



Conceptual Expansion of the Public Sphere from Literary and Political to Scientific

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Abstract:

The public sphere is one of the most important explanatory and normative concepts in the field of political sociology. Addressing the public sphere is especially important because it can explain the transition from the traditional to the modern. In particular, the fundamental question here is whether it is possible to arrive at a normative understanding of the situation in Iran by addressing and analyzing the public sphere, as Habermas has described it. Our problem is a general and at the same time specific problem. There are two central concepts in Jürgen Habermas's theory of structural transformation in the general sphere. One is literary-artistic speech and the other is political-moral speech. According to Habermas, the public sphere was first formed around literary and artistic debates, and then into political and moral discourse. From then on, the public sphere became practically a focal point for criticizing the political situation; To the extent that the public sphere became a free space and the concept of public opinion was born from it. In this article, while briefly explaining the two aforementioned areas, an attempt is made to propose a third area that describes our descriptive and normative understanding of the transition to the modern situation. This third field can be called a scientific field.

Keywords: Modern Society, Progress Issue, Scientific Public Sphere, University

Introduction

One of the explanatory and normative issues regarding the realization of the modern is the question of rupture and / or continuity.

However, some proponents of the modern age argue that the legitimacy of the modern age lies in its separation from tradition and

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in the necessity of the application of reason in this period (Blumenberg, 1966). We make such a presupposition here that, after all, the modern age contains "some" of a break with the past and tradition. Given this premise, the second question in this context is exactly what process and where this rupture occurred?

Social relations arising from the interaction of religion with politics, the interaction of science with society, and even the questioning of natural disasters and evils in life are among the topics of discussion over the separation from the traditional world. (Nikfar, 2016; also: (Ramze Endut, 2020). But from a social point of view, Habermas sees the place of this rupture as the realization and evolution of the "public sphere"; The public sphere was the mediator of people who wanted a change in their life and style. In his book *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, he traces how the public sphere evolved in the European bourgeoisie.

Habermas defines the public sphere as a space between the private sphere and the state in which citizens have the opportunity to form public opinion through social institutions that give rise to free and rational debate. Discussions can be conducted face-to-face, or through various forms of language teaching, such as written and visual media. The ideal of the public sphere is to be open to all and to judge only the superior reasoning force between different claims, not deception and force (Habermas, 2013). He speaks of two general fields of art and literature, and politics and society. The mediation of these two areas in building a better society and world arises from the interconnected nature of these two areas; The public political sphere did not work without the support of the literary sphere, and this one did not do

its work without the motivation of the latter. An important issue related to the public sphere is the physicality of human activities; In these areas, man is fully present with his body and with his motives and interests and determines the transformation.

Given Habermas's arguments and the universal logic of modern progress, our question is what is the relationship between these two areas in the process of our efforts as Iranians to modernize. Was there an element of connection between the two domains? If not, which seems to be the case, where are the grounds for that lack of connection and now, where can this connection be considered possible? Whereas in Europe the public political sphere has emerged from the heart of the literary public sphere; For us - and for historical reasons - the possibility of a relationship between the public literary and political spheres is (has been). Here, and in the last century, in spite of many efforts to realize the public literary sphere, the public political sphere has at most consisted of guilds that have been separate from literature. The literary public sphere could not connect itself to the active political public sphere. Therefore, our political action has been less subjective and, as a result, has not risen to the level of intermediate subjectivity. Although modern poetry was an attempt to bridge the gap between the literary and political spheres, this form of poetry generally devoted its historical force for change to its separation from traditional forms of literature; And so, it failed to form the public sphere of literature that would realize its power in the realm of politics in such a way as to connect us to the modern world and to shape contemporaneity for the Iranian people. New poetry, in the sphere of artistic work, has connected the poet's maximum world to the new world by appealing to the

concept of the right to be present in the world; A connection that, due to the lack of complete divorce from tradition, and in other words, "understanding the presence of another in self-perception" had also faced problems (Mokhtari, 2010).

