Political Implications of "Self" and "Other" in the Political

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Abstract:

The relation of thought and objectivity, truth and reality, individual and society, knowledge and power, economy and culture, and subject and object can be considered as origins; Each of which has been and still is the source of the emergence of special schools of thought in the history of thought and politics. Among these ideological dichotomies, the relationship between "self" and "other" is one of the most important confrontations, the importance of which has been somewhat neglected in the history of political thought. Therefore, the present study seeks to examine the relationship between "self" and "other" in political thought. From this perspective, after expanding the conceptual space of the subject and expressing its problematic aspect, he will examine the different dimensions and aspects of his relationship with the other. According to the thematic documents presented in this research, the research method is descriptive-analytical and the method of data collection in this research is library. The findings of this study indicate that the relationship between self and other in political thought can be observed in the most detailed relationships, as the relationship of man with himself to more general relationships such as the relationship of man with other cultures. What is significant in this regard is the nature of the relationship that the "self" establishes with the "other."

Keywords: Self, Other, the Political, Relationship between Self and Other

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Introduction

Society is formed not with the " self" but with the presence of other human beings, because social life is impossible without the presence of the "other". The " self" and the "other" communicate in and through language, and what is important and tolerable here is how they relate. This has led to its long-standing relationship with another in philosophy. In the philosophies of idealism, from Plato to Hegel, man exists to participate in absolute existence; In other words, in order to exist, every individual must be connected to the general truth. This is why the discussion is more about the general human being than the particular human being; Whereas, according to the thinkers of existentialism (individual), he should think about his existence and try to find his true self. Therefore, regarding the relationship between oneself and another, one can refer to (Irene Rima Makaryk) in the book Encyclopedia of Contemporary Literary Theories that; She considers the relationship between "self" and "other" based on the assumption that in the heart of personal experience, there is a mental self that alienates everything as another, from itself (Makaryk, 2011, p. 112). In a large part of the history of philosophy, this relation has been formulated according to the relation of the subject (self) in the position of the observer and the understander and the object (other) in the position of the observed and understood.

Therefore, the purpose of this article is to examine the relationship between oneself and another in political thought. In general, a review of research and studies related to the subject of the present study shows that research in this field has paid attention to its own and another's discussion from different aspects. In a book entitled "The Self, the Other, and God in Kierkegaard's Thought,"

Razieh Zeinali (2021) first examines that one of the most important issues for every human being is his relationship with himself, the other, and God. If we look at these relations from Kierkegaard's point of view, we will see three important and fundamental issues.

Every human being has to recognize and try to resolve issues about knowing himself, the other and God and the relationships that are formed in between. Rah-e Hagh et al. (2016) in an article entitled: "How the relationship between oneself and another in Iran in the last century with the application of Bakhtin model and Chantal Mouffe approach"; In order to understand and interpret the qualities of their relationship with each other, the authors try to dissect the propositions contained in Bakhtin's thought and use Chantal Mouffe's approach to politics. Soltani and Zahedi (2017) in an article entitled: "Self and other in Nima's thoughts" in this article has tried to examine different and different aspects of this issue.

The findings of the research indicate that Nima is one of the post-constitutional poets in Iran who has taken this issue seriously by raising issues about "self" and "other"; But because of his attachment to the Hegelian dialectic, in the later stages of his work he confiscates the difference between the "self" and the "other" in favor of a unified, cohesive, and unified world. Seyed Hossein Mousavi (2017) in a dissertation entitled: "His own political and other guarantees in Shariati thought"; The present study intends to study the political guarantees of the relationship between "self and other" in the thought of one of the prominent thinkers of contemporary Iranian history, namely Ali Shariati. The author concludes that the self and the other and the relationship between the two in the Western intellectual heritage has been a

long-running debate that has made it inevitable to address it. In the modern age and with the hegemony of the Cartesian paradigm, man was introduced as the basis of cognition. Therefore, in this article, an attempt is made to study one's own political guarantees and another of political thought, which in turn can add to the innovation of work.

