# Thick Recognition Failure and Terrorism Emergence in the Middle East (ISIS in Iraq as Case Study)

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## Abstract

The Middle East has witnessed many identity conflicts and rising violent extremist groups after 2003. The most prominent one has been the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which has come to the sphere of politics, in the post Arab Spring era. The goal of this paper is to examine the roots of the emergence of violent extremist groups, principally with reference to ISIS rising in Iraq. To do this authors propose "the four-dimensional thick recognition" model that consists of four concepts i.e., 1) historical narratives, 2) self-esteem 3) ontological security, and 4) hubristic identity. This model highlights that historical narratives of conflict, along with lack of self-esteem leads to feeling of ontological insecurity. This, in turn, leads to a kind of hubristic identity crisis, which often paves the way through struggle for regaining it. By content analysis of major texts published by the ISIS through two major magazines, namely Dabiq and Rumiyah, we try to demonstrate how the rise of ISIS was rooted in the issue of thick recognition failure. The paper concludes that thick recognition failure in these four phases, led to the establishment of violent extremist groups particularly in regions with memories of conflict.

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## 1. Introduction

The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is a Sunni jihadist group that captured and held significant territory in Iraq and Syria beginning in 2013 in an attempt to establish a state-like "caliphate" purportedly based on the Islamic governance model. The emergence of ISIS in Iraq, as well as its territorial expansion in parts of the Middle East and North Africa, has drawn scholars' and policymakers' attention to a new trend of extremism and non-state actor terrorism. This paper seeks to answer why these groups have emerged and how they have become violent actors in regions such as the Middle East by utilizing the identity-related and structural causes implied by the "thick recognition" concept (For another identity-related analysis see, for example, Haghi and et al,2022). The conceptual framework of the four-dimensional thick recognition model is formulated in this paper. We contend that the failure of the thick recognition process has resulted in the rise of violent extremist groups such as ISIS. This paper assumes that the core of ISIS formation is an individual as an independent entity. This agent, who is engaged in a mutual recognition process needs to be recognized while also itself is acting as a recognizer. This paper by focusing on ISIS and three levels of analysis among individuals who are Iraqi-Sunnis, state which is considered governments in Iraq after 2003, and the Western coalition, the US, and Iran are defined as international system level. Also, the authors focus solely on Iraqi ISIS members.

## 2.Literature Review

Several studies have been conducted to investigate the primary causes of the emergence of extremist groups such as ISIS in Iraq. Pierre-Jean Luizard examined the causes of ISIS's rise from a historical sociology perspective in Le piège Daech: L'État islamique ou le retour de l'Histoire. Luizard believes that the historic Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, as well as the artificial borders in these countries, hastened ISIS' extremism. During the early days of ISIS' declaration of Caliphate, they shared photos of ISIS flags with the motto "Collapse the Sykes Pico Borders" on them (Luizard,2016:35). Based on this approach, the author considers a historical gap between Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq as one of the main reasons for the formation of ISIS.

Bakhtyar Ali seeks to highlight the reasons for the ISIS emergence, in an article titled "ISIL, Oriental Violence, and Critique of Fascist Wisdom." He claims that ISIS emerged as a result of incorrect policies of defining and

differentiating identities and drawing borders between oneself and others, by challenging the "Eastern capitalist system" and political groups in the region. "ISIL represents a terrifying and dark force, as well as a mechanism to deal with power and humans; ISIL is a gateway to understanding the human mind and the recent 100-year history of this region," he says (Ali, 2015:14). In another article, Ali discusses the concept of identity and its effects on racial and tribal groups in the Middle East, distinguishing between permanent and temporary identities, arguing that ISIS has a permanent and ideological identity that views other identities in the region as enemies. He claims that after the advent of modernity, this group attempted to capitalize on it, but no changes occurred in their nature, and they continued to kill others violently based on their permanent identity (Ali,2015:41; Mirzaei Tabar,2022).

The book ISIL, the Khilafat Nostalgia by Fouad Ebrahim, on the other hand, discusses the origins of ISIS from a different angle. The author defines this group as "a Salafi organizational group aiming to execute Sharia and revive the Islamic caliphate through violent actions known as Jihad" (Ebrahim, 2016:110). He traces the origins of ISIS to 2006 and the signing of the Ḥilf al-Muṭayyabīn[1].

In his article "ISIL and the Third Wave of Jihadism", Fawaz Gerges blames the establishment of ISIS on the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. He claims that many groups, including marginalized Ba'athists and Sunnis, who had no place in the new Shiite power structure, turned to extremist groups. He does, however, see ISIS as a continuation of jihadi thought. Gerges sees Al-Qaeda as the result of an unholy alliance between Saudi Salafism and radical Egyptian Islam, whereas ISIS is the result of an unholy alliance between Iraqi Al-Qaeda and the defeated Ba'athists (Gerges,2015:339).

From another perspective, Patrick Cockburn in The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution recognizes the ISIS as a terrorist group and argues that the war on terrorism has failed because the United States has tried to avoid offending those states who funded the Jihadist groups in the

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1. The name is derived from the pre-Islam Ḥilf al-Muṭayyabīn (pledge of perfume wearers) Treaty. This allegiance was made during the struggle over positions related to the Ka'ba, and ultimately it was agreed upon between Abd Manaf and several Quraysh tribes such that they soaked their hands in a bowl of perfume and spread it over the Ka'ba.

region. By doing so, he believes that, the United States has contributed to the resurgence of jihadism in the Middle East. Cockburn also holds other states accountable, such as Britain and Turkey, for the success of ISIS. Saudi financing of jihadist groups has, he adds, contributed significantly to the violence between Shia and Sunni Muslims in Iraq and Syria (Cockburn, 2015:19). Also, for Cockburn it was the mishandling by the West of the conflict in Iraq which was disastrous and fed sectarianism. He asserts that, it became a Sunni uprising which in turn played a crucial role in rejuvenating the Sunni backlash against Maliki's Shia-dominated regime in Iraq which these led to the growth and success of the ISIS in Iraq (Cockburn,2015:64).

In The Islamic State: A Brief Introduction, Charles Lister describes ISIS as "a qualitative evolution of the al-Qaeda model," but with a more professional military and the ability to create a practical model for social governance that has been relatively successful, particularly in "unstable environments" (Lister,2015:22). Lister traces its roots from the release of its notorious father figure, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, from a Jordanian prison and the group's formation in Afghanistan in the late-1990s. He shows that how the weakness of the central government in Iraq paved the way for ISIS to create a shadow authority and then it's future military succession.