In this article, and in the style of philosophical analysis, we assume that the general literary and political spheres among us have failed to establish an active connection (which, of course, has important historical contexts); We will advance the conceptual analysis of the public sphere in such a way that in addition to the two forms of the public sphere that Habermas has analyzed, we will introduce a third form. This field can be called "general scientific field". The ideal place of this public sphere is historically the same university where a large number of scientists, students and professors from various fields of knowledge discuss scientific issues. This public sphere, especially in several respects, can be an accelerator of progress among us; First, in order to embed the conditions for the possibility of rethinking in historical social relations, which had generally involved us in the natural challenge of the struggle for survival and manifested itself in the Iranian bureaucratic system; Second, and more importantly, the presence of the active human being as a whole, which includes women in particular and assists them in the process of reducing discrimination and expanding freedom, and ultimately in terms of shaping the process and interdisciplinary approach.

This is also a preliminary point that because in this article we intend to expand Habermas analysis in another field appropriate to the situation in Iran, according to several studies, no research has been found in this field. A review of research background in this field generally implies an explanation

of Habermas's theory of the public sphere. From this category, "Study of the constituent elements of the public sphere in Habermas's thought", written by Mehdi Bustani and Kamal Pouladi, read by Habermas, written by Hossein Ali Nozari; This book, too, is merely an educational description of Habermas's ideas, rather than a kind of "re-reading." Even Nancy Fraser in her extensive research has not tried to contribute to the development of this theory (Fraser, 2003). However, Hulab (1999) in "Habermas, Criticism in the Public Sphere" vaguely mentions the basic conditions of the possibility of extending the theory of the public sphere to the scientific field. Najafzadeh (2010) has presented a relatively brief classification of studies that have attempted to apply Habermas's public domain theory in the Iranian environment.

Triple worlds or three realms of reality

To enter the discussion, we will first look at the three worlds of reality as the beginning of the design of the third public sphere. In the theory of "universal pragmatics", Habermas provides a kind of ontology of the totality of the reality of the world to explain the logic of action in the biological realms of human beings. His problem is by no means "ontological" but "social"; That is, he seeks to understand all kinds of human relationships with the whole reality of the world, not to discover reality itself. He begins from the point that the whole reality of the world consists of three spheres, or three ontological realms, with which human beings have a special relationship with each of these three realms.

Habermas himself describes these three worlds as follows:

A) the external reality of a state of affairs; B) the inner reality of the intentions

that a speaker wants to present to the public; C) the normative reality of what is mentally recognized as a legitimate interpersonal relationship (Habermas, 1989, p. 28).

These three worlds can be expanded as follows.

The world of inner nature

The inner world of nature is a collection of everything that the subject finds within himself and includes all feelings, emotions and motives, desires, abilities and drives and the like. This world is the subjective world called the "I", as direct access to its contents is possible only for this "I" itself, and other subjects can become aware of the contents of this world only through the mediation of linguistic representations (both verbal and non-verbal). For example, when someone smells a rose and gets a special feeling from it, this feeling is perceptible in itself and in its individuality only for the person who has smelled the rose; And others only become aware of such a feeling at the same time that the person expresses that feeling in the form of a linguistic representation. This linguistic representation, of course, can take many forms, from physical gestures to the utterance of verbal or written propositions, and even in the form of artistic expression in one of the forms of poetry, music, painting, story, and the like. Thus, the type of human relationship with the world of inner nature is essentially personal and subjective logic. This logic can only leave the inner world and enter one of the other two worlds and find an objective or intersubjective logic when it enters one of the expressive forms (Habermas, 1989, p. 35).

