The Implications of the Islamic Theory of Fitrah in International Regimes: Power, Plenty and Pride

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Abstract

The kind of perspective we have about international institutions has always been one of the most controversial issues in the field of international relations, and after the Islamic Revolution, Iran's foreign policy adopted a brand-new approach to the international institutions. Furthermore, with the United States` administration under Donald Trump withdrawing from several international treaties, including the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA), the topic of international regimes and their effectiveness has acquired new political and intellectual momentum. The main question is 'What are the decisive factors in the creation of international regimes, their efficiency and endurance?' The hypothesis is that power, interests, and pride are the three factors that simultaneously play a role in the creation, efficiency, and endurance of regimes. This article examines three main approaches for explanation of international regimes, with each one emphasizing on just one of the factors of power, interests, and ideas, and therefore concludes that single-factor explanations would not be able to provide a profound understanding about formation and functioning of regimes. Thus, by assuming that dissimilarity of the propositions in these three approaches does not necessarily mean that they are inconsistent, a multi-variable approach is provided that goes beyond the mere integration of the approaches examined, Which combines these three factors in an overall analytical framework and by Using Islamic thought, has considered nature (Fitrah) along with the two stimuli of fear and profit as the third arm of the triangle of fundamental stimuli in determining the behavior of international actors.

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Introduction

Regimes are among the main international institutions that exist in most areas of contemporary global politics, from security to environment. "International regimes are defined as follows: A set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge." Principles are beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions for action.

Decision-making procedures are common practices for collective decision-making and implementation. Some examples of international regimes can be found in the field of non-proliferation, international trade, Protection of the Ozone Layer and human rights regimes. Meanwhile, the non-proliferation regime is more familiar to us, considering the fact that Iran's nuclear program and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) falls under this regime. There are several views on the causes of the creation, efficiency and endurance of international regimes. Given the significant political, economic, and security repercussions of the Iran nuclear case and its place under the NPT regime, and the necessity of having foresight in decisions related to this case, it is important to ask fundamental questions about 'How regimes are created and what factors affect their effectiveness and how do they evolve?' The answers to these questions can be effective in making the right decision about kind of engagement with international institutions in general and engagement with world powers in Iran nuclear case in particular.

In this article, by explanation of the theoretical framework based on the anthropological teachings of Islam and the visions of scientific realism in the existing literature on the philosophy of science and application of the concept of international regimes, the three general approaches are studied and reviewed. Then, by application of the Islamic theory of Fitrah, an attempt is made to reduce the theoretical gaps in this field by adopting a multi-variable approach to the study of international regimes.

1. Theoretical Framework

Obviously the first step for explaining the creation of international regimes as a manifestation of the behavior of international actors in the contemporary world is a study of how these actors were formed and transformed. In other words, before we say what the behavior of an actor is, we should ask 'What that actor is?' Since the subject matter

and basis for forming the discipline of international relations is the study of the society's behavior that composed of human beings, each one of international relations theories has tried to answer this question based on anthropology and then sociology.

Thus, at the outset, these theories have reduced states to human beings and then analyzed their behavior based on human characteristics, including in creation of international regimes. In this regard, the focus of the realism has been on human fear and liberalism has focused on human profit and gain. Ideational perspectives such as constructivism also emphasize on intersubjective cognition and knowledge and ideas, and accordingly provide a subtle view on the role of constructing beliefs and emotions. In this context, critical studies of identity have started to fully examine the role of emotions in relation to the issue of identity. The crucial interior feeling and motivation that this group of studies, apart from fear and utilitarianism, has paid attention to is a sense of pride; for example, Richard Nadlibu (2011) tries to introduce a new approach to the study of international politics by introducing spirit as an important factor and placing the sense of pride under it.

Accordingly, three major schools of thought have been developed around the discussion of international regimes as follows: Neoliberalism, which bases its fundamental analysis on the alignment of actors' interests; realism, which considers power politics among states as a fundamental variable, and cognitivism, which emphasizes on the causal and social knowledge of actors.

Thus, each one of these schools of thought formulates and propounds a separate set of view on the origins, stability, and consequences of international regimes. This paper argues that single-dimensional anthropology of these approaches has led to their imperfect analysis of the factors in the creation, efficiency, and evolution of regimes and thus, based on the Islamic view of human nature, it seeks to remove this analytical defect.

In fact, this article seeks to provide a new understanding on the nature of international regimes by questioning the fundamental assumptions of the major schools of international relations and reformulating important variables of these theories. In general, in order to provide a macro-level analysis, this paper first provide a critique of the assumptions of micro-level approaches. In fact, the dichotomy of structure and agent fades in this article; In this regard, the insights of scientific realism in the philosophy of science are used. According to this approach in the philosophy of science

Structure and agent are inseparable. The structure is a level emerged from the agent, and although structural analysis offers mechanisms and

powers beyond the qualities and interactions of the agents, reference to these qualities and interactions of the agents is unavoidable. In the case of international regimes, reference to the qualities of states that are agents of the structure of the international system is required for the structural analysis of regimes.