The Jihad threat: ISIS, Al-Qaeda and beyond edited by Feredric Wehrey, Robin Wright and other experts, comprehensively explores the roots of ISIS and Jihadism emergence. They believe that Jihadism has always been produced by a confluence of factors. This special report highlights that the "volatile mix of shifting demographics, notably a surge of youth, higher literacy, and greater social aspirations intersecting with economic woes, growing unemployment, and deepening political malaise or disillusionment" are some of the most prominent reasons to flourish the Jihadism (Wehrey and Wright,2017:24). Among them, the authors particularly categorize six main conditions which pave the way for establishment of extremist and Jihadist groups: the frailty of states, ideological upheaval, conflict zones, foreign intervention, socioeconomic factors and technology.

This present article aims to address the same issue but by using the conceptual framework of the four-dimensional thick recognition model to show the reasons behind emergence of violent extremist groups by considering ISIS a case study.

## 3.Theoretical Framework

The "Four-dimensional Thick Recognition Model" addresses the concept of thick recognition (Haji-Yousefi and Zakeri,2017:95). As Wendt points out, thick recognition is to respect and pay attention to a subject for something that distinguishes it from others (Wendt,2003). This type of recognition emphasizes identity characteristics and highlights the uniqueness of identity. In other words, it takes into account the characteristics that distinguish a subject (Möller,2007:60; Wendt,2003:511). Thick recognition is, in fact, Axel Honneth's self-esteem, which denotes specific characteristics that set one apart from others. These characteristics go beyond one's legal rights and refer to the recognition and acceptance of differences (Honneth,1996:122). The four-dimensional thick recognition model emphasizes that conflict-ridden historical narratives, combined with low self-esteem, create insecurity and instability for agents regarding their unrecognized identities, leading to ontological insecurity. This, in turn, causes a hubristic identity crisis, which frequently leads to a struggle to reclaim one's hubristic identity. These four dimensions/phases are defined further below.

### 3-1.Historical Narratives

According to Richard Ned Lebow, historical narratives shape individual memories, which are shaped through intersubjective processes, often reflecting and sometimes reinforcing dominant narratives in society (Ned Lebow,2006:3-4). As a result, memories serve as bridges between our perceptions of the past and the present. Collective memory also contributes to construct the central core of societies. Collective memory refers to individual and group perceptions that are socially constructed over time and shape individuals' nature, social status, and importance of being a subject. Because group memory cannot be recalled collectively, narratives play an important role in this regard (Anderson,1983:204).

Lisa Strombom believes that new narratives through thick recognition can bring community members and those involved in conflicts back into the community, resulting in a gradual change in identities, which can lead to changes in controversial identities (Strombom,2014:169). This reconstruction of identity through narrative changes has the potential to reassemble not only our thoughts and perceptions but also war-torn communities in general. When governments trigger such a narrative shift in

a particular direction, it leads to the reconstruction of the identity of specific groups of different languages, religions, or ethnicities. The self-perception evolves; it shifts from an unambiguous understanding of the self as threatened and insecure to a more complex understanding of the self as capable of doing both good and bad. In societies with conflicting memories, the identities perceived as most central to the self mostly coincide with the master narratives of the nation or ethnic group. Because these groups are commonly perceived as under constant threat, the identity dynamics in these conflicts take on quite distinct characteristics (Strombom,2014:176).

Individuals give meaning to their identities through their individuality as well as their participation in collective narratives. When this history is linked to specific conflict narratives, its relationship with collective identity and society's perception of conflict becomes clearer. Although narratives are numerous and constantly changing (due to the many competing ideas), some of them come to dominate over time, which are called chief mnemonic narratives. They may also dominate the main constructions because they are registered in official institutions of memory related to national history and collective memory. This is especially true for memories of the past and different sides of a conflict.

### 3.2- Self-Esteem

Axel Honneth takes inspiration from Hegel, George Herbert Mead, and Donald Winnicott, all of whom discuss the consequences of acknowledgment. This image regards self-esteem as the key to identity. Self-esteem evolved into a form of social approval during the transition from traditional to modern societies. Self-esteem was a sign of honor in traditional societies, whereas it turned into social standing and prestige in modern societies (Honneth,1996:8). At this point, other groups and governments recognize and accept the individual's political and social agency as an independent actor, with its various types of endogenous socio-political constructs. Each identity, individual, local community, nation, or government is established concerning a set of socially recognized differences (Connolly,1991:64).

Honneth defines self-esteem as a unique characteristic of individuals that sets them apart from others. Extending beyond one's legal rights, this characteristic refers to the recognition and acceptance of differences (Honneth,1996:122). He states that the ability to sense, interpret, and realize

one's needs and desires as a fully autonomous and individuated person—in short, the ability to form an identity—is critically dependent on the development of self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem. These three modes of relating practicality to oneself can only be acquired and maintained inter-subjectively, through being recognized by someone who has also been recognized. As a result, self-realization is dependent on the establishment of mutual recognition relationships.

In addition to a demand for acceptance and recognition as a free and independent actor, subjects inherently have a subject-like sense of their social position within a group, and when this social position is not accepted, the recognition process will fail, and the actors will perceive this lack of recognition as a threat to their various material desires. As a result, actors are likely to show violent reactions (Fickenscher and et al,2015) because they feel that their "true social worth" is invaded (Miller,2001).

### 3-3. Ontological Insecurity

Almost all scholars have framed this concept based on Anthony Giddens' perspective. In his book Modernity and Self-identity, Giddens defines ontological security as "confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action. A secure understanding of one's surroundings is the foundation of ontological security" (Giddens,1991:243). It refers to the need to experience oneself as a whole, the continuous person in time—as being rather than constantly changing—in order to feel agency (Giddens,1991:244).

Jennifer Mitzen believes that people require a secure sense of self. Agents require a consistent perception of their surroundings, so uncertain perceptions jeopardize identity security. Actors, as a result, tend to create cognitive certainty and behavior in order to establish a consistent routine. Individual identity is formed and sustained through relationships, according to ontological security researchers. As a result, actors shape ontological security through routine interactions with significant others. Then, because continual agency necessitates the cognitive certainty provided by these routines, actors become entangled in such social relationships (Mitzen, 2006). This security and stability of self-identity perceptions, according to Mitzen, does not imply that self-perception must be constant forever, but

that a sense of personal continuity will lead to the formation of agentive constructions.