Theoretical framework: the relationship between "self" and "other" in political thought

The relationship between oneself and another can be seen in the smallest detail, that is, man's relationship with himself, to more general relationships, such as man's relationship with other cultures. What is significant in this regard is the nature of the relationship that the "self" establishes with the "other." Michel Foucault and his influence, Edward Said, consider the nature of this relation to be "representation"; In their research, they seek to understand how the "other" is "represented" and under what technologies. In his poststructuralist theory of "Orientalism", Edward Said says; The real question is, can a true representation of something really exist? Or that all representations, because they are representations, remain primarily confined to language and then to the prison of representative culture and institutions and political space. Said considers the second option to be true and, based on it, seeks to show how the Western "self" represented the Eastern "other" for itself. Said's Orientals, like Foucault's madmen, perverts, and criminals, are in a state of "otherness" born of their "differences" with things that are considered normal, normal, real, and right.

Through scholarly writings, diplomatic archives, travelogues, and literary works, Said shows how Europeans reduced the "East" to a "written" position in the post-Enlightenment period; And then took it in the form of colonialism. He believes that this acquisition was made possible through a discourse of "difference" which he called "Orientalism". Orientalism is an extremely coherent discipline with which European culture in the post-Enlightenment era was able to govern the "East" politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and even Create and build. According to Said, Orientalism, as a set of representations of knowledge and system, was able to portray the East as the "civilized other" of Europe.

Based on this orientalist view, the words "self" and "other" are considered as the most key basic concepts in the field of "representation". The "other" is anyone who is separate from the individual, and the existence of others is essential to defining what is called oneself. It is also crucial to determine the unique place of individuals in the world. As noted, the concept of "other" has been used differently in postcolonial discourse. From the point of view of this discourse, the colonial subject is the "other" of the colonialists. In this discourse, another refers to the subjects of the colonies who have been marginalized by the colonizers; And the subjects of the colonialists identify them by distinguishing them and comparing them. Another presence is vital to the existence of the subject, because the subject exists in his gaze.

According to metaphorical discourse, Orientals, and especially Muslims, are portrayed as "other" or outsiders; In Western travelogues, short stories, and literary texts, Easterners are portrayed as savage, uncivilized, useless, backward, and erotic and violent; Also, the eastern lands are defined as dark and unknown places, which have the historical mission of spreading civilization. These features used in the colonial texts are

more of a policy of "representation" than a description of the truth; Through it, firstly, to emphasize the distinction of this group from Westerners, and secondly, to highlight Western culture in front of them. In such texts, a pattern is formed above the "self" and below the "other". But this "other" does not take off his clothes with the decline of colonialism from these lands; In other words, it becomes a project in their texts that can always be used to humiliate and subjugate lower nations, tribes and groups.

Based on this non-constructive reading of the "other", some thinkers in the Eastern world, in opposition to the colonial discourse of Orientalism, sought to; By reversing this discourse, whatever Orientalists have attributed to the "Eastern" civilization in another inferior position to the Western civilization. Which is called "inverted orientalism". However, in both Orientalist and Orientalist approaches, the relationship between oneself and the other was organized in the form of a hostile relationship based on a kind of irreconcilable antagonism; In such a way that every "self" considered the "other" as its own hell.

But the fact of the matter is that in the realm of political thought and in the intellectual apparatus of political philosophers, the relationship between oneself and another has always had a conflicting relationship based on the relationship between friend and foe and insider and outsider. In this regard, this ratio can be typified in the form of a range of different views; In this article, the purpose is to formulate such a typology of the relationship between oneself and another in the minds of different thinkers. In any case, whether the other, as Sartre says, is the hell of man, or whether, as the thinkers of the philosophy of well-being acknowledge, is the paradise of man; What is certain is that today

we have no escape from encountering and communicating with the "other." Therefore, based on such a necessity, it can be said that understanding different and alternative ideas of this relationship can organize our horizons and visions in relation to others who are not like us.

Research Findings

This section examines the relationship between self and other from different perspectives in political thought.