Of course, the state itself is a structure derived from individuals and human beings, and therefore, for explaining their behaviors, in addition to structural variables of the international system, one should consider the characteristics and interactions of these individuals and human beings as agents of the state system. Therefore, if the article talks about incentives such as fear, profit or pride, it does not mean that it wants to provide an explanation at the micro level, but it indicates the ontological and temporal precedence of micro level variables, which in their absence, structure is not formed. Structural analyses necessarily have assumptions at this level, and these assumptions are decisive in the effects and consequences that are considered for the structure and the macro level.

Therefore, the main critique of this article to the theories of international relations regarding international regimes is focused on their anthropological assumptions and their single-dimensional view of human beings. Therefore, using Islamic scholarship and thought, a three-dimensional image of human beings is presented and the consequences of this image for the theory of international regimes are examined.

Based on scientific realism, ontologically there is a social reality that is composed of multiple forces that impose constraints on individual life. These forces are structured through some forms of internal and external relations, power structures, and social roles. In this view, epistemological issues cannot be resolved before and separate from ontological problems. Also, the nature of causal forces in the social sciences cannot be comprehended only through empirical studies. In short, scientific realism is committed to ontological realism (there is a reality separate from the mind that we want to know); Cognitive relativism (beliefs are socially generated) and judgmental rationality (the principled possibility of choosing between competing theories despite cognitive relativism) (Joseph and wight, 2010: 5-12).

2. Literature Review

In 1975, John Ruggie in his article "International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends" for the first time introduced the concept of international regime into theories of international relations. He defined the international regime as a set of mutual expectations,

rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states (Ruggie, 1975: 570).

In the same year, Ernst Haas in his book "The obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory," and also in his article on international systems and regimes examined regional regimes and institutionalism. According to Haas, when interdependence is occurred and states seek to adapt to the consequences of interdependence resulting from science and technology, they call for the establishment of international regimes (Haas, 1975 AD: 147; Haas, 1975 AD b).

In 1980, he wrote "Why Collaborate? Issue-linkage and International Regimes" which examined the formation and continuity of international regimes by emphasizing on interdependence among states in the international system and also by emphasizing on the cognitive element of agents (Haas, 1980 AD).

In 1977, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in the third chapter of their book "Power and Interdependence" examined the development and collapse of regimes. In this book, they proposed that understanding the evolution and dissolution of regimes is a key factor in understanding politics in the context of interdependence, and to explain changes in the international regimes, four models are provided that are based on changes in 1) economic processes, 2) general structure of global power, 3) structure of Power in issue-areas and 4) impact of international organizations on the capabilities of power (Keohane and Nye, 1977 AD: 32-51).

Oran Young first studied international regimes in 1975 in "Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation" and then in 1980 in "International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation." Young defines regimes as "Social institutions governing the actions of those interested in specifiable activities (or accepted sets of activities)." In his view, regimes are acknowledged patterns of action around which expectations converge. As a result, regimes are social structures (Young, 1980 AD: 332-352).

The Journal of International Organization in Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring, 1982, published a collection of articles by renowned authors in the field of international regimes (12 articles), edited by Stephen Krasner. The articles in this collection address these two main issues: the effect of regimes on behavior and related outcomes and the relationship between fundamental causal variables and regimes (Krasner, 1982 AD: 185).

In the same volume, in his article entitled "*Coordination* and Collaboration: *Regimes* in an *Anarchic World*," Arthur Stein formulates a conceptualization of regimes that regard them as a variable that limits

national behavior and thus shapes international interactions. In his view, sovereign states have a rational incentive to develop processes for making joint decisions when confronted with dilemmas of common interest and common threats. In these contexts, self-interested actors logically ignore independent decision-making and form regimes (Stein, 1982 AD: 300).

In this set of articles, in their paper entitled "International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis," Puchala and Hopkins assert that international regimes are attitudinal and consequently subjective phenomena, and primarily exist as members' perceptions, expectations, or beliefs about legitimate, appropriate or moral behavior (Puchala and Hopkins, 1982 AD: 245).

In his article "*International Regimes*, Transactions, and *Change*: *Embedded Liberalism* in the *Postwar Economic Order*," John Ruggie argues that regimes do not just include what actors say and do, but also include what they perceive and accept as meaningful in an intersubjective framework. Ruggie believes that after analyzing the factors affecting strength or weakness of trade and bargaining, it will be easier to move forward in looking at regimes with a value-oriented and less self-centered perspective (Ruggie, 1982 AD: 570).

In the article "*Cave*! *Hic Dragons*: A Critique of Regime Analysis," Susan Strange questions usefulness of the concept of regimes because, in her view, it is a vague, inaccurate fashion with bias towards order instead of change or equality, and is essentially static in the face of multifaceted reality of cooperation and conflict in the international system and ultimately it is embedded in a restrictive and state-centric paradigm (strange, 1982 AD: 480).

Mearsheimer in his 1995 article "The False Promise of International Institutions" argues that optimistic assessments about the role of international institutions and regimes in promoting international peace are unjustifiable. In his view, what is very remarkable about institutions is that they have had little independent influence on states` behavior (Mearsheimer, 1994-95 AD: 12-13).

In their paper in 2000 entitled "Integrating Theories of International Regimes," Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger try to integrate the three realist, neoliberalist, and cognitivist approaches to explore the possibility of increasing explanatory power in the study of international regimes. They have sought to bridge the dichotomy of relative gains and absolute gains in the realist debate with neoliberalism by presenting a contextual rationalist theory that distinguishes between situations in which actors are concerned only with absolute gains and those with relative gains (Hasenclever, and others, 2000 AD: 14-16).

