the structure, nature of regional organizations and institutions, and its role in regional developments.

One of the most important components of a regional security complex is the patterns of friendship and enmity. Buzan et al. Argue that historical friendships and hatreds, as well as issues of conflict, play a role in shaping the pervasive set of fears, threats, and friendships that define a regional security complex. In this regard, historical variables such as enduring hostilities (Arabs and Persians) or being in a civilization with a common culture, affect the specific characteristics of a regional security complex. This component shows which model of an enemy, rival, or friend dominates the system and to what extent these patterns have been internalized by coercion (external force)

or through benefits (profit and loss calculation) or legitimacy (perception of good or bad, right and wrong) (Abdollah khani, 2010). Another important criterion for the existence of a regional security complex is "proximity". The regional security complex is associated with the actions and reactions of individual governments and reflects the attitude of each state to its environment, its relationship with the severity of political-military threats, and security considerations. Given that threats are manifested at close and geographical distances, proximity is considered a necessary principle for the formation of a regional security complex. Proximity makes security interactions between neighbors far greater than the security interactions of governments located in different regions. Walt has also emphasized this point (Walt, 1987:29-46). In general, regional security complexes are models of sustainability and as infrastructures can have mediating effects on the relationship between the great powers and governments, as well as the interactions of governments in the region. The regional security complex is a social reality and beyond all its components and can intervene between intentions and consequences.

Part II: Partnership Security Patterns in the West Asian Region

West Asia is considered as a subsystem of the Middle East region due to its strategic location, dynamism, and variability as one of the most important insecure and crisis regions in the world because the occurrence of any crisis, insecurity, and change in this region will have trans-regional and global effects. For this reason, the great powers are strictly in control of the developments in this region and guide them if necessary (Ghodsi, 2010:210). The Nixon-Kissinger two-pillar policy, the Gulf

Cooperation Council, and the new Arab NATO plan recently proposed by the United States and the Arab states in the region are among the security models from the West, especially the United States, which were keyed as security models in the region.

The Nixon-Kissinger Doctrine

Britain's intention to withdraw from its historic position in eastern Suez in 1968 was awaited by Washington, etc., and was carried out at the worst possible time, because American forces were increasingly involved in Vietnam and Southeast Asia. When Nixon became president of the United States in 1969, he undertook a thorough review of US policy toward the Persian Gulf. This was part of a global effort to redefine US security interests when these forces were needed paradoxically. Americans were also increasingly shunning what was considered potentially costly foreign obligations. The results of this review led to the emergence of the Nixon Doctrine, which relied heavily on security cooperation with countries in the region as tools to support US interests around the world. In the Persian Gulf, it was decided to rely on the two most important countries, Iran and Saudi Arabia - a strategy that was immediately called "two-pillar policy" (Lawrence, 2014:445).

However, it was clear from the outset that Iran would play a key role in this doctrine because of its military capabilities, its location between the Persian Gulf and the Soviet Union, and the Shah's willingness to cooperate actively with the United States on security issues. Iran also stated that the power vacuum created by Britain's withdrawal from the region should not be filled by any foreign country. The retreat of the British, the pursuit of security, the prestige

of arms ownership, and the granting of the role of "regional gendarme" to Iran made the Persian Gulf countries the major importers of conventional arms in the world. The election of the Nixon administration complicated relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Saudis saw Iran and Iraq as potential threats, and Riyadh saw the arms race between the two countries as detrimental (Akbari, 2015: 143). Nixon's two-pillar policy pursued another goal: to destabilize Iraq by supporting the Kurdish uprising against Baghdad. The plan failed with a deal between the Shah and Saddam Hussein in 1975, but that agreement paved the way for the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Persian Gulf, as well as Israeli-US cooperation in the region. With the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the Nixon Doctrine collapsed and the United States remained safe in the Persian Gulf without an ally.