The world of outer nature

This world is a collection of everything that is inherently objective. The collection of everything that is outside the mind of the subject and that can appear as an object on

it, is the world of external nature. Thus, all the following belong to the world of the outer nature. Everything found in nature (including objects, the earth, stars, animals, and the like); With everything that other human beings have created (including society and culture and the like); And even other human beings themselves (which is a different kind of "I"). The relation that "I" (that is, the subject) makes to this world and its belongings is an objective relation, that is, the belongings of this world all appear as objects on the "I" and can belong to my consciousness and action. The subject can recognize these objects, transform them, and even construct them in some way. Other "I's" can relate to them just as I do to the outside world. That is, unlike the inner world belongings, to which direct access is only available to the "I", other "I's" can access the outer world belongings. It is clear that access to the belongings of the outside world is mediated here through the five senses and the human perceptual system in general. This is why, since all human beings have more or less the same perceptual system and understanding, it can be argued that all human beings (all "I's") have equal access to the belongings of the external world. The meaning of objectivity here is the same relative commonality in how human beings perceive the belongings of the outside world. For example, almost all people see a rose "red" unless there is a problem with the visual system. The objectivity of the red flower comes from the sharing of subjects in a part of their perceptual system. But the linguistic representation of the relation of "I" to the belongings of the external world manifests itself in the form of news propositions, for example the proposition "this flower is red" conveys news of the external world. The final form of linguistic representations of the external world is sci-

entific propositions. Everything that is said in science (both experimental sciences and humanities) is news about the outside world. Thus, it can be said that the inner nature (subject) is affected by a kind of external nature (object), that is, the subject or mind in its cognitive activity is affected by the object and thus its internal nature corresponds to the external nature. This adaptation, of course, does not mean the mere passivity of the mind or the reflection of the outside mirror inside. The final form of linguistic representations of the external world is scientific propositions. Everything that is said in science (both experimental sciences and humanities) is news about the outside world. Thus, it can be said that the inner nature (subject) is affected by a kind of external nature (object), that is, the subject or mind in its cognitive activity is affected by the object and thus its internal nature corresponds to the external nature. This adaptation, of course, does not mean the mere passivity of the mind or the reflection of the outside mirror inside.

The social world

This world is the realm of the whole universe that forms the relation of subjects to each other. Society in its general sense, which includes the relationship between subjects and structures, is a world between the "I" and the "other" both as subjects. The belongings of this world are neither objective as the external world nor subjective as the inner world, but intersubjective (intermediate). Speeches and actions that somehow involve request, glory, command, expectation, reward, punishment, and the like all belong to this world. For example, when someone gives a rose to another, he wants to have a loving relationship with him. This does not mean that one wants to inform another about the outside world (here about the

rose), but that giving a rose is a sign of one's intention to have a loving relationship with another. Also, giving a rose to another does not mean that someone wants to express their feelings about the rose. In this world, "intentions" are more important than "meanings" and "news", and intentions are primarily "practical" rather than theoretical and epistemological. So, the social world and society is the world of action. The final form of linguistic representations of the belongings of this world is manifested in customs, norms, values, rules and laws, that is, everything in the field of ethics and law and politics that regulates the actions and speeches of human beings in their collective life. (Habermas, 1989, p. 55).

Arbitration criteria in each of the three domains

It is said that in each of the three realms of reality, there is a specific type of belongings and contents. The contents and belongings of the world within the foundation are subjective. The belongings and contents of the outside world are based on the objective, and the belongings and contents of the social world are based on the intersubjective. Accordingly, the kind of relationship that human beings take with the contents and belongings of each of these three realms is either subjective, or objective, or intersubjective. However, these three types of human relations with these three realms, when they appear in the field of human speech and action, without exception, acquire only an intersubjective character. Thus, two levels of relation can be distinguished: first, the direct relation of man to each of the three realms of reality, and second, the indirect relation of man to these three realms, which appears in language (including both speech and action). The first is called the first-degree ratio and the second is the second-degree ratio. In the first-degree relation of logic, the relationship with the

inner, outer, and middle worlds is each subjective, objective, and intersubjective, respectively. But in the quadratic relation, which is necessarily intersubjective, that first degree relation appears at the language level, and this is when we want to share our first-degree relation with the three realms at the language level. What is important here in terms of the concepts of the public sphere and culture is this quadratic relation to the realities of the three realms. With this separation of proportions, the question now arises as to what and how this intersubjective second-degree relation appears at the language level, and what is its logic? In other words, when we say that we transfer the words and actions related to the first-degree ratio to the level of the second-degree ratio, what exactly do we do and what happens in practice? We will first try to clarify the face of this question with an example, and then we will move on to an answer to it.