3. Critical Review

Despite diversity of views on regimes and their categories, as noted in the three major schools of international relations and their emphasis on just one human characteristic, if we divide different views on international regimes, based on one key element in their definition of regimes, then we will have three general approaches. First, the interest oriented approach, which builds its analysis upon alignment of actors' interests, and its main example is neoliberalism; In the above mentioned studies, the works of Ernest Haas, Robert keohane and Joseph Nye, and Arthur Stein fall into this category;

The second one is power-oriented approach, which considers power relations among countries as a basic variable, and a clear example of which is neo-realism. The works of Susan Strange, Mearsheimer, and krasner fall into this category. At last, we have the knowledge-based or cognitive approach that emphasizes on the causal and social knowledge of actors and its main example is constructivism. The works of Ruggie, Wendt, Puchala and Hopkins fall into this category. Accordingly, before presenting a picture of international regimes based on Islamic anthropology, a critique of these approaches is presented.

4. Power-Centric Approach

According to power-oriented theories, international institutions and regimes are analyzed and explained based on power. Institutions reflect the global distribution of power and are founded on the calculations of great powers of their own interests and have no independent effect on the states behavior (Mearsheimer, 1994 AD: 7).

Institutions endure as long as balance of fundamental power in the system has not profoundly changed and they will fail when balance of fundamental power in the system changes (Waltz 2000 AD: 26).

For Susan Strange, all arrangements that are called regimes will simply rapidly disintegrate as soon as the world power structure changes, because world powers have made these arrangements based on their interests (Seifzadeh, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 429).

Realists argue that because of prevailing security competition, cooperation between states is limited and real peace is impossible. This view is rooted in five assumptions: The first is anarchic structure of international system. The second one is that nations inherently have some offensive military capabilities that allow them to hurt or even destroy each other. Third, states cannot be sure that others will not use their offensive military capabilities against them.

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Fourth, survival and maintaining their sovereignty is the most fundamental motivation and incentive for states. Fifth, states think strategically about their survival in the international system. When these assumptions come together, they stimulate states to act aggressively, and three main patterns of behavior result from these assumptions. First, states are afraid of each other, are skeptical of each other's actions, and are always worried that war may be imminent. Second, each state's goal will be to ensure its own survival, and since there is no higher authority, they cannot depend on others for their security. So alliances are temporary.

Third, states seek to maximize their relative position of power, because it is assumed that the greater a state's military advantage, the more secure it will be. The ideal goal is hegemony in the system; In this case, survival is almost guaranteed (Mearsheimer, 1994 AD: 9-12). That is why relative gains are important and cooperation is considered fragile.

Therefore, as it is observed, realists transfer human fear to states and see survival as the most fundamental stimulus and motivator of states and believe in states' distrust of each other, the importance of achieving relative gains, and ultimately the fragility of cooperation. Hence, they see that cooperation occurs as the result of fear of a common enemy or after surrendering to greater powers. That is why they see international regimes as imposing and securing interests of the great powers.

Since realists cannot deny the existence of regimes as a form of cooperation, they must have an explanation for them. The theory of hegemonic stability is the first major realist account on the formation of regimes. This theory has two versions (Osherenko and Young 1993 AD, 9-10). According to the benign version, existence of a hegemonic state leads to emergence of regimes that benefit not only the hegemon but also the weaker states in the international system. Regimes are seen as a public good that the hegemon provides.

The malignant version of hegemonic stability is more consistent with assumptions of the classical realism about the nature of international actors and world politics, according to which the hegemon creates international regimes that promote its interests (Hasenclever and others, 1997 AD: 84).

Balance of power is another concept used by realists to describe regimes. In this framework, the pattern of order varies according to concentration or diffuse of power. In unipolar and hegemonic constructs, based on the character of hegemonic power, various kinds of regimes, imposed and appeased can be formed. In bipolar construct,

two categories of regimes are formed in each of the two blocs, and in multipolar construct, there are multiplicity of regimes that operate under each pole. In general, the established regimes are directly bound to power and transformation of power structure will cause transformation of regimes (Ghasemi, 2005 AD/1384 SH: 54). The power-oriented explanation of the formation and evolution of regimes is presented in the following figure.

To provide a critique of this approach, it could be mentioned that given definition of regimes, which includes a set of principles, i.e. beliefs about causal mechanisms and correctness, as well as norms, and given that these are subjective concepts that are achieved through reasoning and experience and not by force, this approach cannot well explain the formation of common beliefs that develop the principles and norms of the regime.

5. Interest-Centric Approach

According to this view that is represented by neoliberalism people are profits seeking actors who seek to maximize their profits. Neoliberals accept neo-realist assumptions about international system but reject their consequences. They in addition to recognizing anarchy and uncertainty as the defining features of international system, also accept the neo-realist view that states are purposeful and rational actors interested in maximizing their own interests (Keohane, 1984 AD: 25). Neoliberals believe that institutionalism significantly reduces behavioral ambiguities by sharing states` information among each other, thereby reducing anarchism. In fact, they admit fragility of cooperation, but emphasize on the existence of cooperation arrangements (Moshirzadeh, 2009 AD: 38).