A. The historical course of the relationship between oneself and another in philosophy

The relationship between oneself and another refers to an ancient problem in ontology and philosophy. In analyzing this relationship, different reliance on each of its two sides has led to different and sometimes contradictory attitudes. In modern and postmodern thought, the relationship between the "self" and the "other" has become one of the important fields of thought. Although the outline of one relationship with another seems to be a modern issue; But we can also look for deep roots and ideas for it from the same ancient period (Rashidian, 2014: p. 308).

Apart from the scattered references to "otherness" in the works of the pre-Socratics, it can be said that the first philosophical discussions in this field begin with Plato. In the Sophist treatise, jealousy is mentioned as one of the supreme goods, and in the guest treatise, the "other" is considered as one of the belongings of "Eros". In addition, the fact that Plato chose the form of "Hampers" to compose his works implies to him some other significance. In the eighth and ninth books of Nicomachean ethics, Aristotle mentions friendship as a kind of relationship with the "other" (Olia, 2009, p. 21); In the same book,

he examines friendship as a true virtue. It is a "benevolent" relationship between individuals, which is a purely moral relationship and is not subject to considerations such as biological need or pleasure. We want a friend's good for himself, not for ourselves, and when there is mutual good, it becomes friendship.

Friendship is based on the similarity of our nature or inherent kinship with the "other." But the social condition of Greek society, which was based on inequality between citizens, slaves, and foreigners, made this benevolence selective and privileged, rather than universal; Because how can all human beings be loved regardless of the differences in their virtues and qualities. Loving at the same time strengthens my own possessions and is like the greatest external blessing. This friendship is possible in the context of the city-state. Friendship is a complement to human infinity, and in comparison, with God, who has no partner or friend because of infinity. Therefore, friendship is a special and finite human experience and value (Rashidian: 2021, p. 308). According to Hellenistic thought, the Stoics also showed another fear in their thought by proposing teachings such as universal empathy and the general brotherhood of human beings. In the Middle Ages, the doctrine of Christian love or agape or to love one's neighbor was developed by philosophers such as St. Augustine and St. Thomas; And became the object of attention to the "other" (Olia, 2009, p. 21).

In other words, the Greek concept of agape, meaning love and affection, became Christian love, except that Aristotelian friendship was elitist and even aristocratic, but Christianity preached universal love (to the neighbor, even to the enemy); Because with Christianity, the "other" becomes a neighbor who, according to God's command, should be loved as himself. Here, as Arendt puts it, "I do not love another simply because I meet him in the world, but in him I love the reality of being a creature." Augustine also said that he loves the "other" because he is a creature of God. The other never occurs by itself and in the likeness of another as an inherent and irreducible reality in scholastic philosophy (Rashidian, 2014, p. 309). Thus, it can be seen that the roots of the relationship between the "self" and the "other" can be traced back to antiquity, Hellenism, and the Middle Ages of Western philosophy.

However, in spite of the obvious and hidden references to another in ancient philosophy, examples of which have been omitted above; It seems that the problem of "other" should be considered as a problem that is raised in contemporary philosophy as a special problem of ontological and epistemological importance. At a time when, according to Derrida, it is a time of escape from self and centrality; Issues such as the necessity and role of the existence of the "other" in the formation and consistency of the "I", the issue of other minds, and the interpersonal or intersubjective status of many phenomena are among the eventual consequences. Which has been referred to as the "Copernican Revolution of Mind, Ethics, and Social Thought" (Audi, 1999, p. 71).

At the beginning of modern philosophy, Descartes inaugurated the age of modern subject-oriented philosophies with a transcendental view of the subject and the transformation of its consciences into levels independent of the world; And inevitably sparked a debate about the relationship between the "self" and the "other." By emphasizing the clarity and distinction of one's own intuitions as the criteria of correct ideas and precepts, Descartes left practically no room for the "other"; And imagined "otherness" more in the form of disturbing traditions, misleading

intellectual references and even deceptive demons (Rashidian, 2014, p. 309). Interestingly, in the interpretation of Merleau-Ponty in his work entitled "Visible and Invisible" in this regard; Referring to Descartes' Reflections, he says that for a philosophy that places itself in the position of pure attitude and flying above the horizon, meeting the "other" cannot be involved; Because the gaze dominates and can only dominate things, and if it falls on people, it turns them into artificial, mannequin-like figures. Which move only with springs (Rashidian, 2014, p. 309).