In other words, if an actor cannot reach the self-esteem stage through a recognized social position and social relations, i.e. the social and political agency of a community, one will feel one's identity at risk and will inevitably show a violent reaction. These conditions are more likely to occur in contexts that have historically been associated with some form of ontological insecurity and identity threat.

### 3-4. Hubristic Identity

According to Thomas Lindemann, hubristic identities may be a cause of war. He defines 'hubristic identities' as "the desire for recognition of one's superiority that is not shared by other major international actors." The desire for hubristic superiority is inextricably linked to an image that is far superior to actual power. This claim of hubristic superiority and proclivity to define hubristic identity can take many forms. This superiority can be expressed through race, nationality, identity, religion, or political regime (Lindemann, 2010:31).

It is difficult to objectively recognize hubristic identities for studying civil wars. Speeches by political leaders who assume a special leadership role or an international mission may be a useful indicator of this ambition. Another indicator is power interest in architecture, music, and performing arts, as seen in the Versailles palace or Hitler's love of Wagner's powerful music, or in totalitarian regimes' great figures and parades. The analysis of all manifestations of these superiority claims is clearly impossible. When the more expensive and luxurious governmental buildings are compared to those of other powers, it can be stated that stronger and more authoritarian buildings (such as neoclassical style buildings) indicate that an ideological government is likely in power. As a result, numerous figures and images of Stalin, Hitler, and Saddam Hussein, as well as their "pharaoh-like" structures, evoke a sense of "divine" power. There is a connection between arrogant identities and the outbreak of war. Those who believe they play an ideal and significant role in their identity and society are more vulnerable to "narcissistic wounds"[1] (especially in the two cases of Wilhelmine Germany and Hitlerism Germany) (Lindemann, 2010:32-3).

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1. Narcissistic wound is a type of mental disorder based on extreme megalomania and

In summary, the model emphasizes that historical narratives of conflict, combined with a lack of self-esteem, create a sense of insecurity and instability for agents regarding their unrecognized identities, which eventually leads to ontological insecurity. This, in turn, causes a kind of hubristic identity crisis, which frequently results in a reclamation struggle.

## 4.Research Methodology and Data Collection

The research theoretical model necessitated unearthing the conflict-tainted historical narratives of Iraqi Sunni Muslims in order to analyze their primary concerns regarding other domestic and international actors (the Western coalition, Iran and Shiism, as well as the Iraqi government during Maliki). To this end, we examined major texts published by ISIS in two major magazines, Dabiq and Rumiyah. The content of 14 issues of Dabiq, from Ramadan 1435 AH (July 2014) to Rajab 1437 AH (April 2016), and 10 issues of Rumiyah published between Dhu'l-Hijjah 1437 AH (September 2016) and Ramadan 1438 AH (June 2017) was analyzed. The keywords chosen for further analysis were USA, West, Obama/Bush, France, Belgium, Turkey, Iran/Persia, Rafida/Nusayri (as the main origin of ISIS's opposition to the international system), and Mālikī (as the main source of ISIS's opposition to Shiite Mālikī rule inside Iraq). The frequency of these keywords revealed how ISIS viewed those three groups.

Also, this paper elaborates on how conflict-ridden historical narratives, combined with a lack of self-esteem among Iraqi Sunni people, have led to experiences of insecurity about unrecognized identities and ontological insecurity among Iraqis who have joined ISIS by implementing the Four-dimensional Thick Recognition as the theoretical model in three levels of analysis among individual-state and individual-international system. The authors investigate how the ignored hubristic identity of those Baathi-Sunni citizens in Iraq can result in a violent struggle for recognition through terror and fear against the three mentioned groups.

**Table (1): Dabiq Journals, Issues 1-7**

|  | Dabiq 1 | Dabiq 2 | Dabiq 3 | Dabiq 4 | Dabiq 5 | Dabiq 6 | Dabiq 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **U.S.** | 5 | 1 | 19 | 13 | 10 | 29 | 11 |
| **West** | 3 | 1 | 7 | 8 | 7 | 3 | 18 |
| **Obama/ Bush** | 0 | 0 | 17 | 32 | 5 | 0 | 8/6 |
| **France** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 10 |

superiority complex resulting from inferiority complexes.

| Belgium | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Turkey | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 2 |
| Iran/ Persia | 0 | 3 | 9 | 32 | 2 | 17 | 1 |
| Rafida/Nusayri | 2 | 12 | 6 | 11 | 2 | 10 | 6 |
| Maliki | 1 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

**Table (2): Dabiq Journals, Issues 8-14**

|  | Dabiq 8 | Dabiq 9 | Dabiq 10 | Dabiq 11 | Dabiq 12 | Dabiq 13 | Dabiq 14 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| U.S. | 9 | 24 | 15 | 22 | 60 | 15 | 19 |
| West | 17 | 21 | 11 | 20 | 28 | 3 | 14 |
| Obama/ Bush | 4 | 9 | 6 | 11 | 2 | 0 | 4 |
| France | 7 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 3 |
| Belgium | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 4 |
| Turkey | 7 | 17 | 16 | 22 | 9 | 1 | 2 |
| Iran/ Persia | 7 | 15 | 5 | 56 | 19 | 15 | 6 |
| Rafida/Nusayri | 3 | 19 | 6 | 28 | 20 | 53 | 18 |
| Maliki | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

**Table (3): Rumiyah Journals, Issues 1-10**

|  | R1 | R2 | R3 | R4 | R5 | R6 | R7 | R8 | R9 | R10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| U.S. | 2 | N.A | N.A | 6 | 0 | N.A | 4 | N.A | 7 | 15 |
| West | 0 | N.A | N.A | 2 | 0 | N.A | 3 | N.A | 1 | 3 |
| Obama/ Bush | 0 | N.A | N.A | 1 | 0 | N.A | 0 | N.A | 1 | 0 |
| Iran/ Persia | 18 | N.A | N.A | 7 | 0 | N.A | 0 | N.A | 4 | 7 |
| Rafida/Nusayri | 0 | N.A | N.A | 4 | 18 | N.A | 21 | N.A | 5 | 11 |
| Maliki | 15 | N.A | N.A | 0 | 0 | N.A | 0 | N.A | 0 | 0 |
| Belgium | 3 | N.A | N.A | 0 | 0 | N.A | 0 | N.A | 0 | 0 |
| France | 0 | N.A | N.A | 1 | 2 | N.A | 0 | N.A | 0 | 0 |