In fact, they are indebted to economic theories and emphasize on institutions role in reducing information and exchange costs. According to this approach, international markets often lead to less than optimal results. When states constantly meet with such results, they are motivated to move towards creating common institutions that reduce information and exchange costs and make international commitments more credible (Keohane, 1982 AD: 326).

So here, too, we realize that how liberals' emphasis on humans profit seeking and their pursuit of more interests spill over to states` behavior, and from which cooperation of states for common interests is inferred. Keohane, as a neoliberal, accepts the realistic theory of hegemonic stability, according to which the existence of a hegemonic power leads to the formation and functioning of international institutions, but believes that international cooperation is beyond what this theory predicted and more sustainable than it. In fact, he tries to show that how cooperation is sustainable and continues to be stable after the decline of hegemon. According to him, because states see their interests in continuation of cooperation and consider it as dependent on the continuation of regimes, even after decline of the hegemon, regimes and therefore, cooperation continues (Mushirzadeh, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 66-68).

It is argued that in a situation where states are reluctant to accept asymmetry of gains in cooperation in favor of other partners, not only international regimes are not useless, but can undertake more functions to reduce members' concerns about relative gains (Hasenclever and others, 2000 AD: 15). The following figure illustrates the interest-centric approach to regimes.

This approach cannot explain that in the absence of a hegemonic power or in conditions of imbalance of power that states do not have the same capability to retaliate and deviation from the regime can have more individual gains, how it is going to prevent deviations of the states that seek to maximize their interests, from violating the regime.

6. Knowledge-Centric Approach

The third major approach in the analysis of regimes is cognitivism or constructivism. This approach emphasizes knowledge and ideas as key explanatory variables in the formation of regimes. For cognitivists, power and selfish interests are not sufficiently explanatory. From their

point of view, cooperation between states cannot be explained without considering factors such as the values of actors, their beliefs about certain issues, and their knowledge of how they may achieve their goals (Smith, 1987 AD: 255).

Cognitivists disagree with neoliberals and neo-realists on several issues, including the rationality of actors and the anarchic nature of the international system. Instead of starting with power and interests of states, they argue that the states` behavior implies existence of a normative structure that must be analyzed because of its specific characteristics. Cognitivists believe that the demand for regimes depends on how actors perceive problems and think of solutions for them (Hasenclever and others, 1997 AD: 136-137).

Cognitivists disagree with the previous two approaches on the true logic of actors' behavior. Neo-realists and neoliberals, which we can take them together as rationalists, assume that countries act according to the logic of consequence, while cognitivists reject this premise and argue that states, like other actors, follow the logic of appropriateness. An actor, who behaves according to the logic of consequence, first examines his options and preferences and then calculates which of the possible ways of action has the best consequences in the light of these goals. In contrast, the behavior of an actor who acts according to the logic of appropriateness can be determined by the following argument: What kind of situation am I in?

Who am I? And what commitments have I made?

What is the most appropriate action for me in this situation?

Thus, unlike actors who act according to the logic of consequence, these actors do not merely consider norms and rules, but their behavior is derived from it.

Cognitivists argue that states` interests should not be taken for granted. States ahead of deciding on international cooperation need to define their interests and be sure of the conditions. At this point, a big deal depends on the interpretation of the conditions, which in turn depends on the body of knowledge that the actors have at any given time. Knowledge shapes our understanding of reality and informs decision makers of the relationship between means and goals (Hasenclever and others, 1996 AD: 206).

Such an approach emphasizes the importance of common meanings; because in order for knowledge or ideas to influence the establishment of regimes, they must be widely shared among key actors (Krasner, 1983 AD: 19).

One way to spread new knowledge and ideas is to spread it through cognitive communities. New ideas and understandings or changed

circumstances affect actors 'beliefs, which may lead to a simultaneous change in actors' behavior. When this happens, actors go through the learning process. Learning may cause states to change their interests or strategies (Hasenclever, et al., 1996 AD: 209). The following figure shows a cognitive-based view of regimes.

It has been pointed out that the two power-oriented and interest-centric perspectives ultimately denote that two natures and motivations or internal drivers of fear and profit naturally lead to pursuit of power and interests. However, the cognitivist view that emphasizes knowledge and ideas does not refer to an internal incentive. This can have two meanings; First, knowledge and cognitive variables are the only intermediate variables that affect the ways through which, goals for acquiring power and interests are pursued (which is the natural response of two stimuli emphasized by the other two perspectives); In this case, there is no contradiction with the previous two approaches and only adds to their richness by incorporating a new variable. Some cognitivists actually have this in mind.

The second meaning is that cognitive variables are important in and of themselves, regardless of their relation to power and interests, and even have priority over them. Many cognitivists share this view. In this case, cognitivists must either, as realism shows that fear and security dilemma lead to attempts by states to increase their relative power, show that certain cognitive variables, despite changes in power and interests, always lead to a particular result or must finally, refer to an incentive other than fear and self-interest to have a new, meaningful and explanatory statement.