But with Emmanuel Kant, he is a prominent philosopher of the Enlightenment who comes to the feet of the "other" and it is in his mind that the other or the other is important in consciousness (Olia, 2009, p. 21). In fact, it is in Kant's philosophy that there is a kind of recognition of the value of the "other" to the essence of the other, although without explicitly proposing another problem (Rashidian, 2014, p. 309). In this regard, Paul Ricoeur in his work entitled "Sympathy and Respect" believes that; The act of imposing another "cannot be done in the continuation of the Cartesian cogito, but, as Kant rightly saw, is done in an act in which reason limits the claims of the empirical subject." This principle of limitation is found in "respect," which is the treatment of man as an end in itself. No empirical feeling can be the basis of a moral relationship. This means that moral principles and criteria are not derived from lived experience, and for example we do not conclude through experience that lying is an immoral act, but that the act is based on a priori and rational criteria. Therefore, the moral principle must be rational and firm in reason. It is in the analysis of respect that Kant's philosophy lies about the existence of the "other" (Rashidian, 2014, p. 310).

Here Kant seems to show the difference between "thing" and "person" through the very concept of "respect"; And believes that things are determined by price and exchangeability with other things and the criterion of equivalence; But a person is distinguished by a higher value and respect than any other value, which is not equivalent but is a value in itself. In fact, in Kant's practical intellect, humanity as the end is the limiting and superior condition of all means. But in this irreducible idea of humanity, the view of the "other" and its moral dimension emerge. But the difficulty of Kant's philosophy is that respect in it does not mean respect for the concrete human being and flesh and blood and blood in it; Rather, it is respect for the general moral law, "formal or formal," which does not exercise the right of the "other" to its absolute individuality, but formulates it in the most abstract and conceptual way. Thus, the other in Kant's philosophy does not find the form of an empirical human being living in his external reality.

Based on this and along this historical course, the philosophical relationship between "self" and "other" can be said; In Kant's thought there are still thick streaks of subject-centeredness and the study of knowledge through the cognitive agent's encounter with the mystery of existence alone. But in Hegel's theoretical apparatus, the relation of the "self" and the "other" within human reality became an explicit subject for thought because the whole of knowledge acquires an intersubjective character. By designing the relationship between the eunuch and the servant, the relation of self-awareness and self-recognition in the other and their conflict (Olia, 2009, p. 21) showed the importance of the "other" in shaping self-awareness. Based on this and along this historical course, the philosophical relationship between "self" and

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In this connection, among later philosophers, the relationship between oneself and the other has always been explicitly or explicitly considered; And each in the form of new concepts, terms, and phrases, or shifting the focal point, has sought to shed new light on this ratio and reveal its hidden and neglected angles. In such a way that Kierkegaard, by arguing the "other" as an obstacle to man's relation to God and individuality and responsibility, Feuerbach with the me-you relationship; Edmund Husserl by emphasizing another place in the world calendar and the intersubjective status of the various levels of objectivity; Max Scheler, focusing on the place and importance of "empathy" in ethics; Heidegger by discussing being with each other and treating them as existential attributes of Dasein; Martin Buber relying on the me-you relationship and the importance of the relationship and meeting the other; Gabriel Marcel and Carl Jaspers on the importance of partnership and interpersonal relationships; Jean-Paul Sartre with his plan of conflict with another and another share in receiving the "I" of self; Simon de Beauvoir from a feminist point of view with the theme of man as subject and woman as man; Mikhail Bakhtin with the originality of dialogism, Hans Georg Gadamer with dialogue-based hermeneutics; Jacques Lacan with the design of the subconscious and another; Theodore Adorno with his critique of the philosophy of oneness and the critique of the other; Jacques Derrida with emphasis on the text in the position of others and critique of the suppression of otherness (Olia, 2009, pp. 21-22); And countless other thinkers in modern and postmodern philosophy, each with a different and sometimes similar approach to "otherness" on the horizon.