In the example of the rose, look at these three statements:

1. The rose makes me happy.
2. This flower is red.
3. I have brought this rose for you.

The content of each of these three propositions goes back to the inner, outer and middle worlds, respectively. The first shows a state within me that, before being expressed in the form of this proposition, only I myself had direct knowledge of and access to. The feeling I get from a rose is a first-rate ratio; But when I express it in the form of a proposition such as proposition 1, I essentially want to share indirectly with others the feeling that only I myself have direct access to it. Thus, by making such a statement, I bring subjective content from the inner world to the level of intersubjective content in the world. In other words, I have made a claim about something in the inner world, I

have shared it with a listener, and I expected the listener to accept my claim, that is, to consider it valid. The question is, how does the listener find my claim valid? In proposition 2, "This flower is red" - I have, in essence, made a claim about the world. Before making this claim in the form of such a proposition, I have constructed for myself my relation to the outside world, which is essentially objective; That is, my mind has become aware of and affected by something in the outside world, that is, I have realized and known something in the outside world. But when I express this relation in the form of proposition 2, I have in fact again made a claim, and I have made it with the interlocutor who I expect him to accept my claim, that is, to be valid. Now, the question is, how does the listener find my claim valid? In Proposition 3 - "I have brought you this rose" - I have essentially made a claim about the interpersonal relationship that belongs to the world (society). Before making this claim, in the form of such statements, I have already established my relationship with the social world between myself and the other, that is, I intend to establish a loving intersubjective relationship with the other. It is clear here that the ratio of degree one is already intersubjective, that is, it is only in this world that the ratios of degree one and degree two overlap. However, when I express my intention in the form of Proposition 3, I have in fact again made a claim and shared it with the listener, and I expect him to accept my claim as well, that is, to consider it valid. Again, the question is, how does the listener find my claim valid? The main question here is how our claims about each of the three worlds - expressed in the form of words and actions - are themselves put forward and judged in the social and intersubjective world? In other

words, what is the logic of validating claims or claims and how is it? How do first-rate ratios become second-rate ratios in the social world and gain credibility? This question is essentially a question of the logic of the social world, and the social world is the public sphere in which human beings interact, interact, and organize dialogue with each other. This is how society is formed through interactions that are essentially "linguistic" or "action". The question of how to validate claims, then, is essentially the question of what society is through the analysis of symbolic actions in language. The logic of society is linguistic logic, it is symbolic logic, and the public sphere is essentially the realm of symbolic exchanges. We do not intend to address this question here. It is also said that the criteria for judging claims about the inner, outer, and middle worlds are each of "honesty," "truth," and "legitimacy," respectively. (Habermas, 1984, p. 100)

The explanation given by global pragmatics helps us to propose, according to our own circumstances, the third general sphere, which, in the absence of a link between the first and second spheres, can compensate for our slow progress in the realization of modern values. The discussion of the third area is also one of the angles of defending the university in Iran.

Shapes of the public sphere: a contribution

Habermas has been able to analyze two forms of the public sphere in his book *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* and to date its evolution in Europe. According to Habermas, two forms of the public sphere emerged and evolved in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which later contributed not only to the consistency and functioning of democracy in modern societies; More importantly, it has been instrumental in the emergence of a new

concept of culture and its production and consumption. In the evolved public spheres, culture was largely freed from the narrow confines of certain social groups and classes, and as a result of the evolution of the public sphere in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe, culture first emerged from the monopoly of the aristocracy and the clergy; And thus individuals belonging to a new class called the bourgeoisie were able not only to be more productive in the production and consumption of culture, but even to impose their own values on the logic of the public sphere. Second, in later historical stages, the scope of public sphere was extended to other levels and social strata, and thus, for example, non-bourgeois classes such as workers, women, and the like were able to participate in public sphere debates. These are the two general areas Habermas is interested in:

The general field of literature and art

In the realm of the subjective world (inner realm), subjects always have different emotions and states. The natural tendency of subjects is more or less that they want to share these feelings and states with others. The tendency to express oneself is not something that one normally wants to prevent, unless there is an external or internal obstacle. But since immediate access to these feelings and states is possible only for the subject himself, sharing them with others must necessarily be in such a way as to bring maximum understanding and empathy or empathy on the part of the audience. This necessity has two implications. First, self-expression cannot be sincere; That is, the subject, based on his natural tendency to express the belongings of his inner world, must in principle share with others the same feeling and state that he has within himself.