Regarding the first possibility, the concept of appropriatness logic proposed by cognitivists may seem a convincing answer. That is, actors, according to their definition of themselves and their role, always take the action that is expected of them. But first, cognitivists themselves acknowledge that not all actors behave according to appropriatness, and

some act on the logic of consequence, more commonly known as rational choice theory; And this is enough for this view to lose its explanatory power due to structural variables and the emergence of the security dilemma, and secondly, it is not compatible with human will and free choice, and ultimately leads to a kind of determinism like materialist theories.

Utilizing cognitivist insights on international regimes reveals the importance of actors' perception and shared understanding of pride and public good. While common knowledge, ideas, and values are certainly important for establishing regimes, the weakness of this approach is that it can explain the substance of a particular regime but does not necessarily explain when or under what conditions these common ideas or values emerge or when consensus values or knowledge influences the behavior of countries to the extent that they lead to the formation of regimes (Haggard and Simmons, 1987 AD: 510).

A general critique to the above three approaches is that the anthropological assumptions underlying their analysis represent a single-dimensional human being which is inconsistent with the complex, multidimensional reality of human beings in the real world. It is not clear how and on what basis each of the stimuli of fear, self-interest and cognitive variables form the basis of each of the above three approaches. So we will come to the question of whether it can be said that in words of Rumi, each of these views touches a part of the elephant in the dark room.

The answer to this study is positive according to the literature of Islamic thought, which emphasizes the fact that truth is composed of Fitrah and natural dimensions and physical and spiritual realms, and accordingly tries to provide a framework that answers the main issues in the field of international regimes, i.e. The formation, continuity and efficiency of regimes should be modified in accordance with this interpretation of human being.

7. Multi-variable Analysis of Regimes and Islamic Theory of Fitrah
In the Islamic view, there is a duality of Fitrah and nature, on the one hand and there are stages of self (Nafs), including the inciting Nafs, the self-accusing Nafs and the Nafs at peace, on the other hand. Accordingly, the divine Fitrah of man is in conflict with his nature, including the material and animal dimensions of nature. Man, who is composed of material body and abstract soul, his nature returns to his material body and his Fitrah to his abstract soul (Javadi Amoli, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 257) and the abstract Fitrah of man is purified from the

features of matter, such as time and place and change (Javadi Amoli, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 58).

Man's vices belong to his nature and his virtues are related to his Fitrah. Therefore, in the soul of every human being, there is a clash between Fitrah and nature and the dominance of nature leads to the dominance of vices (Javadi Amoli, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 169).

As for the stages of the Nafs, the inciting Nafs orders people to commit evil and the self-accusing Nafs reprimands people for committing evil and the Nafs at peace is a state in which rebellious natures are subdued after purification of the soul and inner purification from impurities. Thus, man`s will and prudence would be under the control of reason and Fitrah and the inciting Nafs is no longer capable of fighting reason and faith (Mesbah, 2010 AD/1391 SH: 6-7).

Therefore, based on the Islamic thought, the assumption of this article is that human truth is composed of Fitrah and natural dimensions, physical and spiritual realms; and human behavior cannot be reduced merely to an internal stimulus such as fear or self-interest within the natural and material framework. What has been emphasized in theories of international relations has been mostly the material dimension of man along with the viewpoint of instrumental rationality. However, the Fitrah dimension of man has qualities such as perfectionism, truth-seeking, benevolence, justice-seeking, libertarianism and other divine values that act according to the logic of appropriateness rather than being explained by instrumental rationality. Our assumption is that human society, like human beings, is in the midst of conflict between these two categories of traits and needs that move forward and evolve.

Accordingly, what a theory of international relations needs to address at the anthropological level is to identify the rules that govern this conflict and the interaction of these two sets of attributes.

In generalization of these two categories of human features and needs to apply for states and international actors, as well as to linkage between micro with macro level of analysis, we can use the vision and idea of "Emergent Ontology" of practical realism, which emphasizes the layered nature of reality. According to this vision, matter (solids) can be said to be more fundamental than life and essential for life; Life is also more fundamental than rationality and precedes it. In other words, matter, life and rationality are more fundamental than society and human history and precede it.

Thus, although sciences such as biology dealing with the lower layers of reality may be able to explain things about the mechanisms of the higher layers of reality, such as human behavior, they cannot fully explain them. Laws that are discovered and identified at one level

cannot be reduced to other levels. Each level has its own emergent powers that, although rooted in other levels, have emerged from those levels and depend on them, but cannot be explained only by explanations rooted in more fundamental levels. Therefore, emergent levels have their own strengths and capabilities (Joseph and Wight, 2010 AD: 9-12).

Therefore, in the explanation of international regimes, the causal role of structural variables, including the distribution of capabilities, the linkage of actor's interests, and the distribution of ideas, should be kept in mind as variables arising from the stimuli of fear, profit-seeking, and pride-seeking in human nature.

8. Fitrah, Public Good And Pride

This article, believing that any social theory should consider a place for human will and free choice, based on Islamic thought, links the cognitive variables emphasized in the third approach to an internal stimulus other than fear and interest. This stimulus is Fitrah that leads to pursuit dignity and pride as the goal. The theory of Fitrah in the Islamic thought depicts a nature for man that is divine, all-encompassing, incontrovertible, non-acquired and infallible, and is the distinguishing feature of man from other beings (Labkhandagh, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 55).