## 5.Conflict-Ridden Historical Narratives in Iraq
### 5-1. Individual-State

Since 2003, when Shia rulers came to power in Iraq, the historical narrative of Sunni rule over the country has shifted. This collective memory was formed through inter-subjective processes and frequently reflected society's dominant and current narratives. Sunni de-Ba'athification and lack of political integration resulted in perceptions of oppression, identity neglect, and a collective sense of humiliation. Individual and group perceptions that are socially constructed over time and shape the nature and identity, social status, and importance of agency of individuals are referred to as collective memories by the authors (For the impact of collective memory on the issue of federalism in Iraq see, Budaghi and et al,2021). However, because the post-2003 narratives occurred recently, they had accumulated in citizens' minds to the point where they felt no need to consult books or historical documents. According to tables 1, 2, and 3, the word "Maliki", which

represents ISIS's hostility toward the current government in Iraq during 2003 and later, has been used more than 25 times.


**5-2.Individual- International System**
Many conflict-ridden historical narratives have constructed part of Iraqis' social identity against the Western coalition and Iran. The collective conflict-ridden memory of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which is repeatedly mentioned in ISIS propaganda such as "and this auspicious progression will not stop unless the shameful Sykes-Pico Agreement is removed" (Dabiq, 1435:4). Another historical narrative that constructs confrontation with the international system was formed following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, when the UN passed Resolution 687 to impose numerous sanctions on the Iraqi government and people (Jafari Valdani,2010). People were denied access to clean water and electricity as a result of these sanctions. Even the import of medicine and food was prohibited by the UN. The bombing of Iraqi cities between 2001 and 2003, under the guise of the Iraqi government violating airspace and killing thousands of Iraqis, is a historical memory until the 2003 attack, which shaped the Iraqi people's historical perceptions. However, the situation deteriorated following the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Mossallanejad,2016). The Abu Ghraib Prison incidents are the tipping point in recent conflict-ridden memories against the West. Janis Karpinski, an American general, accepted command of Baghdad's nearly destroyed Abu Ghraib Prison in June 2003. Karpinski was a member of the army's reserve force with no prior experience as a warden (McKelvey,2007). The public release of photos and videos of torture, humiliation, rape, and abuse of prisoners in January 2004 sparked a massive wave of anti-Americanism and hatred among Iraqis. Many academics believe that Iraqis are proud people, and that the occupation of their country stepped on their toes, while they also faced humiliation, sexual torture, and horrific murders of their Sunni compatriots in prisons run by the West, particularly the Americans. Furthermore, the massacre of Fallujah residents in response to their protests against the presence of US forces in that city fueled Iraqis' hatred and hostility toward Americans. Rohan Gunaratna, a terrorism studies expert, believed that this level of hostility would increase the likelihood of the formation of extremist groups. In the case of Iraq, he stated that it was a new

land for jihad and other events that had a significant impact on Islamic movements and Muslim communities (Gunaratna,2003).

According to ISIS' publication Dabiq issue 1, Amir Al-Mu'minin stated, "O Ummah of Islam, take note that today the world is divided into two armies, two ditches: the army of Islam and faith and the division of blasphemy and hypocrisy; Muslims and Mujahids on one side, and Jews, Crusaders, and their allies on the other." All blasphemous nations and religions are led and directed by the Jews, with the United States and Russia at the helm (Dabiq, 1435:1:10). "We are messengers of new victories, advances of the Islamic state, and expansion of its borders," Aleppo's head of tribal affairs said during a meeting with tribal leaders in the area about the collapse of the Sykes-Pico border and the opening of roads between Iraq and the Levant (Dabiq:1435:1:12). ISIS confirms its Anti-Americanism in Dabiq:

- On Shawwal 11th, 1435 AH (August 7th,2014), the US decided to re-intervene in the affairs of the Muslim Ummah by an airstrike against the Islamic State and its people. The attacks, which resulted in the execution of James Foley, highlighted several important points that Americans overlooked:1) The US had intervened in the affairs of the Islamic State, which was backed by allied groups and Saudi Arabia. These groups are currently pleading with the United States for additional support and assistance, which, God willing, will be looted by the Islamic State,2) In his speech on August 20, 2014, Obama refused to mention Steven Sotloff, demonstrating once again that the US administration's top priority was the security of Israel and its allies, including the Zionist Peshmerga forces. These appear to be more important than their citizens' lives (Dabiq,1435:3:2-4).

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi addressed the artificial boundaries of the Islamic lands as follows, "O soldiers of the Islamic State, Oh youths of Muhammad (PBUH) ... Today we are standing at the doors of a new era. This is a turning point for the map of the region and even the world. Today we see the end of a lie called West civilization and the rise of the Islamic sun." This is exactly what Bush said in his last speech to the US troops: "This region is changing to what threatens the civilization," by which he meant the

civilization of polytheism and infidelity, usury and prostitution, and humiliation and subjugation. Baghdadi said, "This direct enemy of Allah, Bush, said about the auspicious rise of the Islamic State, they try to establish the Islamic State from China to Spain. Although he is a liar, he told the truth" [Ja'al Haq wa Zahaqal Batil (Right has come and Wrong has been destroyed)] (Dabiq,1435:4:4).

Opposition to the US-led coalition is also reflected in this group's stated policies. The fourth issue of Dabiq contains a forewarning:

- Oh the US, the US allies, and Crusaders (Christians) be aware that this is more dangerous and larger than you ever imagined. We warned you that we are living in a new era when the [Islamic] State, its soldiers, and its sons are all leaders rather than slaves. They are the people who have not been defeated in centuries. The outcome of their battle is obvious from the start. Unless their victory is guaranteed in advance, they have not been prepared for the battle since Noah's time. They believe that being killed equals victory. The key is right here. You are up against unbeatable opponents. This group is not concerned about their Western nationality; they are all Crusaders who are considered distant enemies of the Muslim nation. How can you enjoy life and sleep when you avoid assisting your brothers, instill fear in the hearts of Crusaders, and respond to their attacks with multiple attacks? Do your best, O monotheist, wherever you are, to protect your brothers and your state. The best thing you could do is try to kill any infidels, whether they are French, Americans, or allies (Dabiq,1435: 4: 9).