Thus, with a more detailed look and departure from the above brief description, one can risk saying that in modern philosophy, the relationship between oneself and another is a major philosophical issue. Merleau-Ponty, in the visible and the invisible, sees this as essentially Western. Husserl's phenomenology as an "egomorphic" philosophy, by proposing

a kind of transcendental solipsism, ultimately reduces all other nesses to the "self." In this regard, he says, in the realm of things that rightly and fundamentally belong to my transcendental ego; They must lay the groundwork for a calendar of these original transcendences that go beyond what truly belongs to the ego and emerge as "others." But despite Husserl's ego logical position, the formation of "another monad" in "My Monad" through a simulated transition plays a decisive role in his philosophy; Because the formation of any kind of objectivity, including the objectivity of the world, is done after the formation of the "other ego" and his collaboration with the "ego" in the calendar of these objectivity (Rashidian, 2014, p. 310).

Therefore, Husserl's view of "another" should be reviewed in the text of his discussions on his calendar, another, and different layers of objectivity in transcendental mind. He finds itself a transcendental consciousness (to the distinction of empirical) that is the basis of an absolute basis; That the whole world, including others (or more precisely, each other), is in it is common or capitalized (Olia, 2009, pp. 105-106). In this way, the first point about the calendar of "other" words to Husserl is that Husserl reserves another credit or other non-religious credit. He explicitly says that we do not have direct or intermediate access to other transcendental themes; (If this was the case, itself was no longer "transcendental" and placed in my area of belonging). And between me and the other, there is always an obstacle that prevents his sensual life and teach him and I will. The final thing that comes from me is to find out in terms of the likelihood and sympathy. This is an important point that Derrida emphasizes Husserl on it (Derrida, 2007, p. 158-159).

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Davis also rightly says that according to Husserl, in the phrase "other self", the most important thing is itself and not the other (Davis, 2007, p. 59). Along the way, in Martin Heidegger's influential book Existence and Time, you see Dasein's self in opposition to "others" or "them" or "people." Although he does not limit this confrontation to a specific period, his reliance on "public opinion," which is undoubtedly a modern phenomenon, reveals the historicity of his image of this confrontation. "People" or "others" who are "all and no one" take control of Dasein's possibilities by exercising their dictatorship; And

Dasein can only get rid of this subjugation by anticipating death. But Heidegger's solution is not an individual solution, but Dasein achieves his identity only by transforming "others" (Davis, 2007, p. 311).

In any case, Heidegger, in contrast to Husserl, who considers the first certain certainty to be transcendental consciousness outside the world; It is believed that Dasein is "always ahead" in the world and "with" others, and this latter feature is so fundamental; That even if there were no other reality in the world, this fundamental structure of Dasein would still remain strong. In this regard, he says in the historical work "Existence and Time" that coexistence is an existential characteristic of Dasein, even if he is not really ahead of others or does not feel and perceive. Even being Dasein alone is coexistence in the world. It is only in coexistence and for coexistence that the other can be absent. Being alone is an imperfect state of coexistence. This state may be evidence of coexistence (Heidegger, 2007, p. 311).

Based on Husserl and Heidegger's idea of the relationship between self and other, we can speak of Immanuel Levinas's thought in this regard; His thinking about the relationship between himself and the other is in a way the result of his long conversation with the idea of these two philosophers as his greatest teachers. He believes in time and another that the theological "other" reduces the subject to a state of passivity; Because our relationship with another is always a relationship with a secret that is like the height of death that empties us of powerlessness and the power to act by controlling our senses. Contrary to Heidegger, who reinforces Dasein's death with his most complete being-ability, Levinas says that death deprives the subject of his ability by pushing him to the possible limit (Rashidian, 2014, p. 309).