In the Islamic anthropology, Fitrah is defined as the consolidating element of man and the common truth of all human beings. In spite of sexual, ethnic, racial, linguistic and national differences, human beings have a common nature and essence, which indicates the unity of mankind. There are different definitions and interpretations of Fitrah. "Initial Actuality of Man," "Talent and Exclusive Potential Power of Man," "True intuition of the soul, meaning intuitive awareness of its inherent poorness and its related truth," and "a kind of a priori perception" are some of the definitions given to Fitrah (Dehghani-Firoozabadi, (2010 AD/1389 SH: 58).

According to Imam Khomeini's viewpoint, there are two types of Fitrah: Makhmurah (Saturated or inherent) and Mahjubah (Veiled or Hidden). The former is divided in two parts, primary and secondary. Primary means Love for perfection and excellence while the secondary means hatred for imperfection and defective. All people without exception are saturated in this kind of Fitrah. As long as this nature is not covered with veils, it is the common feature of all human beings and its rules are universal (Khomeini, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 180).

The second type of Fitrah is called Mahjubah, and according to Imam Khomeini's outlook, those who are get involved in carnal and

somatic veils, based on this Fitrah have unjustly recognized perfection and felicity in material affairs and satanic overindulgences. As a result of the veils, the pure inherent Fitrah transforms into a Fitrah that will immerse people in the slopes of worldliness and Satanism. All the evil that comes out of man is due to the nature being in veiled, and the Fitrah itself due to its adherence to veils in essence turns into evil (Khomeini, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 82).

Therefore, although the human beings are benevolent by nature and perfectionist, but the inclination toward the world and material things creates a veil for the innate Fitrah; Therefore, it needs a road map (Sharia) and a guide (the person who has reached perfection) so as not to allow the Fitrah to adapt mistakenly (Khomeini, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 339).

To explain this concept, Motahari the Martyr refers to the issue of "Moral Good" versus "Moral Evil" and asks 'where does the "Moral Good" as a rule originate?' 'Whether it is an indoctrination imposed by social necessities or it is something in the human ego?' He answers that there have been a series of issues that are raised today in the name of "Humanity" and there is no school of thought that does not attach importance to a set of human values, and by stating that humans sometimes seek benefits and profit, but there are other things beyond which do not fit with the logic of profit, believes that these human values are rooted in the ego and human nature, which are tendencies of Fitrah that exist both in the area of knowledge and in the area of desires (Motahari, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 35-37).

Based on the background of Fitrah in Islamic thought, we call it "the spiritual tendencies of man that lead him regardless of any idiology or creed, towards divine values such as seeking truth and justice, fighting oppression, libertarianism and altruism, and as a potential talent and force, exists in human nature." It is in fact the Makhmurah nature in Imam Khomeini`s words. The common denominator of these values is the existence of public good in them.

Public good is a concept rooted in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. Contemporary moral philosopher John Rawls defines the public good as "Certain general conditions that are... equally to everyone's advantage." Public good is basically formed when social spaces, institutions, and systems operate in a way that benefits everyone. Existence of a public health care system, efficient public safety and security system, peace among states in the world, fair political and legal system, healthy environment and prosperous economic system are examples or parts of public good. Establishing and maintaining public good requires the collective efforts by some, and

often large numbers of people. The public good should be accessible to all members of society, and no one can easily be deprived of it (Velasquez, 1992 AD).

From this point of view, public good is different from concepts such as common goods, collective good, common interests, public expediency, etc., because its generality and commonality are inherent. The divine values guided by Fitrah are of this kind and are examples of public good. Thus, Fitrah can be more briefly defined as the "Inherent tendency to maintain and promote the public good."

Therefore, from the Islamic point of view, we consider Fitrah along with the two drivers of fear and interest as the third side of the triangle of fundamental drivers in determining the behavior of international actors and argue that knowledge and worldview of actors emphasized by cognitivists binds these three sides and determine the weight of each of them in shaping the behavior of actors. In the meantime, the actors' views specifically on public interests, threats, and goods, especially in prioritization of preferences, play a key role in their behavior in the international arena, including in the formation of international regimes.

Fitrah is a stimulus that by pursuing a set of values that ensures the public good helps man to achieve the goal of salvation. Since realization of these values is in conflict with the characteristics of the material dimension of man, namely his self-interest and fear, their realization requires self-sacrifice, risk-taking and preference for the public good over individual interests.

It is here that pride and honor are formed as a reward for self-sacrifice and risk-taking in order to contribute to the realization of the public good, and the acquisition of these values and the effort to achieve them is a virtue and a source of pride and honor. Pride or honor is a social and relational thing, and the opposite is shame and humiliation. Ned Lebow considers pride to include two dimensions, internal and external. The inner dimension is self-respect or self-esteem and the outer dimension is the dignity that others give to a person (Ned Lebow, 2010 AD/1390 SH: 122).

What has recently been emphasized in the literature on the role of sentiments in international relations regarding the role of pride, has been its external dimension, which has been affected by Hegel (1977)'s dialectic of "Master and Slave" and its central concept of conflict for identification. In this regard, Axel Honneth, through his internal critique of the works of Jürgen Habermas, has framed a social theory based on the constant and endless struggle for identification. Honneth sees social convergence as a dynamic process that involves struggle to identify identity claims by social actors. He sees social conflict as the

result of the exchange of moral claims; Claims that should in principle be accepted by society (Haacke, 2005 AD: 181).