When Paul Bremer[1] took over after Jay Garner in 2003, he immediately

began issuing orders to dismantle the former regime's power structures. The Ba'ath Party, the Ministry of Defense, the Republican Guard, the Ministry of Military Affairs, the National Security System, the World Security Organization, the Air Defense, the Quds Army, the Fedayeen Saddam, the Saddam Lion Cubs, the Presidential Office, the Revolutionary Command

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1.Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq after 2003 U.S. invasion

Council, and the Ministry of Propaganda were all disbanded (Lateef AlZubaedi and et al.,2016). The coalition government had implemented a policy of de-Ba'athification. Bremer was inspired by the US experience in Germany following World War II. He had told one of the sheikhs, Jaba Oud, that "every Sunni is a Ba'athist, every Baathist is a Saddam supporter, and every Saddam supporter is a Natzist" (Cottam and et al,2016). The de-Ba'athification plan was implemented in May 2003 with the expulsion of all members of the party who held positions in Saddam's government and the prohibition on recruiting them in the new government's public sectors.

Bremer writes in his memoirs that the de-Ba'athification program had to be carried out completely because many Iraqis were forced to join this party during Saddam Hussein's presidency in order to get a job, or some were members without committing a crime (Bremer,2006). Bremer, on the other hand, had no idea that his decision would result in the layoff of over 20,000 people, as well as job insecurity, disrespect, and a lack of prestige. Because the government provided many job opportunities during Saddam's presidency, most Iraqis were forced to join the Ba'ath Party in order to work in the government. As a result, many Sunnis saw this decision as a plot by Shiites and US forces to attack Sunnis (Cottam,2016).

In Mosul, one of the provinces that welcomed this group, David Petraeus delegated responsibility for de-Ba'athification to Ahmed Chalabi in 2003. Meanwhile, many professors of Mosul University have been fired (Cottam, 2016). This process considerably influenced not only the daily lives of Iraqis but also Sunnis' perceptions of Shiites in positions of power and politics. Many Army specialists were also dismissed during the second phase of the process. These men had all lost their legitimacy and credibility during Saddam Hussein's reign, and they were now unemployed and unpaid. Many of these forces later joined ISIS militants and rose to positions of power with decent payments. What had remained in the minds of Sunnis in Iraq since the early days of the coalition's rule was a narrative of self-contempt and insecurity manifested by the government during both Shiite government and coalition forces.

Another traditional and historical narrative among some Sunni people in Iraq is Shu'ubism[1] and Safavism, which dates back to the history of Ottoman

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1.A movement that as Ignaz Goldziher describes, had formed by Iranians who saw their

and Safavid relations, when Shia was declared as the official religion of Iran and stood in opposition to the Ottoman Empire at the time. In modern Iraq, during the "1920 Revolution"[1], which was regarded as the beginning of the

development of Iraqi national identity, Sunnis accused Shi'ites of being non-Arabs who participated in the revolution aimed at replacing the British occupation with the presence of Iranians (Lateef AlZubaedi and et al,2016). There are numerous such stories among the Arab community's Sunnis. In Iraq, the Iraqi Al-Qaeda organization claimed responsibility for all attacks against the Badr Corps or members of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), and in September 2005, it publicly declared a full-fledged war against Shiites, dubbing them Rafidas (who rejected the idea that Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman were the legitimate successors of Muhammad) (Lateef AlZubaedi and et al,2016:388). The activities of the "Association of Muslim Scholars in Iraq (AMSI)", which was founded on April 14, 2003, by some Sunni clerics in the UAE outside of Iraq, could also be mentioned here. One of the strategic plans of this group, in cooperation with some Iraqi Shiite politicians, was negative propaganda against Iranian programs. In an interview, the group's leader, Harith al-Dhari, stated that the Iranians had a program with political, historical, and ethnic purposes. According to al-Dhari, the political goal of this program was to undermine the importance of Iraq, reduce its role in the region, and, eventually, dissolve it from the international arena. Al-Dhari believes that Hakim's intention to federalize Iraq reveals Iran's decisions and plans to create a specific protected area for itself in the region.

Various issues of Dabiq have portrayed the assassination of Shiite forces (Rafidas), Nusayris, and Iraqi police as a victory and a religious duty (Dabiq 1437:14:37; Dabiq,1435:2:34; Dabiq,1435:4:23). Antagonism toward Iran, as a powerful player in Iraq's post-2003 politics, can be found throughout the ISIS media and magazines. According to the findings of the publication analysis in tables 3 and 4, the terms Iran, Persia, Majusi, and Rafidi, which are used as insults and contempt against Iran (the Iranian government and

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national identity endanger by Arab domination in early Islam during the Omavid Era. The main purpose of these movements was overthrow of Arab governments at that period (Goldziher and Eftekharzade,1371:23).

1.Iraqi revolt against the British

people), confirm this claim. The fourth issue of Dabiq says, "Oh soldiers of the Islamic State, thank God, you have had great achievement! Your reward is with Him. He will heal the believers' chests with the killing of Nusayris (Alawites) and Rafidas by you. He will fill the hearts of the infidels and the hypocrites with anger through you" (Dabiq,1435:4:6). "Severe and frequent battles have occurred between the braves of the Islamic State and the Safavid Crusader tykes in Al-Fallujah province. Recently, the Mujahedin have cleared the martyrs near Saqlawia, and scandalously defeated the Safavid army. "(Dabiq,1435:4:18).

This magazine also describes Iran as a supporter of Iraqi, Syrian, and Hezbollah policies, stating that "Shiite militias in Iran are now fighting to defend Baghdad." The Iraqi regime and its founder were among Syria's most powerful allies of the Assad regime. They dispatched fighters to the Abolfazl al-Abbas Battalion. The Assad Air Force has ceased attacks on the Islamic State in several Levant cities, possibly because it is less expensive to use the US Air Force, especially given the Assad regime's financial collapse and lack of precision in targeting. Simultaneously, it has been able to "hide" chemical weapons from the West and directly use them. Hezbollah has dispatched guerrillas to fight Muslims in Iraq and Syria. Yemen's Houthis, an Iranian ally, have taken over Sana'a (Dabiq,1435:4:41).

