Phenomenology, Marxism in Question of Immigration

Joel Patomäki

joel.j.patomaki@student.jyu.fi
University of Jyväskylä

Abstract

I will look at immigration from the perspective of phenomenology and its somewhat Foucauldian understanding of governmentality in the third way that Marxism integrates phenomenology. The term economism has been kept as a primary reason for closing the state borders from immigration. Different ideas of which sector of being clearly defined legitimizes the sovereign. I hypothesize that in the economic times of third-way economic policies just behind us, economics is the most clearly defined category to legitimize sovereignty and its borders in many senses. Economism as a reason to keep borders closed is paradoxical since economic activity most clearly penetrates the borders. Poststructuralist analysis of flows like in Gilles Deleuze or of hospitality in a political sense and context in Jacques Derrida is essential. Phenomenology helps to understand governmentality, as I will argue/show. It can also help to see keeping people out of sovereign - like the state as a question of governmentality. The question becomes a technical question of governmentality. The point is to sketch out the technical governmentality concerning the immigration question, mainly phenomenologically.

Keywords: Phenomenology, Governmentality, Immigration, Foucault, Postphenomenology, John Searle .

Introduction

Here, I will define primarily the governmental question concerning immigration. I will see Definition of risk and agency: This might be vague, but it should work. According to Ulrich Beck, reflexive modernization also means agency structure (theoretically structure, not structure as social structure), that individuation in which "individuals reflect upon and flexibility the rules and resources of their workplace and leisure time" (Beck, 1992, p. 3). This analysis of risk agencies is also present in the changing mining laws of Finland, my home country. Risk of different identities and border passing is also present (Adeuanju, Oriola, 2011)

There is the phenomenological reading of Deleuze, and the embodiment analysis of technology is an important (also phenomenological) point of reference in this article. Biopower is the capacity to control ourselves with dispositive created in our social practices and their complex interaction. Reidar Due explains in his book *Deleuze:* "For all thought is now seen as social practice taking place within force field composed of other social practices" (Due, 2007, 127.) Those fields are Intuitively, this idea is reasonable. The problem is that every thought comprises the force fields when looked down in more detail. Due claims this notion is not causal because "thought is real, both as process and as a 'form of content' and that social reality cannot exist independently of the thoughts that it generates and that it embodies through social practices and modes of organization." (Due, 2007, 127-128.) This questions the Ferrarisian notion of separation between the social and natural world.

John Searle has also been claimed to be a phenomenologist in many senses in general. Before we can go to the American reading of Biopower in Deleuze's thinking that paradoxically found this social ontology, let me briefly note some basic principles of the Foucauldian theoretical project of biopower. I must start from the very beginning. Foucault began his famous book *The Archaeology of Knowledge*.

"For many years now, historians have preferred to turn their attention to long periods, as if beneath as if beneath the shifts and changes of political events, they were trying to reveal the stable, almost indestructible system of checks and balances, the irreversible processes, the constant readjustments, the underlying tendencies that gather force, and are suddenly reversed after centuries of continuity,

the movements of accumulation and slow saturation, the great silent, motionless bases that traditional history has covered with thick layer of events" (Foucault,1972, 3) There is ontology of law connected to also Foucault (Biasiotti, 2011).

On the other hand, it is essential to note that from a more scientific perspective, the Foucauldian notion of biopower has been seen altogether as out of time by Donna Haraway. As Rosi Braidotti notes, "Foucauldian diagrams of power describe what we have already ceased to be" (Braidotti, 1994, 104.) The critical point here is that in posthumanist thinking (which Braidotti is part of), an important figure, Latour, states that "scientists define facts, only facts; they leave the politics and moralists the even more daunting task of defining values. Critical posthumanist thinkers such as Deleuze and Guattari (1983) believe that the socius as a full body forms a surface where all production is recorded, at which point the entire process seems to emanate from this recording surface (Deleuze Guattari, 1983, p. 10) and" all production constituting a surface over which the forces and agents of production are distributed" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 10) This shows how ways to speak go to the same line with object-oriented thinking described by its creator as "object is whatever opposes the human subject."