On the other hand, he criticizes Husserl's view, considering the dissolution of all other nesses in the "self" as an immoral approach. For Levinas, the condition of morality is the possibility of recognizing the "other," as an inherent and irreducible being. Levinas defends asymmetric morality in opposition to Kant's symmetrical morality, which is expressed in his moral laws and assumes a reciprocal relationship between himself and another; Which recognizes the other's zeal and does not consider moral action on the part of the individual as a function of expecting similar behavior from another, but even considers such expectation as destructive of moral action (Rashidian, 2014, p. 311). Kant's moral law is to treat another as you would expect someone else to treat you, but Levinas says you should always be afraid of the other, even if the "other" is not.

The discussion of the relation of the "self" and the "other" to Levinas is not limited, and Jean-Paul Sartre makes some thought-provoking phrases in this regard. Contrary to Husserl, he believes that we do not calendar another, but meet him. He also points out that the "self" is neither formally nor materially inside consciousness, but outside, in the world: like the other self, it is a being of the world. Thus, in his view, a relationship with another is not based on consciousness; Because consciousness is spontaneous and non-contemplative, and in order not to fall into the trap of solipsism and self-centeredness, we should not consider our relationship with another on the basis of consciousness. Another creation, as if the world is taking me away from me, a center is created, as if the world is drawn towards it and is formed around it. The constant possibility of me becoming an object is that someone else is basically looking at me at every moment. It is

enough for someone else to look at me to be who I am.

So, I have lost my transcendence. I have an outside, I have a nature, my initial descent is another being. I am not in danger either by accident, but the fundamental construction of the universe - I - is for another (Rashidian, 2014, p. 311). In other words, another is "a broken glass," which, although it speaks a hint of truth, is incapable of telling the whole truth. The other becomes hell, when he analyzes you only on the basis of external behaviors and externalities, and is unaware of the inner character and motives and apprehensions. Another goes to hell when he sees you now, but he is unaware of the intricate network of causes that have been entrenched in you since birth. Another will go to hell when he grabs only one image of you, cuts it and encloses it in his frame of mind (https://3danet.ir). This is why Sartre's famous phrase, "My hell is another," is formed.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty replaces mind-sharing with body-sharing. In his opinion, one cannot speak of another calendar or construction, but of another in the depths of the world on which I have opened. Our body opens in the body of the world to be filled immediately; In such a way that the other and I are characterized by their mutual envelopment in something tangible, which eliminates the unity of view and makes the emergence of another possible. Another presence is revealed to me at exactly a certain moment, suddenly, and by another eruption in the world (Rashidian, 2014, p. 311). In a way that my crooked attitude is denied, I feel seen; And the other is the x that is there, which I have to think about to notice the visible body that I suddenly feel I have (Merleau-Ponty: 1964).

Merleau-Ponty argues for a critique of Sartre's reflexive philosophies and "negative" philosophies, which place themselves and the other in a radical confrontation; Which is not enough for another to be truly another; And should not a calamity, a constant threat, a change of direction for and against, a judgment beyond any protest, without a place, without relativity, without a face like a frightening ghost, be able to crush me with a glance at the dust of my own world. Rather, it is enough, and it must have the power to decentralize me and confront its own centrality with my centrality. And it cannot do so except because we are not two exterminators located in two worlds per se and incomparable; Rather, we are two inputs to a single being, and each of these inputs is accessible only to one of us, but appears to the other as an input with the right to use it; Because both belong to the same universe (Rashidian, 2014, p. 311). Thus Merleau-Ponty sees himself and the other in a single horizon as a kind of co-destiny.