Therefore, satisfying the validity condition of "honesty" in self-expressive speeches and actions is a criterion for judging and measuring them through non-conflict with previous and subsequent self-expressive words and actions. In short, the subject has no reason at all for "dishonest" self-expressive action, unless he has another intention, in which case he no longer has self-expressive action for understanding, that is, he does not want to act according to the logic of the inner subjective world and then the intersubjective logic of the social world. In this case, there is most likely some kind of deception or force. But the second implication is that self-expressive representations must be expressed in an effective and motivating way in order to gain maximum understanding and empathy. It is this effort to influence and motivate the audience that drives self-expressive speeches and actions towards artistic and literary expression. In other words, in the world of self-expressive speech and actions, the main purpose of self-expression is to "excite" the audience, not to "convince" them.

That is why beautiful and effective rhetoric is much more important here than reason and logic. The function of art and literature is, above all, to motivate the audience to understand the belongings of the artist's inner world. In all forms of artistic and literary expression (including poetry, story, play, film, music, painting, etc.), in the final analysis, we encounter the expression of the artist's inner self, which of course can have complex, nested and detailed forms. But these complexities should not distract us from understanding the logic of subjective representations and expressions. The complexities of works of art and literature can ultimately be traced back to the simple logic and pattern of expressing belongings to the subject's

inner world. Likewise, the understanding and critique of a work of art and literature is ultimately done by referring to the condition that the claim of "honesty" is fulfilled, and honesty is achieved by comparing the self-expressive representations of the subject back and forth and observing non-conflict between them. (Habermas, 1984, p. 102).

Hence, in the field of literary and artistic criticism, the main task of the critic is to find out to what extent a work of art is compatible with the previous and subsequent works of an artist; And if it does not match, it should explain what has happened in the artist's mind that has led to the creation of a different work in style or content. Thus, in the general field of literature and art, three types of action occur with the same logic: the creation of the work, the perception of the work, and the critique of the work. The creation of the work is done by the creator with the aim of sharing the contents of his inner world and empathizing with the audience. The perception of the work is done by the audience with the aim of exploiting the subject (creator) in his inner world; And the critique of the work (which can also be the audience) is done with the aim of evaluating and measuring the beauty of the work by examining the originality of the work and the honesty of the creator of the work in expressing his inner selves.

However, all three types of actions with the same logic are also used in a common ideal, which is "beauty" in its most general sense. In other words, the ultimate and universal value of the public sphere of literature and art is "beauty", which, through its production, distribution and consumption in a social place called the public sphere of literature and art, ultimately leads to the meaning of people in their lives.

Beauty is a value that is ultimately created in the minds of subjects, and through this creation an unnatural "pleasure" (in the non-physical and non-physical sense) is created that can make life worth living for human beings. In other words, the world of the subject's inner desires and ideals - which is a world other than the harsh world of nature outside - finds a kind of "subjective objectivity" during the creation, understanding and critique of the work of art; And thus, the inner and subjective aspiration of human beings to find meaning and meaning in their lives is realized. It is through this semantics and meaning-giving mediated by the ideal of beauty that the personality of the subjects is also nurtured and developed. The subject (self, person, individual) is in the public sphere of literature and art who constructs himself and extends his ideals and aspirations to the world outside him. In other words, through all these actions, what is ultimately reproduced is the subject. Thus, the main function of the general literary and artistic sphere can be considered as "reproduction of the subject". Since in the general literary and artistic sphere the ultimate ideal is beauty, the ideal action is also the "creation" or "creation" of beauty. Hence, the ideal person in this field is also the "artist" who creates beauty. (Habermas, 1984, p. 103).