Persian Gulf Cooperation Council

The Iranian revolution can be considered a turning point in the tendency towards anti-Americanism in the countries of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. This effectively ended the West's informal reliance on Iran-Saudi Arabia cooperation to secure the Persian Gulf, and for the first time directly challenged US political and military dominance in the region. Therefore, the occurrence of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war can be considered as two important and effective factors in the formation of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council. On one hand, these two factors transformed American interests in the Persian Gulf, and the orientation of the initial foreign policy of the post-revolutionary political system in Iran greatly increased the threat of overthrow by indigenous forces in the eyes of the Arab

rulers of the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, the Iran-Iraq war provided a good excuse to exclude Iraq from membership in the Gulf Cooperation Council. Thus, the Western bloc, led by the United States, set out a plan to establish a collective security system in the Persian Gulf region to protect its interests. The Gulf Cooperation Council announced its existence in Riyadh through an agreement between Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. In March 1981, a technical committee was tasked with drafting the statute of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and on the sidelines of the third meeting of the Conference of Islamic Countries in Taif, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait presented a draft security and military pact. After numerous consultations between the United States and Britain with the countries of the region, a political, security, military, and economic treaty entitled "The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf" was formally concluded on March 17, 1981 (Momeni, 2005).

The Gulf Cooperation Council, led by Al-Saud, is seeking to use military force to prevent the overthrow of authoritarian regimes threatened by popular revolutions in the face of the rise of Arab nations from North Africa to the entire Arab Middle East. However, in the current situation in the region, the Cooperation Council does not have the capacity to play such a role, and many political experts believe that the council lacks a successful track record of achieving its organizational goals due to adopting an approach contrary to the political and social currents in the region.

The problem is that countries that join a confederation do not have a problem with legitimacy, while many GCC countries struggle with this problem. On the other hand, in the

discussion of foreign policy and security, the member states of the Cooperation Council do not have a common approach. Therefore, any change that is considered disruptive to the status quo will be met with a reaction from the Arab Conservative Concert (Bina, 2011:5). Finally, we can conclude that some of the factors that have prevented the GCC from becoming a strong and dynamic regional organization are:

- Ignoring the assumptions of the convergence of the council,
- Saudi Arabia's border disputes with the United Arab Emirates,
- Bahrain-Qatar border dispute
- The differences between Kuwait and Bahrain, the sharp differences between Qatar and Saudi Arabia over the developments in Yemen,
- The political structure of member countries,
- Internal challenges and crises in some member countries, such as the crisis of legitimacy,
- The dispute over the single currency, along with Oman's opposition to the council's single currency,
- Non-implementation of the customs union and the common market,
- Heterogeneity in the level of member development,
- Traditional tribal prejudices,
- Political and security dependence on superregional powers, including the United States,
- The presence and intervention of foreign forces in the region and their prevention of the formation of endogenous regional economic and political arrangements,

- Finally, the lack of necessary attention to the development of relations with other countries in the region and the use of their high capacity to increase regional cooperation (Javadi Arjomand Vahedi, 2012: 879).

Another criticism leveled at the GCC is that it is not made up of all the countries in the region, and even the name GCC is incorrect because the security system of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council without Iran as one of the powers in the region and even Iraq is meaningless and unstable.

Arab NATO plan

The plan to create an Arab army date back to the 1950s when the Ba'ath party was in power in Syria and Gamal Abdel Nasser was in power in Egypt. The Arabs had lost the war with Israel in 1948, and Egypt, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, had won a major victory in the 1956 war, but the Israeli threat remained a major threat to the security of the Arab world. Thus, in 1958, an alliance was formed between Syria and Egypt, and the Arab Republic was formed, but this alliance did not last long and only disappeared after three years, and in practice, the Arab army was not formed. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 raised the issue of the formation of an Arab army again, but this time differences between Arab countries prevented the idea from being implemented. At the same time as Donald Trump came to power and his tough stance against Iran, the United States of Trump intends to engage the region in another war, this time by attacking Islamic Iran, by selling weapons to countries in the region while making huge profits. For this reason, unlike all American presidents, he announced the destination of his first foreign

trip to Saudi Arabia. During Trump's visit to Saudi Arabia, Riyadh agreed to buy \$ 110 billion worth of weapons from the United States and spend another \$ 350 billion over the next 10 years on Saudi defense and immediate purchases from the United States alone. It was during Donald Trump's visit to Riyadh in May 2018 that the idea of forming an Arab army was mooted as part of the Islamic Coalition Against Terrorism, and in March 2018, Donald Trump explicitly announced that the United States would withdraw its troops from Syria unless the Arab countries pay for the presence of American troops in Syria.