Based on this thought process in the colorful skirt of the idea of looking at oneself and another, we can also mention François Lyotard; In the book "Conflict" and in line with Levinas's thought, he presents a more political picture of the relationship between himself and another. Conflict is a conflict in which there is no law accepted by the parties to resolve it. Hence, there is no word for injustice and no standard for justice, and that is Levinas's question. Here we are faced with disorganized speech regimes that must be recognized as they are and without effort in delivering or dissolving them. But philosophers must advocate and echo the rhetoric of the oppressed. Thus, in spite of similar concerns, unlike Levinas's model of dialogue, Lyotard's model is a tribute to describe the political as a kind of controversy between the "self" and the "other" (Rashidian, 2014, p. 312).

However, Jacques Derrida, as a philosopher in postmodern discourse, believes in the book of writing and difference, unlike Lyotard; That Levinas pursues the hidden goal of all versions of empiricism by absolutizing the infinite externality of the "other" and remains in the construction of a two-name idea that is not really philosophy. In this regard, Derrida refers to Levinas's thought; This idea relies on a moral relationship in which a nonviolent relationship with the infinite is infinitely different, that is, with another.

Only this relation can free metaphysics from its state of subordination. This idea is neither theology, nor mysticism, nor religion, nor a certain kind of morality; And it is not intended to take its license from the Hebrew texts, but it is a reference to the most irreducible element of experience itself, that is, going to another, completely different (Derrida, 2016, p. 25). In any case, the relationship between oneself and another is inherently inclined towards politics, or in other words, it becomes a political action, the example of which is described in more detail below.

B. The self and the other in the realm of politics

Openness to the heterogeneous other in different realms has its own difficulties, impossibilities and impossibilities. In the realm of epistemology, the fact is that everyone is somehow related to the "manifestations" of the world, and its "beings", even if they are recognizable, absolute consensus and certainty about them is not attainable. Needless to say, the world emerges in a special way for each person or group or class; And this different phenomenon of the world is somehow the source of the formation of various schools of knowledge, each of which distinguishes the "self" from the "other" who does not think about the world like him.

This distinction can also be seen in the moral, social, religious, methodological, etc. domains. Identifying distinctions that do not easily allow for tolerance, tolerance, and openness toward others; However, it can be said that in the realm of politics, which is in a way an arena of conflict and conflict of interests, and the existence of one means the absence of the other, this openness and tolerance becomes even more difficult. Hence, in this field, theories about the type of encounter with another are diverse and diverse. Chantal Mouffe believes that the realm of politics, which is the realm of competition and conflict, has a completely different relationship between itself and the other in this relation in moral relations and formulations. In his view, in the realm of politics, one should not and cannot try to compete with another instead of uniting with another; Contrary to popular belief, insisting on imposing a moral relationship between oneself and another in politics may lead to violence and exclusion rather than friendship.

Instead, Mouffe believes that the relationship between oneself and another in politics should be based on a kind of "agonism"; That is, a kind of relationship in which the conflict between me and the other in politics does not disappear, but this conflict does not lead to the elimination of the other and violence. Carl Schmidt, on the other hand, instead of prescribing an agonistic relationship between himself and another, emphasizes a hostile and antagonistic relationship that is based on a relationship between friend and foe. From Schmidt's point of view, the distinction between friend and foe represents the greatest degree of severity and severity and distinction, coherence and disconnection.

This distinction can exist theoretically and practically, without applying moral, aesthetic, economic, or other distinctions; There is no need for the enemy to appear as an economic competitor, and it may be even more useful to trade with him. Throughout his treatise on the concept of the political, Schmidt has always emphasized that the friend-enemy distinction is the distinguishing feature of the political. But he has always insisted that such a distinction should be made in a purely political way, not on economic or moral grounds.

Yet the other is a stranger, and this is sufficient for the nature of what is, that is, acutely different in existence and alien domination with which conflict is possible in emergencies. These cases cannot be determined by general a priori norms nor by arbitration of a non-stakeholder and therefore neutral party (Schmidt, 2013, p. 15). For Schmidt, therefore, a relationship based on friendship and enmity is a kind of concrete relationship. The real relationship that unfolds in an unresolved conflict between us, our friends, and their enemies. This concreteness of the relationship between friend and foe will always presuppose the real possibility of war. Also, this relationship requires the basic idea that the conflict between friend and foe will not be resolved, except in a real war that will lead to the destruction of one of the parties.