Deleuze and Guattari state, "The performative itself is explained by the illocutionary, not the opposite" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 87). Roland Bogue describes Deleuze's and Guattari's Thousand Plateaus in the following way: "*Thousand Plateaus* takes up many themes of the themes of *Anti-Oedipus* (volume one of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*), but in ways that do not so much complement as complicate the elaborate schemata of the first work. In place of the opposition of molar and molecular in *Anti-Oedipus,* one finds a triad of molar, molecular, and nomadic, to which correspond three 'lines': the molar or rugged segmentary line, the molecular or supple segmentation line, [and] the line of flight. (Bogue, 1989, 124)

Searle writes that institutions are historic and created by language. (Searle,2010) This makes it easier to understand the differences between new materialism and the linguistic understanding of institutions. In neoliberalism, no public institution would generally deliver the service but a filter mechanism, for example, phone calls at standard (cheap) prices. Then, institution in the sense of risk understanding and management technologies is the only filter that

helps to understand risks. This leads to new materialism, which does not make a difference between material and language or society and nature. The comparison is essential to show that interconnections reduce risks in Ulrich Beck's theory about societal dangers. When nature, society, language, and material are interconnected, it is easier to see and trace the interconnections that reduce risks.

Goodchild describes Deleuze's idea of institution: "All fixed orders of society, including conventions, institutions, and impulses that provide a framework for possible social relations but which themselves remain unaffected by what happens are instances of antiproduction" (Goodchild,1996,74). In Deleuzian terms, an institution is this kind of filter mechanism that is not static. One example of a practice approach and how it is connected to the registers is how capital plays the role of a recording surface. (Deleuze & Quattari, 1983, 11-13.) Much writing concerns posthumanism and practical subjects like immigration (Braidotti, 2018. Rosenberger, 2015).

Ferraris's idea that collective intentionality is better explained through arch writing, the text as the contents (Ferraris, 2013, p. 154). According to Andrew Sayer, a critical realist with a posthuman twist in his theories: "If structures are widely distributed such as those of capital accumulation, then this implies that although they have some spatial and temporal precondition, these can be met in variety of spatial and temporal contexts" (Sayer, 2000, pp. 136-137) There is an institution of capital accumulation that is not fixed and as Sayer states affect spatial and temporal contexts that are not part of the institution.

Finnish Teivo Teivainen uses plane as a word that can explain some breaking of barriers in theoretical methodology framework - that resembles general ontology in partly Marxist and non-Marxist economic debates. The same idea can be found in how Deleuze describes the concept of **a diagram**: "Panopticon traverses all these forms and is applied to all these substances: it is in this sense that a category of power exists, as a pure disciplinary function. Therefore, Foucault will name this the *diagram,* a function that must be 'detached from any specific use' as from any specific substance" (Deleuze, 1988, p. 72). The Spinoza political implications of Deleuze. (Negri, 2000).

This questions the Ferrarisian notion of separation between the social and natural world, which could also be seen as Foucauldian according to Ferraris (2013), who sees his social ontology as

Foucauldian. On the other hand, it is essential to note that the Foucauldian notion of biopower has been seen altogether as governmentality in some popular discourses of Foucauldian theory. Pennywise title, Remembering Out of Time by Donna Haraway, means that Haraway sees Foucault as out of time in the 1980s boom and enthusiasm for new technologies.

As Rosi Braidotti notes, Foucauldian diagrams of power describe the history of different pressures in society and such. (Braidotti, 1994, 104.) Foucault is critical for some forms of contemporary British Marxism. There are Marxist pressures and chaotic piles of history (in the Marxist sense), so to write. There are also phenomenological approaches included in most third-way Marxist approaches to the methodology of, for example, cultural studies.

Posthumanism thinkers such as Deleuze and Guattari in the concept/term the socius as a whole body forms a surface where all production is recorded, at which point the entire process seems to emanate from this recording surface (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 10) and "all production constituting a surface over which the forces and agents of production are distributed" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 10) This shows how ways to speak go to the same line with object-oriented thinking described by its creator as "object is whatever opposes the human subject."

"The quasi causality of the body without organs is best understood concerning the larger social body without organs, which, in its reterritorialized form, Deleuze and Guattari call *socius*" (Bogue, 1989, p. 94). How could these areas created be the sole purpose and driving force of calculation? Object-oriented ontology is also understood partly through structuring objects as things in themselves. In that case, these calculations are only part of the complex process of calculating and changing different elements.