Accordingly, the idea was raised that Donald Trump was seeking to form an Arab army and replace it with American troops in Syria. In fact, Trump seeks to reduce the cost of a US military presence in the Middle East by forming an alternative regional military. He also wants to facilitate broad co-operation among the bloc's member states on missile defense, military exercises, and counter-terrorism. The plan, which US President Donald Trump described as a "strategic Middle East alliance" and named an "Arab NATO," is a military, security, and anti-Iranian project to prevent the expansion of Iran's legitimate influence in the region and the continuation of anti-Iranian plans by the United States. The project goes beyond the kingdoms of the region and involves the participation of Jordan, Egypt, and Israel.

In this part of the research, we intend to analyze the failure of the Arab NATO plan in the region.

Non-internalization of norms and formation of a common identity

One of the main and important factors in the formation of collective and common identity between countries and members of a secure society and the formation of regional organizations and unions is the existence of common norms and especially the internalization of norms (Adib Moghadam, 2009:28). A study of countries and regional institutions shows that a common regional awareness and perception of common threats, common destiny, and common identity has not yet been formed.

Lack of common understanding

There is no doubt that the main pillar of any collective security alliance is that all members must have a common and equal understanding of the threat. Otherwise, it cannot be considered an attempt to ensure collective security, and this is exactly what is true of the Arab NATO, both internally and externally.

First, according to some analysts, the first threat to Arab NATO comes from within the alliance itself. The question is, "What alliance is Trump talking about in the region?" The founding principle of any union is "One for all, all for one"; That is, a war against a member state is a war against all members. But here, the threat of war is a set within itself that is supposed to protect everyone's security from an external threat.

The second obstacle, which is much greater than the first, is the differences of opinion between Arab governments and nations over the threat of Iran. Although many Arabs now see Iran as a serious threat, many more continue to believe that the US and Israeli threat to Arab security is far greater than the Iranian threat. A new poll shows that Iran tops the list of countries threatening the Arabs only in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, but in the rest of the Arab

world, the threat of Iran is far less public than the threat of the United States and Israel. Besides, people in many Arab countries believe that their main problem right now is [not Iran, but] the lack of a good system of government and the lack of effective policies to tackle poverty, unemployment, and social inequality (Kabalan, 2018).

Conflict in thoughts and ideas

The members of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council are by no means united in their thoughts and ideas. Iran has in the past been able to successfully divide the alliance and play with Oman, Kuwait, and part of the United Arab Emirates against another part of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, as well as opportunistic Qatar. In addition, Iran can even play against the Cooperation Council with the cards of Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. The council, in turn, has shrunk due to the economy, and in some cases, internal dissatisfaction has been increasingly limited. Concerning Jordan and Egypt, it should be noted that they have already moved away from the strategy of the closed government council on Syria and Iraq and moved towards the Syrian-Russian camp; Where the fight against terrorism, stability, and security are the priorities of the day.

Conflict and duality

The Arab world is in a state of "duality or bipolarity" more than ever. The differences between Qatar and the four countries of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, and the UAE continue, and there is still no clear prospect of ending these differences. In this regard, while the six GCC member states in the US plan must be members of the Arab NATO, Qatar, and Oman did not participate in the "Arab

Shield 1" exercise held in Egypt. Instead, Morocco and Lebanon were invited to participate, while militarily in Lebanon, Lebanon's Hezbollah has an important position, even beyond the Lebanese army. In fact, Lebanon participated in the "Arab Shield 1" exercise as an observer member, and one of the goals of the joint Arab army is to counter the regional influence of Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Competition of countries in the region

The geopolitical and strategic structure of the West Asian region is such that patterns of behavior lead the countries of the region to competition at best, not unity. (Like the rivalry between the members of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council) This rivalry is still seen between Saudi Arabia and Egypt over the formation of the Arab NATO (Akbari, 2015: 29).