The sixth issue of Dabiq confirms suicide attacks and Shiite killings, "On 15 Jumada l-Ukhra, Brother Seyfollah Al-Ansari carried out a suicide attack in Baghdad against a group of Rafida combatants and leaders. He walked among them and detonated his explosive belt, killing over sixty people and injuring over a hundred more. Several Rafida leaders were killed, most notably Ahmed Shakir al-Khafji, the head of the Alexandria district. May Allah accept our brethren as martyrs" (Dabiq,1437:14-25). The Americans announced the withdrawal of their last special forces from Yemen just one day after the operation. The operation is reminiscent of the Mubarak attacks, which al-Zarqawi directed to attack Iraqi Rafidas and assassinate their cleric, Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim (Dabiq,1436:8:19). ISIS writes in another section of the fourth issue of Dabiq, "On the 19th of Jumada al-Awwal, Caliphate soldiers launched a massive massacre in the Abu Ghraib neighborhood of western Baghdad, killing 50 Safavid and Rafida fighters and forcing them to flee. These attacks took place at the same time as a

martyrdom-seeking operation in Sadr Town's military zone (Madina al-Sadr in Baghdad)" (Dabiq,1435:4:2).

## 6.Lack of Self-Esteem in Iraq

The honor was a sign of self-esteem in traditional societies, whereas social status and prestige reflect self-esteem in modern societies, that is, what grants itself a distinct identity as an independent entity. Here we demonstrate how Iraqi Sunnis' loss of dominance in government since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 has resulted in feelings of political and social neglect.

### 6-1.Individual – International System

At the 2002 Opposition Congress at the Metropolitan Hotel in London, the first signs of an attack on Iraq's true social value emerged. Over 50 parties attended the conference, each with their own ideas about how the conference should be held and how the US should intervene in the opposition's decisions. The audience, however, objected to the fact that the actual conference was being held on the 14th floor in the residence of Zalmay Khalilzad, the US ambassador to Iraq, while the audience was meeting on the third floor. The conference was attended by representatives from the US and the six-member council of Ahmed Chalabi, Ayad Allawi, Massoud Barzani, Jalal Talabani, Sharif Ali ibn Hussein, and Abdul Aziz Hakim, as well as a 65-member committee of 30 Shiites, including Ahmed Chalabi, Ayad Allawi, and Abdul Aziz Hakim, 18 Sunnis, 12 Kurds, 2 Turkmen, and 3 Assyrians, to plan and coordinate the post-Saddam events (Lateef AlZubaedi and et al,2016).

Another significant issue arose when the coalition government, with the assistance of the United Nations, chose the members of the Transitional Government Council in August 2003. Although the council appeared to include all Iraqis, including Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds, Christians, and Turkmen, it was repeatedly criticized and its legitimacy was called into question, particularly by Sunnis who believed that the Shiites and Kurds wanted to eliminate the Arab Sunnis' position with the new developments. The 25-member council was made up of 13 Shiites, 5 Sunnis, 5 Kurds, one Assyrian, and one independent member.

### 6-2.Individual- State

The interim government was led by Ayad Allawi, and among the 32 members of the cabinet, 10 Shiites, six Sunnis, and seven Kurds served as ministers or deputy ministers. The 2005 parliamentary elections, and the Sunnis' decision not to participate in them, exacerbated their feelings of marginalization. Jalal Talabani was elected as the transitional government's president. Ibrahim Ja'fari's cabinet included 16 Shia ministers, eight Kurds, six Sunni Arabs, one Christian, and one Turkmen.

The Nouri al-Maliki government, which took over after Ibrahim Ja'fari, was no exception, with 16 Shia ministers, 7 Sunni Arab ministers, and 6 Kurd ministers. Sunnis felt misrecognized and marginalized in these circumstances, and their self-esteem suffered as a result. This phase of failure of the thick recognition process, in addition to a lack of self-esteem, defines the social status of individuals within society, and the realization of Arab Sunnis' self-esteem. Neither the international system nor the Shiite government were able to legally recognize these subjects as distinct identities. This process has harmed the mutual recognition of a person's being in communication and social interaction with other subjects.

## 7.Ontological Insecurity in Iraq

Iraq is a multi-racial, ethnic, and religious country where rivals operate while loyal to a specific place or locality. In this country, communities engage in conflict as if they are independent and distinct from one another. Ethnicity or tribal geography also contribute to the crisis, forcing people to rely on multiple identities. This multiplicity of affinities exacerbates the disunity of identity, revealing a kind of passivity and negative separation in an Iraqi individual and exposing him/her to contradictory feelings of belonging and recognition (Lateef AlZubaedi and et al,2016). This social inherent identity separation, combined with other factors such as the existence of various types of armed religious groups and the nature of the crisis and war zone, creates insecurity and an ontological security crisis for an Iraqi individual. Ontological insecurity is defined as the inability to understand dangers and threats, such that the subject is unsure which danger or threat to deal with and which to ignore. The individual's energy is spent on immediate needs in this case. In short, the individual will not have a sense of subjectivity.

## 7-1.Individual- International System

One of the most significant consequences of the 2003 war was the marginalization of the Arab Sunni minority, including trained and skilled military personnel, who were left unpaid and thus pushed towards violence (Barakat,2005; Hatch,2005). Another unfavorable outcome was the democratization of Iraq by the Bush administration, which provided an ideal environment for various ethnic-religious political parties to offer their own limited and dispersed slogans. Unfortunately, they were unable to find a solution to unite and integrate Iraq (Davis,2007).

Another sign of an attack on security was the 2003 massacre in Fallujah, the second largest city in Anbar Province with a population of 300,000. The residents held Salafi and extremist religious beliefs, and religious clerics wielded more political power and influence than sheikhs (Cottom and et al, 2016:42). The first massacres in Fallujah occurred shortly after the US troops entered the city. In April 2003, 50 people were killed and 65 were injured during an anti-American rally in the city (Hashim,2006:23). In the autumn, General Swant launched an operation called "Iron Hammer" against the people of Fallujah, declaring, "This is a war, and I am ready to break the walnut with a heavy hammer." (West,2005:34). The situation was no better in Ramadi, the capital of Al-Anbar Province, and other Sunni Iraqi regions. In these circumstances, the Sunni Iraqi is constantly defining and redefining an identity that is constantly under attack. They live with human insecurity and a lack of reliable understanding about their existence, whether they are Sunni or Iraqi, Arab or from Fallujah.