Deleuze and Guattari state, "The performative itself is explained by the illocutionary, not the opposite" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 87). Roland Bogue describes Deleuze's and Guattari's Thousand Plateaus in the following way: "*Thousand Plateaus* takes up many themes of the themes of *Anti-Oedipus* (volume one of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*), but in ways that do not so much complement as complicate the elaborate schemata of the first work. In place of the opposition of molar and molecular in *Anti-Oedipus,* one finds a triad

of molar, molecular, and nomadic, to which correspond three 'lines': the molar or hard segmentary line, the molecular or supple segmentation line, [and] the line of flight. (Bogue, 1989, 124) These lines are not important for my research except that they make it easier to see the performative's role in the mechanistic collective. Foucault states: "For a long time it was thought that language had mastery over time, that it acted both as future bond of promise and as memory and narrative" (Foucault, 1994, p. 167). "All fixed orders of society, including conventions, institutions, and impulses that provide a framework for possible social relations but which themselves remain unaffected by what happens are instances of anti-production" (Goodchild,1996,74)

In this chapter, it is crucial to see that according to my theoretical understanding, New Realism is not a Realist position in general (namely, that reality has its own existence independent of the subject). However, it is more like a development of post-modernist thought, an attempt to fix different problems associated with post-modernist assumptions; different forms of realism have developed. It is important to note that Graham Harman describes that de Landa has distinguished different linear causation, typically material, and catalysis causation, usually expressive. These can also be understood as modes of reality, social or natural, in that expressive is social and not material. There is governmentality in the question of immigration, as explained in the abstract. This point only shows that the phenomenological approach is more superficial, but it is also needed to understand governmentality.

This is important because Harman claims that the idea that entities are only catalysts is similar to Bhaskar's idea that there are always many tendencies in every cause. (Harman, 195-196, 2010) The new realist divides nature and society compared to other forms of realism that are near to it theoretically. One example of a practice approach and how it is connected to the registers is how capital plays the role of a recording surface. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, 11-13.) The capital can also be seen as a metaphor in a Bourdieu way.

John W. Cook argues that Wittgenstein's Humean view of causation remained the same during his philosophical career. (Cook, 1994, 177–181.) This understanding of causes is common to the Wittgensteinian theory of knowledge. Human practices meaning and knowledge in the social world. In his book Social Construction of

What, Ian Hacking writes, "Kant may have cast the mold, but drive for construction belongs to the twentieth century" (Hacking, 1999, 47.) Scott Lash supports the assumption that the constructivist account belongs to the twentieth century. He tries to challenge the belief that critical theory is modernist and post-structuralism is post-modernist (Lash, 1990, 153.) This can be understood as a risk more important than culture, and the era before the First World War coming back can be traced back to this pragmatism. The idea in neo-communist terms (basically neo-communist as one story in neocommunism) is that conformism and consumerism swallowed the socialist creative ways to more uniform counter or subculture.

Risk can be traced and blocked in the counterculture, which is the common intuition nowadays. Next, I will posit these questions about ontological beings (in general) in the framework of social ontology. Namely in the world of conventions, rules, and performatives. According to Deleuze applies this genetic principle to all features of social organization, including the human 'subject' (Due, 2007, 130.) The formal starting point of their method is multiplicity. A multiplicity is an indeterminate 'group' defined formally as *a capacity to be affected* prior to the elements it will consist of" (Due, 2007, 130.) Latour sees the social, or, as he likes to put it, assemblages, as interconnected and interwined entities. Also, counterculture can be seen in the Latourian way. Counterculture is an example of assemblage and risk here. The point is about the separation of nature and society.

Elder-Vasses account of causality separates different Spheres of Social Reality. From the point of view of this Latour/Deleuze axis, he claims that society is part of the well-structured and organized, layered theory of the emergence of properties *from nature* since he is claiming that collective intentionality can be individuated as a particular stratum of reality that is either needed or not needed in the causal sphere. The claim that the social world and social structures are represented by text denies this claim because the social is always represented by text. Ferraris suggests that texts replace collective intentionality. The individual can easily alter a textual/social form. Causality of human action is often modified in practice, as R. Harre and E.H Madden (1975, 83.) claim in their book *Causal Powers*. Critical realists take a very different approach to reality and claim that reality consists of different levels, and those levels function as

independent and reducible through the concept of emergence. Searle also states that emergence plays a vital function in the explanative structure of nature.