Because Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi is trying to get the original idea of the Arab NATO plan in competition with King Salman of Saudi Arabia.

Intensification of sectarianism in the region

The Arab NATO as an institution serving the interests of traditional governments will not only see confrontation with Iran, but also the Shiites of the eastern Arabian Peninsula and Lebanon, and the majority of Iraqis will feel threatened by it. Sectarianism will intensify in the Middle East.

Non-nativeness and widespread differences

The most important challenges facing the formation of the Arab NATO are non-indigeneness, ignoring regional realities, and, of course, the wide-ranging differences between Arab countries. The fact that the Arab NATO

is not the idea and initiative of an Arab country and its main designer and supporter is the United States, which seeks to intervene in the Persian Gulf regional security system to prevent alliances between the countries of the region and to strengthen its presence and influence between them, is one of the most serious factors that destroy the authenticity and credibility of this plan in the public opinion of the countries in the region.

Differences in views on the Arab NATO

Another important challenge is the differences in the views of Arab countries on the need for the formation and operation of this military unit. While Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain are serious supporters of the plan, officials in countries such as Oman, which have friendly relations with Iran, are skeptical. Qatar, which has been under sanctions by neighboring Arab countries for more than a year and is still angry with them, naturally cannot be a good nut in this coalition. After the war with Iraq, Kuwait has always tried to stay away from war and conflict and to have a relatively peaceful relationship with all its neighbors. Therefore, perhaps this is why Kuwaiti Deputy Foreign Minister Khalid al-Jarallah spoke about the Arab NATO and its purpose: "To think that the goal of this coalition is Iran is a wrong view, and I emphasize that the goal of this coalition is to meet all the challenges in the region" (Al-Alam News Agency, 2018). Egypt, which has considered itself the leader of the Arab world since the fall of the monarchy, will not be willing to be under the command of Saudi Arabia. The Jordanians also have a historical grudge against the Arabs of the Persian Gulf and try not to fall under the control of these countries in regional relations. Despite such challenges, it seems that the

Arab NATO will not be very successful in practice, even if it pursues the United States.

Part 3: The Partnership Security Model in West Asia

The first and perhaps most important step in building a security system is to determine its framework. The authors of this study used the regional collective security perspective as their criterion. The central focus of the participatory security model is that all countries in the region can achieve relative security by accepting reciprocal commitments and accepting a series of constraints. In this security model, not only friends and allies are present, but from a participatory security perspective, it is assumed that the enemies will accept the same restrictions on their behavior that friends accept, and this is possible despite mutual distrust. It is also assumed that these legal and voluntary restrictions will include reciprocal benefits. In this model, security guarantees are created not through domination but, conversely, by making unacceptable choices aimed at dominating rivals. In a partnership-based security approach, the development of a regional understanding of the reciprocity of security is considered, and the concept of mutual assurance is emphasized before deterrence. Increasing such confidence can alleviate the security dilemma inherent in realistic power policy strategies. This approach seeks to build trust between regional governments through discussion, negotiation, cooperation, and agreement. Strategies for implementing a participatory security model in the West Asian region and the Persian Gulf could include the following:

Building Trust

What is assumed to be the foundation, or at least the consolidation of the bonds created in a system based on security and collective cooperation, is the issue of "gaining trust". We must primarily rely on dialogue and confidence-building measures. Our region is facing a lack of dialogue that is visible at all levels of the region. Our governments need more dialogue now than ever before. These conversations should seek to promote mutual understanding in general before attempting to resolve any issue or reach any specific agreement. We can benefit from positive dialogue and interaction. Such conversations should change useless rhetoric, slogans, and propaganda statements. Although "trust-building" is a complex process and involved various psychological and political factors, but this study tries to address several strategies that can establish and strengthen this process over time:

Consistent and serious efforts to conclude bilateral or multilateral military agreements that seek joint security and, most importantly, transparency in the military development of neighboring countries. This can increase the level of trust-building. Carrying out joint maneuvers will show the ability of the countries in the region to maintain and ensure security, and will expose its shortcomings to eliminate them.