## 8.Hubristic Identity Crisis in Iraq

Throughout Iraq's history, various tribes have had complicated relationships with the government. Due to their political influence and authority, tribal sheikhs served as local judges in regional courts during Saddam's reign (Dawisha,2009). Politicians in Iraq who rise to power come from various tribes and thus seek support from their tribes. During the Iran-Iraq war, Iraqi tribes were instrumental in fostering patriotic Iraqi unity, with a focus on the Arab race (Haddad,2011:95). Even in the 1990s, Saddam Hussein attempted to restore tribal strength in exchange for consolidating his power. As a result, he took steps to redefine and strengthen tribal identities (Jabar,2000: 31). The above-mentioned examples partially represent the status and prestige that has historically become part of tribe identity and Iraqi hubristic identity.

**8-1.Individual- International System**
The Iraqi people's hubristic identity is defined as honor (Asabiya) and prestige (Sharaf), i.e. what gives them superiority and hubristic pride. However, they obtained nothing after 2003 except the dismissal of 20,000 public employees affiliated with the Ba'ath Party, approximately 7,000 deaths between 2003 and 2007, and the humiliation of 8,000 prisoners in Abu Ghraib. Sheikh Shoka, one of Ramadi's Sunni tribal sheikhs, said of the US forces' humiliating and abusive behavior, "They considered all to be enemies and terrorists, and they had a bad humiliating behavior with us; they bombed and broke into houses" (quoted in Cottom,2016:53). None of Honneth's stages of Honneth recognition were recognized by coalition forces in the mutual recognition relationship between Arab Iraqi Sunnis. The physical presence of these individuals was not acknowledged, nor were Sunni people's self-esteem and different ways of life. Because the social identity of the Sunni tribes defines Iraq as a nation, it is not surprising that some tribes, such as those in Al-Anbar Province, support local insurgent groups or Al-Qaeda (Cottom and et al,2016:63). Sunnis faced the prospect of losing power to the Shia majority, which was not only a challenge to their self-image but also an existential threat. They were in a power and prestige crisis, as well as a crisis of honor and hubris for the Sunni Arab race.

**8-2.Struggle for Hubristic Identity Recognition in Iraq**
Failure to recognize hubristic identity is regarded as a source of conflict. Attempts to reclaim one's lost hubristic identity are not always Honnethian and ethical, and they are frequently associated with armed conflicts. This lack of recognition is directly related to the subjects' damaged self-image. When the coalition forces and the Shiite government refused to recognize the Sunni Arab role, Sunnis experienced ontological insecurity as a result of humiliation and loss of honor and prestige during Saddam Hussein's reign. A society with recent conflict memory, such as Iraq, is more likely to resort to armed conflict to reclaim these identities.
According to ISIS, massacres, executions, live burnings, suicide attacks, and terrorist operations are reactions to any cooperation with the coalition, the bombing of Muslims in Iraq, and the imprisonment and torture of ISIS forces and allies. From another angle, these reactions are an attempt to reclaim the hubristic identity of Sunnis, who have a long history of hostility

toward Rafida Majusis and atheist Crusaders and now regard them as enemies of Islam and the Muslim community. As ISIS points out: "Oh soldiers of Iraq and the Levant, understand that the temporal world has deceived the untrustworthy and superficial endowments have made them proud, they are overwhelmed with selflessness, and Satan has made them arrogant... to force them to attack Muslim regions and plan an unprecedented attack in history. The US, Crusader Europe, Communist Russia, Majusi Iran, secular Turkey, atheist Kurds, Rafidas, Nusayris, paid militias, and tyrant Arabs and their armies are all in the same camp" (Rumiya,1435:4:4).

Thus, in the first approach, ISIS has sought to retaliate or punish members of the Western coalition who have been at war with Muslims in any way by engaging in terrorist acts around the world through terror and demonstrations of violence. In the following approach, these reactions can be considered to be performed in order to gain a sliver of recognition for this violent group. Indeed, it can be stated that this group commits suicide and terrorist acts to compensate for the loss of its hubristic identity and to reclaim its lost identity in a non-Honnethian manner. Figure (1) presents some of ISIS's suicide and terrorist acts.

Following the declaration of its self-proclaimed caliphate in 2014, the ISIS group invaded the territories of both Iraq and Syria, occupying many cities and regions in both countries. Taking areas away from the central government's sovereignty is viewed as a step toward a country's insecurity and instability. In January 2014, this group took Fallujah, and in June 2014, it took Mosul, Tikrit, and Al-Qaim near the Syrian border. In May 2015, Ramadi, the capital of Al Anbar province and the largest city in western Iraq, was captured. The capture of the historical city of Palmyra in May 2015 and the destruction of its ancient monuments occurred in August 2015, and UNESCO considered the destruction of the city's ancient monuments, including the 2000-year-old Temple of Baalshamin, to be a "war crime". As shown in Figure 1, the highest death toll from this group's terrorist and suicide operations occurred in Iraq between 2014 and 2017, because operations against the group were carried out by US-led coalition forces and Iran, the most important regional player in Iraq. The historical narratives of these subjects' interactions, as well as the killing and humiliation of coalition forces and the atmosphere of war and insecurity, resulted in the

greatest human casualties in Iraq.



**Figure (1): Number of Casualties of Terrorist Attacks of the ISIS in Different Countries in 2014 and May 2017**

One manifestation of ISIS's instability and obvious violence is the execution of citizens from various countries in response to actions that lead to attacks or killings of Muslims, or even cooperation with the coalition group. On August 19, 2014, ISIS beheaded American correspondent James Foley, prompting ISIS to write, "Watch the execution of American James Wright Foley as a sign of punishment for the US's recent violence against Muslims in Iraq, to calm down the believers" (Dabiq:1435:3:2-4). The beheading of American journalist Steven Sotloff in September 2014 is another case in response to the US air force killing Muslims in Iraq, as reported in Issue 4 of Dabiq (Dabiq,1435:4:51).

Other executions include the September 2014 beheading of British aid worker David Haines, the October 2014 beheading of British hostage Alan Henning, the November 2014 massacre of 322 Albu Nimr tribe members, the November 2014 beheading of American hostage Peter G. Kassik, and the January 2015 beheading of Japanese journalist Kenji Goto. In this regard, ISIS writes in Dabiq issue 7, "Peaceful Japan entered the War on Muslims under the leadership of Nobel Peace Prize winner, Obama. Except for the fact that the Caliph is a dangerous entity for them, what benefits led Shinzo Abe to spend more than $ 200 million on the war against the Islamic

State?" (Dabiq,1436:7:3). Caliph has no need for money and is well aware that the Japanese will never pay it, but by making this request, he intended to humiliate the Japanese government, which has been a slave to the West since World War II (Dabiq,1436:7:4).