In other words, reality is constructed as a theoretical model where entities are placed in different social or natural reality strata. This point can be further represented by Alf Hornborg, who claims that Latour does not see phenomena such as imperialism embedded in technology because he is, in fact, so obsessed with how we use objects that he does not see how the objects use us. (Hornborg, 2016)

Reidar Due explains in his book *Deleuze,* "For all thought is now seen as social practice taking place within force field composed of other social practices" (Due, 2007, 127.) The force consists of objects and persons that both have a similar agency. Both terms are, therefore, fundamentally actors and consist of networks. (Harman, 2016) fields are Intuitive, and this idea is reasonable. The problem is that every thought comprises the force fields when looked down in more detail. Due claims this notion is not causal because "thought is real, both as process and as a 'form of content' and that social reality cannot exist independently of the thoughts that it generates and that it embodies through social practices and modes of organization." (Due, 2007, 127-128.). Discussion on also partly posthuman terms of immigration and citizenship relates. (Crouch, 2004, 78).

Let us look at the account of Causality that Deleuze gives in his social ontology to trace which causality principle introduced here by Deleuze could be seen as Searlean practice. Searle seems to understand. This is the difference between different exact structural levels in Searle's theory. As the unpredictable element, the text is restricted to the Representational principle, which is an analytical concept. It allows parts of causal processes to be separated and observed individually. The genetic principle is described: "Any 'object' is a cluster of relations conditioned by the composition of determining forces and processes of different kinds. (Due, 2007, 130.) He concludes that "we can therefore not isolate within this cluster an individual thing and ascribe to it a series of events which we then set out to explain" (Due, 2007, 130.)."

Here, the concept of social ontology is potentially enlarged: "Haraway wants to fight back by positing affirmative and empowering figurations for the new interaction with animals, mutants, and

machines, which is constitutive of our historical era" (Braidotti, 2002, p. 139). The constitutive idea of modernity was in many areas that the space and material itself were only an instrument to show something or tell a story. However, in modernity, the space itself was the thing that was being transformed and researched through, for example, theatre. According to Christopher Balme Theatre historian Max Herrmann, theatre space is always created only after human movement. (Balme, 2008, 78-79) Therefore, the space of theatre is connected to humans in a posthumanist sense. By this, I mean that humans are closely connected to nonhuman beings, as I will explain more closely later. In Herrmann's example, the theatre space is transformed through human movement, but this is trivial since the two interact and are seen as counterparts that do not necessarily exist without the other (although the actor needs a space, which is often a fact in conventional theatre. The figurations Braidotti explains as the basis of Braidotti's thought is that behind the theatre framing, anything can happen even though it is only exploring the potential of different material or human elements connected in an empowering sense.

One example of a practice approach and how it is connected to the registers is how capital plays the role of a recording surface. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, 11-13.)

Ferraris's idea that collective intentionality is better explained through archwriting, the text as the contents (Ferraris, 2013, p. 154). Ferraris helps in this project by opening a door for a more sophisticated understanding of the terms that Searle calls the causal explanation in his theory. Searle's three terms for causal explanation in his social ontology must be reformed in a more Marxist, self-reflexive, and critical theoretical sense. I will combine the best parts of these ontologies described by Renault by using Searle's ontology as the basis of my research and constructing a process-oriented ontology to three terms that explain causation in Searle's ontology.

The problem of Causation in Searle's social ontology is the following. Searle does follow Austin in the understanding that speech acts are extrinsic relations between statements, text, etc. The problem in this, however, is that there are *nondiscursive presuppositions* (Deleuze & Guattari (2004, 86) that need to be more clearly understood in the manner of cause and effect. Instead, According to Deleuze and Quattari, the performative changes the conditions of speech in three different ways: 1)It made it impossible to conceive

language as a code, 2)It has made it impossible to see semantics syntactic or even phonematics as a scientific zone of language independent of pragmatics 3) made it impossible to maintain a distinction between language and speech. Speech cannot be defined independently of speech acts, according to Deleuze (viime kys al)

The plane of practice is, therefore, separate from any other level. So, in this idea, Searle is not separate from the practice approach. He makes the separation by drawing his theory closer to the neo-materialist theory by admitting the material nature of the status function in his 1995 social ontology. I will look into the question of causality of the performatives through the ontology of Searle. It is crucial how the material background enables differences.