One of the necessary conditions for establishing an efficient security system in each region is the existence of a center to implement the necessary coordination as well as to formulate the required tactics and strategies. From a realistic point of view, the volume of differences and contradictions between the views of countries in Western Asia is high in many cases,

the proposal to establish a headquarters for the development and implementation of this system does not correspond to the existing realities. On the contrary, it is suggested that a study center (preferably independent of any of the countries in the region) be established to evaluate the areas for resolving these differences from an impartial and scientific perspective by hiring experts from all countries in the region. Certainly, the proposals of this scientific forum will be more appreciated than the political and official statements of the countries. Sharing information in all areas helps build trust. The main goal is to make the neighbors aware of the goals and to eliminate misunderstandings and misconceptions. In this regard, we can mention cooperation in various fields, including promoting tourism, student exchange, research trips, organizing sports competitions, encouraging businessmen and businessmen to meet and participate with peers, encouraging artists to connect, exchanging movies and TV series, reviewing textbooks to eliminate negative content and insert positive content about neighbors.

Establishment of the West Asian Cooperation Organization

If such an institution is formed, it can help the countries of the region in the political and economic fields. Commencement and implementation of exchanges of goods, human resources, joint reconstruction, and economic projects, and infrastructures such as railway communications or gas pipeline projects between Asia and Europe. Creating new jobs and rebuilding the economies of the countries in the region will help prevent the marginalization of some population groups and migrant currents in the region, which has put a lot of pressure on people in EU countries today.

Establishment of Diplomatic Mechanisms

Establishment of bilateral and multilateral mechanisms that can be supported by the United Nations. Establishment of peace process negotiations aimed at resolving differences between the countries of the region in the political, security, and environmental fields.

Formation of Public and Private Meetings

Formation of public and private meetings with the presence of political representatives of countries that are influential in the formation of foreign policies.

As long as the Israeli occupation regime and the greedy gaze of the supra-regional powers, especially the United States, are in the region, any security order will face many problems. At least, in the long run, such a security order cannot be formed. The existence of the Zionist regime, the presence of extra-regional powers, the increase of identity and ideological rivalries, the conflict of interests of the countries of the region and the different attitudes of the main actors, the crises in Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq, the Palestinian-Israeli war have been among the most important obstacles to establishing a model of collective security in the West Asian region.

Conclusions

In this study, an attempt was made to analyze the participatory security model in the West Asian region by applying the Regional security complex theory proposed by Buzan. This

model can be analyzed on two levels: sustainable cooperation, which emphasizes the convergence and alignment of countries' positions, and limited cooperation, in which relations are based on limited coexistence, understanding, and coordination, and emphasizes relative development and relative agreement between the countries of the region. In the West Asian region, limited cooperation is expected to be a priority, given that countries in the region do not have convergence and alignment of interests in many areas.

What can be presented as the result of this research is that creating a model of participatory security in the West Asian region requires the determination of the countries in the region, especially Iran and Saudi Arabia, which are the main powers in the region, without which no progress can be made. Not achieved. Even with this determination, disputes cannot be expected to be resolved automatically. According to the present article, it was revealed that the West Asian region has so far been influenced by the security models of the West, especially the United States, which has always tried to implement its desired security order in this region. These models, like the Cooperation Council, have not been successful for the reasons mentioned, and for this reason, alliances such as the Arab NATO will not be successful if they are formed. The model of collective security will be successful if it includes convergence with the great powers of the region and does not have a subordinate function to the great and supra-regional powers while interacting with them.

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