General moral and political sphere

In the realm of the intersubjective world, the set of relations between subjects forms the general moral and political realm, and this is what we call "society." Organizing and coordinating the actions of the intersubjective world in the field of society is done by using the criterion of "legitimacy". The main goal of the subjects in establishing a social relationship is to develop a common plan with the help of other subjects. Hence, the subject

seeks the agreement of other subjects in a social "plan of action." That is, the subject seeks the agreement of other subjects in a plan that he puts forward in forms such as request, injunction, order, prohibition, and the like. In essence, claims to the "legitimacy" of that speech or action are embedded behind every speech or action that the subject makes with the aim of establishing social relations; In other words, the subject claims that his speech or action is justified and valid on the basis of a common and common norm with others.

The common norms on which the legitimacy of the words and actions of the intersubjective world is based can guarantee the success of social action plans (both economic and political). Now these norms (that is, the do's and don'ts) find themselves objectified in two forms at the social level: "institutional" and "non-institutional". The institutional norm is the law; And the non-institutional norm is custom and social value. In essence, non-institutional norms regulate informal social speech and actions, and institutional norms regulate formal speech and actions. The ultimate goal of social discourse and action is the "collective good" of human beings, organized by looking at the general value of justice and fairness. In other words, the collective good is the ideal that defines the individual well-being within the social order, and thus crystallizes non-institutional norms in the field of ethics in the form of the moral values that regulate micro-social relations; On the other hand, institutional norms in the field of politics are crystallized in the form of legal mechanisms regulating macro-social relations. This is how an area called the public moral and political area is formed, in which both the discourses and actions related to the social world and the norms and values that support

them are discussed in public. It is during this public debate that the speeches and actions of actors are constantly evaluated and evaluated. Therefore, every actor must have a normative justification for his words and actions, that is, he must have an institutional or non-institutional norm as the basis of his speech and action in advance. It is this "obligation to justify norms" in the public moral and political sphere that makes words and actions acceptable to others, and thus the claim of the validity of "legitimacy" can be fulfilled. The realms of ethics and politics are essentially the order of rules that regulate the collective actions of human beings, through which society is also "founded" or "established" and then reproduced.

This set of rules also includes norms and laws. The establishment or foundation of society and then its reproduction, as follows from the logic of the intersubjective world, is an activity in the collective principle, that is, it requires the utilitarianism and interaction of subjects. Subjects in the realm of the intermediate world of society coordinate their actions in order to agree on plans of action, and this agreement must also include agreement on norms and laws in advance. The intersubjective social world or the general moral and political realm, then, is the realm of the subjects' joint and continuous effort to reach agreement and to extend its scope. The ideal of collective good or the ultimate standard of justice and fairness is also the guide and regulator of this collective and continuous effort.

Looking at these mechanisms of social establishment and reproduction, the logic of action in the public moral and political sphere can be summarized as follows: because in this sphere the ultimate ideal is the collective good through the establishment of justice and fairness; So, it's ideal action is to

"establish" and reproduce society. Hence, the ideal person in the public moral and political sphere is the same political activist or "politician" who seeks to establish a just society in harmony with others and to strive to preserve and reproduce it. Thus, the ultimate function of the public moral and political sphere is to preserve and reproduce society. (Habermas, 1984, p. 102).

General field of science and technology

In relation to the realm of the objective world (outer realm), subjects primarily seek to relate to the belongings and contents of the natural world outside their minds. This relationship at such a level is a subject / object or mind /object relationship. During this relationship, the subject becomes aware of a reality related to the world outside his mind. The purpose of such a relationship, then, is to discover the realities of the world outside the mind. This relationship is only one level of the totality of the subject's relation to the outside world. The other level is the quadratic ratio, which manifests itself when sharing the discovered facts in a first-degree ratio with other subjects. This second-degree ratio is no longer objective, but inevitably intersubjective. The set of first-degree ratios forms the totality of our "science" to the outside world; But it is this set of quadratic ratios that forms the general domain of science. The subject communicates his findings from the outside world in the form of scientific propositions with other subjects, and in doing so seeks to make other subjects find the claim of the truth of his propositions valid and acceptable. So, in the general field of science, what is put into public debate are the propositions that claim to be true. Understanding and evaluating the truth or falsity of these propositions is also guaranteed by definition with the possibility of everyone refer-