At the bottom, the problems could be about Derrida's idea of the possibility of an illocution. It means that the speech act is enforced and does undoubtedly succeed. On the other hand, a perlocution is more random in effects. The text cannot work causally if no difference is made between the perlocution and the illocution because only the illocution has the billiard ball touch. To say it in another way, is it possible that causal patterns are connected to social facts, or are they an impossible combination? If social facts are understood to be socially constructed? The answer is that, as learned from Bhaskar's account of causality (connected his practice approach to social sciences), the potential is the primary source of a social sphere. So, in Bhaskar's notion, nature is not separate from society in some sense in the same way as, for example, Latour.

Stephen Zepke describes some ideas on how the (social) world, according to Deleuze (and Guattari), is composed. "This plan(e) of composition is not defined by its form, by its substance or by a subject" (Zepke, 2009, p. 116). There is an example of technology that can be used to counter the argument that economics is about social processes (Teivainen 2002 in general) because economics is the process of technical change that counters (as one feature) social threats. This is partly the constitutive argument that Teivainen criticizes in his Ph.D. Social approaches must be contrasted with opposed technology when a risk is considered. This also resembles the new realist (Ferraris 2013, 2015) divide of social and natural. The idea that, in a posthuman way, nature and society are seen as one whole is opposed to constitutionalism (a term used in Teivainen's sense).

In my understanding, risks are controlled by countering a tendency until tendencies around the countered tendency are too thick as metaphors, meaning functionally that they cause different risks. This last is in a critical realist sense, but also a joke. For example, before, I did in Belgium and the Netherlands train hopping with no ticket nowadays; nowadays, I buy a ticket but have to hop on a train. Deleuze describes this problem in the following way: "Representing the topic does mean that it does not only bring to light the situation but also the basic things of the problem" (Deleuze, 2005, p. 107). This argument is a bit against deleuzionaism because the developer of critical realism is Marxist, and deleuzianism, in general, is sometimes against Marxism. There is always in Marxism the idea of vulgar physical production forces. Then, when capital (in very general Bourdieaun sense meaning many capitals) for some reason is collected enough

The representational principle is an analytical concept. It allows elements of causal processes to be separated and observed individually. The genetic principle is described: "Any 'object' is a cluster of relations conditioned by the composition of determining forces and processes of different kinds. (Due, 2007, 130.) He concludes that "we can therefore not isolate within this cluster an individual thing and ascribe to it a series of events which we then set out to explain" (Due, 2007, 130.) According to Deleuze applies this genetic principle to all features of social organization, including the human 'subject' (Due, 2007, 130.) The formal starting point of their method is multiplicity. A multiplicity is an indeterminate 'group' defined formally as *a capacity to be affected* prior to the elements it will consist of" (Due, 2007, 130.)

Deleuze describes this problem in the following way: "Representing the topic clearly does mean that it does not only bring to light the situation but also the basic things of the problem" (Deleuze, 2005, p. 107). The representational principle is an analytical concept. It allows elements of causal processes to be separated and observed individually. The genetic principle is described: "Any 'object' is a cluster of relations conditioned by the composition of determining forces and processes of different kinds. (Due, 2007, 130.) He concludes that "we can therefore not isolate within this cluster an individual thing and ascribe to it a series of events which we then set out to explain" (Due, 2007, 130.) According to Deleuze applies this genetic principle to all features of social organization, including the

human 'subject' (Due, 2007, 130.) The formal starting point of their method is multiplicity. A multiplicity is an indeterminate 'group' defined formally as *a capacity to be affected* prior to the elements that it will consist of" (Due, 2007, 130.)

On the other hand, I will look at the potential of the assemblage theory of Manuel de Landa to give a theoretical space to understand capitalism as a layered organism. As Fernand Braudel, cited by de Landa, says, "It was essential to my purpose to distinguish between these two upper layers and explain them about each other" (Braudel, 1992, p. 25). Manuel de Landa writes in his book *Thousand Years of Nonlinear History* that "we may very well ask ourselves whether some (or most) of these applications has been purely metaphorical. There is, no doubt, some elements of metaphor in my use of the terms, but there are, I believe, common physical processes behind the formation of mesh works and hierarchies" (de Landa, 1997, p. 58).