But the inner dimension of pride and honor has received less attention. As Ned Lebow points out, we can behave in a way that provokes opposition from others but still feel satisfied about ourselves, and this happens if our behavior reflects our values and beliefs and somehow induces the inner demand for pride (Ned Lebow, 2010 AD/1390 SH: 120).

In fact, despite the possibility of opposition from others and even endangering the survival, some actors insist on behaving in a way that is consistent with their beliefs about the public good and salvation. Thus, honor can be considered more important than survival, and risk-taking are formulated in a different way, because honor cannot be achieved without risk.

Accordingly, Fitrah, through salvation and public good, creates a way to overcome its fears and interests, and in this way, generates self-control and self-sacrifice. Creating or joining international institutions and relinquishing some sovereign powers, in fact, not only occurs in view of power and national interests, but also to some extent out of self-sacrifice for the public good. It should be noted, however, that the level of risk-taking and self-sacrifice is not unlimited and often only lasts as long as survival and national interests are not greatly affected. Hence, the existence of a balance of power or a hegemonic power that can

punish those who violate the regime is one of the preconditions for the formation and continuation of regimes. The following figure shows the interaction between stimuli and goals and the central role of cognition.

Decisive stimuli and goals in the formation of regimes.

The important point is that since according to this analysis, the nature is not the only factor in creating and observing regimes, and the two aspects of interests and power, which are rooted in the human worldly dimension, are also in play, and taking into consideration that nature due to veils may distance itself from perfectionist values, the role of nature in regimes does not necessarily mean that the regimes are proper and absolute good, but rather it is more about the fact that the existence of such a stimulus in humans and its emergence collectively will lead societies to create some arrangements for the formation of a better order, although such an effort may be derailed by considerations of power and interest. But it can be said that the effectiveness and durability of the regimes is directly related to the extent to which they are based on the public good, which is guided by nature. Therefore, if interests and power have the dominant role in the formation of regimes, it can be expected that with the change of power equations and the arrangement of interests, the regimes will also collapse or undergo a general change. But if their main basis is the credit of having the public good invested in them, it can be expected that they will continue to exist even with the change of power and interest equations.

9. Public Good and Going Beyond Dichotomy of Absolute and Relative Gains

By introducing nature and pride-seeking, we can overcome the dichotomy of relative and absolute gains in the views of realism and neoliberal institutionalists, which has been the dominant topic of their debates by emphasizing on the importance of the concept of public good. Indeed, the literature on international regimes offers explanations on the role of collective interests in the formation of regimes, but these explanations have failed to succeed in the face of the realism emphasis on actors' fears and security dilemmas, self-help and relative gains. Linking the public good (which is different from the collective interests) to the stimulus of Fitrah and the goals of salvation, dignity and honor and taking action based on the logic of appropriateness can eliminate such a defect.

Therefore, cooperation based on the public good is not achieved for the sake of absolute gains, nor does the fear of relative gains prevent it, because everyone benefits from it equally. But this does not mean that the basis of cooperation is solely the public good. Perhaps only a few actors base their cooperation on the public good, and most actors base their cooperation on absolute gains or power considerations.

Since the public good is not evident in advance, and its recognition requires trial and error, experience as well as logical reasoning and dialogue, it is necessary to have an intersubjective understanding of it. Given postmodern insights on the linkage between knowledge and power and the role of social institutions in defining truth (Foucault, 1998 AD), it can be concluded that unless dialogue is between two equal parties, there will not be any possibility for the weak parties to effectively participate in dialogue on the public good.

The dialogue in this regard is always between powerful actors, and each actor participates in this dialogue in proportion to his power, and naturally the powerful actors try to present their interests as a public good. In this regard, Habermas in his theory of Communicative Action argues that understanding can be achieved by excluding the power factor from the conversation (Habermas, 1996 AD: 20). Since the abandonment of power in international politics seems unrealistic, the only alternative is to achieve a balance of power, and actors who want to play an effective role in the dialogue for the public good must first be equal in power to other participants in the dialogue.

It should also be reminded that shared and inter-subjective knowledge alone cannot in the face of selfish interests and in situations where the security dilemma has not been resolved, lead to the formation of international regimes. Consequently, for knowledge to be effective, first there must be common interests and degrees of balance of power or a benign hegemonic power that diminishes the security dilemma, and second, given the important role of free choice and free will, political decision-makers must take action in the interests of public good. Moving towards the public good, in turn, requires that Fitrah overcome natural characteristics, which will be facilitated by perception of common interests and the formation of balance of power, because in such circumstances, the need for taking risk diminishes.

10. Power, Interests and Pride in non-Proliferation Regime

The role of power in the formation of non-Proliferation Regime can be clarified by the theory of balance of power and the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union and their allies in the bipolar structure of the Cold War. The two superpowers entangled in the arms race could have armed their allies with nuclear weapons, as did by some of their closest allies.

But continuation of this approach for various reasons could have led to the detriment of both superpowers and by the formation of new nuclear powers reduces their power within their respective spheres of influence. Hence, the two superpowers and their nuclear allies, in order

to maintain their power, attempted to form a non-proliferation regime. Therefore, the intent of the nuclear powers on the formation of the non-proliferation regime, besides the balance of power that was formed between them, turned to be a key factor in the formation of this regime. As mentioned, the fear stimulus is a key factor that adds to the importance of the power variable, and one function of regimes is to respond to the fear stimulus and reduce concerns of states for their survival.