ring to the same external facts. The "proof", "confirmation" or "refutation" of the scientific propositions made by the subject is the final end of those propositions that take place in the scientific community or the scientific field. Scientific propositions, of course, range from simple to complex, such as the simple statement that "water boils at one hundred degrees"; But the theory of general relativity is a set of propositions whose truth or falsity is proved, confirmed or refuted in the general scientific field by wide-ranging debates. In the general scientific field, then, theories are finally produced and formulated that claim to be true about the outside world. That is why we can talk about the rightness or wrongness of scientific theories. The production of a theory is related to the first-degree relation of the subject with the outside world, and the design of the theory is related to the second-degree relation within the scientific community.

But for the relation of subject and object in relation to the realm of the objective world, it can be not only from the object to the subject, but also vice versa. The effectiveness and compatibility of the mind with the object occurs in the realm of "science", but the influence of the object from the mind occurs in the realm of "technology". In other words, the subject, in relation to the objective world, tries to adapt itself to the contents of the external world, and thus changes itself. This change together constitutes the science of the subject to the outside world. But when the subject tries to change the outside world according to his will, the "technological" thing happens, that is, the external nature changes according to the subject's mentality. The set of events in which the external world changes in proportion to the internal world creates the

general technological domain, which is placed next to the general scientific domain in terms of the ratio of subject and object. So, the whole public sphere of the external natural world includes both science and technology. In the general field of technology, how to change the outside world is left to public debate and evaluation.

In the general field of science and technology, the ultimate goal is first to understand and explain the outside world (which occurs in science) and second to change the outside world (which occurs in technology). The ideal action in the field of science is the "proof" of scientific propositions, and the ideal action in the field of technology is the change of the world of external nature in the direction of the subject's desires. The ideal place for such actions is historically and socially "university" in its general sense. Here the university is a place where scientists place their claims of scientific truth within the scientific community of their peers for public debate and judgment. So, wherever such a society is formed, it can be called a "university", whether it is a scientific association or a department at a particular university. In addition, the set of all scientific communities in any particular scientific field can constitute the sum of the "general scientific field" in that particular scientific field. The ideal person in the general field of science and technology is also the "scientist". The scientist in the general field of science and technology tries to prove his claims of scientific truth by proving or confirming the members of the scientific community related to his field by making scientific statements. Judging the truth or falsity of these propositions is also done by the criterion of "scientific truth" and by referring to the outside world with scientific tools or methods.

The ratio of the three worlds and the three public spheres to each other

The question is, how do the three realms of reality — the inner, outer, and middle worlds — relate to each other? Likewise, how and by what logic is the relation between the three general spheres — that is, the general sphere of literature and art, the general sphere of science and technology, and the general sphere of morality and politics? Do art, science and ethics have nothing to do with each other? Are the three worlds really three separate worlds that have no relation to each other? Does the totality and unity of the world, with this analytical model, become fragmented in which it is no longer possible to dig from one to another and restore totality and unity on another level? Is it not possible to find overlap or commonality between the ideal persons of each of these three spheres? Can an artist, a scientist, and a politician appear in one person, or if one is an artist, can one no longer be a scientist or a politician? Can art and science interfere in the work of politics in any way, or politics and knowledge in the work of art, or art and politics in the work of knowledge? In general, what happens to this analytical model of isolation, solidarity and connection of the human world? Also, as Kant has shown in his three major critiques, are the criteria for measuring scientific propositions (in the critique of pure reason), moral judgments (in the critique of practical reason), and judgments of taste (in the critique of the power of judgment) really different? And can no relation be established between them? Do scientific truth, moral goodness and artistic beauty have nothing to do with each other? Is character development (the end product of speeches and actions in the public sphere of literature and art); Continuation and promotion of cultural traditions (the final product of speeches and actions in

the field of public science and technology); And can the reproduction and integration of society (the end product of the discourse and actions of the public moral and political sphere) occur truly and in practice separately?