ISIS released a video of the live burning of Jordanian Air Force pilot Muath al-Kasasbeh in 2015, writing, "this week the Islamic State released a video of the execution of Jordanian pilot. According to the video, the Islamic State burned Muath al-Kasasbeh alive in the fire to atone for his crimes against Islam and Muslims, including his active participation in bombing Islamic lands" (Dabiq,1436:7:5). The group carried out several terrorist and suicide attacks in over 18 countries, including coalition forces and any country that had collaborated with this group, as well as Iran, which it has honorably mentioned in some issues of its magazine. Tunisia was another target of the ISIS retaliation. In the tenth issue of Dabiq, ISIS writes, "In Tunisia, Mujahid Abu Yahya al-Qayrawani used a gun to attack a coastal hotel in Sousse, killing dozens of European citizens allied in the fight against the Islamic State" (Dabiq,1436:10:3). This refers to an attack on a Tunisian coastal hotel in June 2015 that killed 38 people.

Other countries in the region targeted by this group include Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, and Egypt. During Friday prayers in Saudi Arabia, an attack and explosion occurred at the Imam Ali Mosque in the Shiite town of Al-Qudaih in Qatif province, killing 22 people and injuring 102 others. On January 29, 2016, it also carried out suicide attacks at the Imam Reza Mosque in Al-Mubarraz, Ahsa, Saudi Arabia, killing 5 people and injuring 18.

ISIS writes in Issue 8 of Dubiq, "In Kuwait, a Rafida Temple (mosque) was exploded by Mujahid Abu Suleiman al-Mowahid. This mujahid went among the Rafidas and punished them for al-vengeance Sunnah's and in defense of the caliph, because Kuwait is a member of the coalition fighting the Islamic State" (Dabiq,1436:8:3). This refers to the June 2015 bombing at a mosque in Kuwait, which killed 27 people.

The US, the UK, Sweden, Belgium, and France were among the main targets for the ISIS attacks in the West. In the 12th issue of Dabiq, ISIS writes, "On the first Friday of Safar, eight caliph's soldiers conducted operations in the heart of French fighters. The operation included several simultaneous attacks with suicide bombers and weapons for a variety of

purposes, including the French Sports Stadium, where Francois Hollande was watching a football match, and the Bataclan Theater Hall, where hundreds of French atheists had gathered for a music concert. These attacks had other targets around Paris, and they were successful, killing hundreds of Crusaders. These attacks shocked the world and reminded infidels that the Islamic State would confront aggression with fire and blood for the honor of the Prophet and those martyred and wounded by the Crusaders in Muslim lands" (Dabiq,1437:12:28).

ISIS writes in the 14th issue of Dabiq, "Brussels, Europe's beating heart, was crucified. Many people were killed by the Mujahedin there. The raging fire that has been raging in Iraq for years is now engulfing Belgium and will soon spread to the rest of the West. Paris was a red flag. Brussels serves as a reminder. What follows will be even more devastating and bitter. God is all-powerful" (Dabiq,1437:14:5). This refers to the March 22, 2016 attacks at the Brussels airport and subway station, more than 30 people were killed and 270 were injured. ISIS attacks were also carried out in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia, and Iran.

## 9.Conclusion

This paper attempted to demonstrate how a group, such as ISIS, emerges and becomes violent. To answer this question, we used the thick recognition theoretical model to show how failures in the thick recognition process can lead to the formation of such organizations and groups over time. Before 2003, historical narratives shaped the mental constructs of Iraqi Sunnis as subjects, according to the Four-dimensional Thick Recognition Model. Furthermore, the US troops, Iranian Shu'ubism, and post-Saddam Shiite rule in Iraq, combined with a failure to develop self-esteem, paved the way for their ontological insecurity. The massive deportation of Ba'ath Party members, the humiliation and lack of even a semblance of recognition of the humane identity of Iraqi prisoners, the massacre of protesters due to the presence of US forces, particularly in areas with a radical Salafi religious background, caused Iraqi Sunnis to question their true value and obtain an insecure understanding of their identities. As a result, they experienced a crisis of hubristic identity, which distinguished them from other Iraqi Arabs. The individual, state, and international levels of analysis were employed in this study to examine mutual relations of recognition between the individual-state and individual-international systems, with manifestations

such as de-Ba'athification, historical governance of Sunnis, and Iranian Shu'ubism falling under historical narratives. The lack of self-esteem and self-realization was investigated at the individual, state, and international levels of analysis in mutual recognition relationships between the individual-state and individual-international systems, with manifestations such as a lack of thick recognition of social status and prestige. Because subject identity is formed through mutual interaction, and following the recognition of all endogenous socio-political constructs, political and social integration will be a means of peacemaking as an independent recognizer in the interaction between states and individuals.

The other side of the model investigated the ontological insecurity caused by the uncertainty and instability of perception towards being, as well as the different place of self within society or opposite the recognizer party, using the individual, state, and international levels of analysis in mutual recognition relations between individual-state and individual-international systems. Manifestations such as the lack of stable perceptions in Sunni-Arab identity in Al-Anbar Province were examined against the failure of the US-led coalition forces to form a transitional government in 2003. At this stage of misrecognition, the individual's being is actually questioned as to what it can be to avoid being attacked, and what threat it should encounter. As a result, one of the fundamental principles of the agency is called into question, as is its being, in the context of any outcome of the conflict, including poverty, insecurity, vital insecurity, and so on, and it leads to the next step, which is the crisis of hubristic identity. Since 2003, Iraqi Arabs have been victims of bias and lack of dignity. The events of Abu Ghraib, Fallujah, and others demonstrated the demise of the recognizer activist in an ontologically insecure space. Here, ISIS is established, and then violence is used to resurrect this lost hubristic identity .

Finally, this paper tried to use the thick recognition theoretical framework to demonstrate how narratives, ontological security, and hubristic identity played a key role in mutual interactions between individuals, states, and the international system, leading to peace or struggle to reclaim lost identity through violent actions.

## 10.Acknowledgement

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