Accordingly, since power is one of the three essential factors in the formation of regimes, fear plays an important role in the creation of regimes, but in the case of the non-proliferation regime, fear has played a clearer role. Fear of being destroyed by nuclear weapons directly provided a strong incentive for great powers to cooperate in order to prevent the proliferation of these weapons. Regarding this regime, states` concern of their survival has been quite evident on the part of the leading actors of this regime. It is also clear that concerns of punishment by nuclear states and the ensuing threats for survival has been quite effective in non-nuclear weapon states` compliance with the non-proliferation regime.

The role of the interest factor and stimulus of profit seeking in the non-proliferation regime is closely linked to that of power factor; Just as maintaining the supremacy of nuclear weapon states over non-nuclear weapon states can be considered the greatest common good of the leading actors shaping the non-proliferation regime; while maintaining a nuclear monopoly and trying to reap the economic benefits of providing peaceful benefits of nuclear fission, including the benefits of nuclear power plant contracts to non-nuclear countries have been other important benefits that encourage nuclear-weapon states to establish a non-proliferation regime. Non-Nuclear weapon states too have joined the regime in pursuit of the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy.

The role of honor as a stimulus in the non-proliferation regime is evident in the arguments that underlie this regime and made its acceptance reasonable and facilitated by members, especially by non-nuclear weapon states. Accordingly, in order to recognize the role of honor in the non-proliferation regime, one must look for the justifications provided in the form of public good for the necessity of establishing this regime and evaluate the impact of these justifications and arguments on the acceptance of this regime by state parties.

According to what is stated in the preamble and provisions of the non-Proliferation Treaty, the main justification related to the public good in this treaty is prevention of destruction and devastation that will

occur in the event of a nuclear war. Developing peaceful forms of nuclear energy and providing the non-nuclear weapon states with access to the potential benefits of any peaceful nuclear exploitation has been another fundamental justification related to the public good in the regime that has motivated members to accept it (United Nation, n.d.).

But whether such justifications can be sustainable over time, especially in view of the discrimination between haves and have-nots in the treaty and the non-fulfillment of the nuclear weapon states' commitments to non-nuclear weapon states, as well as the non-fulfillment of commitments to move towards nuclear disarmament, is no doubt. Therefore, it can be expected if a discourse that will weaken the argument of public good by emphasizing the injustice and discrimination inherent in this regime is emerged, and at the same time new state actors see their interests in violating this treaty and find the ability to avert punishment for its violation, this regime shall be destroyed or modified.

Conclusion

The current approaches in the theories of international regimes alone, due to their reductionist view in explaining human behavior, cannot provide a comprehensive understanding of the important factors influencing international phenomena such as the formation, survival and efficiency of international regimes. The study of Islamic view about human nature shows that Fitrah as the third side of the triangle of essential stimuli along with the two stimuli of fear and profit plays an essential role in determining the behavior of international actors. Fitrah is defined as the "inherent tendency to maintain and promote the common good" and is a stimulus that helps man to achieve the goal of salvation by pursuing a set of values and is closely related to the sense of honor and pride. Fitrah, in view of salvation and the public good, creates a way to overcome fear and self-interest, and in this way, creates self-control and self-sacrifice.

Creating or joining international institutions and regimes and relinquishing some sovereign powers occurs not only in view of power equations and national interests, but also to some extent is an attempt to achieve the international public good. But since the public good is not clear in advance, and its recognition requires trial and error, experience as well as logical reasoning and dialogue, it is necessary to have an intersubjective understanding of it. Given postmodern insights on the linkage between knowledge and power and the role of social institutions in defining truth, it can be concluded that unless dialogue is between

two equal parties, there will not be any possibility for the weak parties to effectively participate in dialogue on the public good.

The dialogue in this regard is always between powerful actors, and each actor participates in this dialogue in proportion to its power, and naturally the powerful actors try to present their interests as a public good. In fact, considerations of power and interests act as veils on nature. In this regard, Habermas in his theory of Communicative Action argues that understanding can be achieved by excluding the power factor from the conversation. Since the abandonment of power in international politics seems unrealistic, the only alternative is to achieve a balance of power, and actors who want to play an effective role in the dialogue for the public good must first be equal in power to other participants in the dialogue. Although it seems difficult, but the study of the rise and fall of different discourses shows that transcendental ideas contain the power that gradually provides the ground for their rule.

On the other hand, shared understanding of public good and honor alone cannot lead to the formation of international regimes in the face of selfish interests and in situations where the security dilemma has not been resolved. Consequently, in order for a shared understanding to be effective, there must be common interests and degrees of balance of power between the great powers or a hegemonic power that punishes those who violate the regime.

In addition, given the important role of free choice and free will, political decision-makers must take steps toward the public good. Moving towards the public good, in turn, requires that Fitrah overcome natural characteristics, which will be facilitated by perception of common interests and the formation of balance of power, because in such circumstances, the need for taking risk diminishes. Therefore, in the absence of innate features leading to the public good, one can only expect highly imposed regimes that serve the interests of the powers that create them and are transformed by changing power equations.

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