In other words, which logic or rationality is the pervasive and specific logic and rationality of each of these three domains that can guarantee their unity and totality? What rationality can curb human scientific and technological actions and discourse and not use atomic energy discovery to build an atomic bomb, for example? Or, conversely, what rationality can take the criterion of scientific truth into our moral and political actions and discourses, and thus establish the plans of collective action of human beings not on the basis of myth and superstition, but on the basis of scientific facts? The same questions can be asked about the relation of literary and artistic actions and speeches to the general scientific and political spheres. In short, is there an exchange between scientific, moral and artistic values? And if so, how? So, the main question here is the question of what and how the logic of "exchange" between the values of these three realms or three public spheres; As this logic must go beyond the specific logic of each of these three areas and connect them in a superior and beyond comprehensiveness. In other words, to answer this question we need some form of transcendental logic, that is, a logic that goes beyond the specific logic of each of the three realms of reality.

This logic is the logic of symbolic exchange that lies in the structure of "language" in general. It is within language and through language mediation that scientific, moral, and artistic values are intertwined and exchanged. The logic of symbolic exchange is the transcendental logic in the same sense as we have mentioned. That is, it passes

through the specific logic of each of the realms of reality and, at another level, guarantees their pervasive comprehensiveness. After all, the academic field expands the logic of symbolic exchange by placement in the university.

Conclusion

The modern world is the result of changing the way we look at reality. In Habermas's explanation, the realm of reality encompasses the three worlds inside, outside, and in between. The realm within is man, the realm outside is nature, and the realm is between society. Each of these three domains has its own ontological logic, although they are not unrelated. The relationship between the three realms, of course, is meaningful and regulated in the comprehensiveness of man's relationship with them. The contents and belongings of each of the inner, outer, and middle worlds are brought from the level of first-degree ratios to the level of second-degree ratios, and thus enter the social world in the form of speech and action representations and are open to public discussion.

Also, the final and ideal form of representations in each of these three realms manifests itself in the form of artistic and literary expression (in the inner realm), scientific propositions and technological actions (in the outer realm), and norm and law (in the middle realm), respectively. Now, if we consider the public sphere, according to Habermas, to be a place where human beings have the opportunity, through social institutions, to give free and rational discussion, to build public opinion in the direction of their claims; Then, in proportion to each of the three realms of reality, we will have a general realm in each of which the logic of action or discussion proceeds in a particular way. In *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, Habermas

addresses only two forms of the public sphere: the literary and artistic public sphere and the public political sphere. But, as we have shown, by taking advantage of another of Habermas' theories, namely, universal pragmatics and the three worlds, and by looking at the book *Towards a Rational Society*, both logically and empirically; One can also recognize a third form of the public sphere that is proportionate to the realm of external nature, namely the general scientific and technological sphere. Addressing this area is important to us in two ways. (Two aspects, each of which requires extensive and in-depth research).

First, the general field of science, although it looks at the objective world, needs actors who can extend the field of action to two other fields. In the meantime, if this field is linked to the issue of women and gender, and women in particular can be fielded in this field, it will be very effective in our progress; Because the issue of discrimination and freedom are intertwined at this junction. The university should be the scene of the student's political action. The university has been very important and has played a role in this field. Second, we said that according to Habermas, the public sphere is somewhere between the private sphere and the state. In our history, we have had no place between the private sphere and the state: our government, in the form of a bureaucratic system, has been the quasi-private sphere, or house-planning, which has made institutional separation impossible. Thus, even with the establishment of museums, libraries, music halls, art galleries, and theaters in the contemporary period, art and literature remained confined there and did not expand into the realm of political discourse. The importance of the general scientific field for us, and from this point of view in particular, is that it must make our "natural

state" the subject of its discussions, research and studies: the university must be the culprit of the evil and privileged bureaucratic system of our time.

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