Bibliography

Adeuanju T. Charles, Oriola B Termitope Colonialism and Contemporary African Migration: A Phenomenological Approach. *Journal of Black Studies.* 2011: 42(6).

Balme. B Christopher (2012). *Johdatus Teatteriin (*Trans. Pirkko Koski). Helsinki, Like.

Biasiotti Maria Angela, Casanovas Pompeu, Fernández-Barrera Meritxell, Sartor Giovanni (2011). *Approaches to Legal Ontologies: Theories, Domains, Methodologies.* Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London, New York: Springer.

Braidotti, Rosi Hlavajova, Maria (eds.) (2018). *Posthuman Glossary.* London New York Sydney New Delhi: Bloomsbury Academics.

Bratman, Michael (2014). *Shared Agency a Planning Theory of Acting Together* Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press.

Butler, J. (1997). *Excitable Speech a Politics of the Performative,* New York, Routledge.

Crouch, C. (2004). *Post-Democracy.* Cambridge, Malden: Polity Press.

De Landa, Manuel (2016). *Assemblage Theory,* Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press.

Deleuze, Gilles (1988) *Foucault* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Deleuze & Guattari (2004). *A Thousand Plateaus* London New York: Continuum.

Derrida, Jacques (1977) "Signature, Event, Context", ranskasta käänt. S.Weber & J.Mehlman. *Glyph* (1): 172–197.

Derrida, Jacques (1992) "Before the Law", pp.181-220 teoksessa D.Attridge (eds.) *Acts of Literature*. Lontoo & New York Routledge.

Derrida, Jacques (1988). *Limited Inc*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

Derrida, Jacques (1994). *Archive Fever.* Chicago London: University of Chicago Press.

Dreyfus, Hubert L & Rabinow, Paul (1982) *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago.

Due, Reidar (2007) *Deleuze,* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Elder-Vass, D. (2010). *The Causal Power of Social Structures.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ferraris, Maurizio (2013). *Documentality: Why It Is Necessary to Leave Traces*. Trans. R.Davies. New York: Fordham University Press.

Groff, R., (2004). *Critical Realism, Post Positivism and the Possibility of Knowledge* New York, Routledge.

Harman, Graham (2016). *Immaterialism.* Cambridge, Malden: Polity Press.

Hornborg, Alf, (2014). *Theory Culture Society.* London, New York: Sage Journals

Kirk Ludwig, (2016). *From Individual to Plural Agency* Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Mulligan, Kevin (2003). "Searle, Derrida and the Ends of Phenomenology" pp 261–286. From: ed. Barry Smith *The Cambridge Companion to Searle* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Meijers W. M Anthonia (2003) "Can Collective Intentionality Be Individualized", pp.167-184 teoksessa Koepsell S Moss (eds.) *John Searle's Ideas about the Social Reality: Extensions, Criticisims and Reconstructions*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Moati, R. (2014). *Searle/Derrida: Deconstruction and Ordinary Language*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Negri, Antonio (2000). *Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza's Metaphysics and Politics.*(Trans. Michael Hardt). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Renault Emmanuel (2016). *Journal of Social Ontology*. Boston, Beijing, Basel, Vienna, Warsaw and Munich: De Gruyter.

Sayer, A. (2000). *Realism and Social Science*. London, New York: Sage Publications.

Rosenberger, Robert (eds.). (2015) *Post phenomenological Investigations.* Boulder, Lanham, London, New York: Lexington Books.

Searle, J. R. (1977). "Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida," *Glyph* (1): 198–208.

Searle, J. R. (1983). "The Word Turned Upside Down," *The New York Review of Books*, October 27, 1983, numero, saatavilla osoitteessa http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1983/oct/27/the-word-turned-upside-down/ (5.9.2015).

Searle, J. R. (1996). *The Construction of Social Reality*. London: Penguin.

Searle, J. R. (2010). *Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tuomela Raimo (2007). *Philosophy of Sociality Shared Point of View,* New York, Oxford Oxford University Press

Wittgenstein Ludwig (2001) *Filosofisia Tutkimuksia,* Bookwell Oy, Juva

Zizek Slavoj, (2014). *The Most Sublime Hysteric: Hegel with Lacan*. Boston, Cambridge, Oxford: Polity Press.