Thus, for Schmidt, politics is all about conflict. In Schmidt's theoretical apparatus, however, in order for the relationship between oneself and others to become a political one, it must take the form of an antagonistic friend / foe relationship. Self / others distinction as a possible condition for the formation of political identity can always become the focus of antagonism. Since all forms of political identities require some form of relationship based on the equal presence of Self / others institution, the possibility of the emergence of antagonism never disappears.

Hence, the belief that society can be formed that antagonism is about to be an illusion. Therefore, antagonism as Schmitt says is always the possibility of present; Schmidt considers the hostility and conflict between themselves and the other as an existential hostility; It can be said that it seems that in appearance, it seems that the condition of realization is the existence of a relationship with the other, which is assumed to destroy itself.

Frankfurt's critical thinker Jürgen Habermas, on the other hand, promotes confrontation with the "other" using the concept of communicative action; And he believes that neither the quasi-phenomenological relation of Buber nor the competitive relation based on the Mouffe contradiction, nor the hostile and antagonistic relation of Schmidt, is neither true nor always based on reality. The neglect of contemporary man from conceptual reason and the one-sided use of instrumental reason has caused him to lose an important part of human capacities on the one hand and the capacities of modernity on the other hand in creating a rational consensus; Instead, with the domination of the capitalist economy, the colonial and hegemonic dimension of instrumental reason expands and prevails. According to Habermas, in the capitalist view, competition and conflict cannot be eliminated because in these narratives, the principle and axis of politics are based on disparate interests and irreducible differences.

In addition, the intertwined relationship between oneself and another in the form of the concept of "dialogue" by Mikhail Bakhtin is one of the most important and serious sources in this field. According to him, eve-

ryone is inextricably intertwined with and influenced by others, and as a result there can be no sound separate from other sounds. Bakhtin believes that in the process of understanding, it is more important for the person who understands to be outside the objects of understanding of his creator in time, space, or culture than you can imagine. Since individuals cannot really see outside themselves and understand it as a whole, and no mirror or photograph helps, only our "outside" can see and understand our real outside; Because they are located in a space outside of us (Wikipedia, the entry of Mikhail Bakhtin) and have acquired this position due to being "other".

Explain that the relationship between oneself and another in Bakhtin thought is not possible outside the boundaries of language. That is, his philosophy and method of dialogue is based on the particular linguistic philosophy that he establishes during his work. For Bakhtin, it is in language and with language that communication between oneself and the other becomes possible. Therefore, the creation of meaning is also done through language, and without the existence of another, the word cannot convey any meaning.

It is therefore clear that understanding the relationship between oneself and the other and the dialogic nature of such a relationship requires an understanding of Bakhtin's linguistic philosophy. For him, language is inherently a dialogue. He believes that language should be studied from the point of view of those who actually use language.

According to him, understanding language requires understanding the social situation and understanding speech also requires the intersection of linguistic and non-linguistic / social. The content or meaning of each expression can be obtained at the intersection of these two linguistic and social dimensions.

However, Bakhtin does not neutralize the social situation and considers it synonymous with the ideological situation. That is why it introduces the element of ideology into the discussion of language. In his view, there is no expression or value-free expression. Expression is the center of ideology.

With this description, Bakhtin describes his relationship with the other in a three-dimensional form and says that there are three elements in the relationship between himself and the other. One center, one decentralized and one relation; Or self and other and the relationship between them; The important issue here is the relationship between them. Dialogism, as mentioned, is the science of discovering relationships. The relationship between oneself and the other is established through the structure of time / space, and therefore one can always wait for the discovery of a new meaning by changing the structure of time and space. In addition, being three-dimensional can be mentioned. The relationship between oneself and the other also requires the presence of an observer whose job is to discover a relationship that has been established between oneself and the other (Pourzaki, 2011, p. 42).

It is important to point out here when we come across the very important concept of dialogism in Bakhtin thought; In Bakhtin thinking, we are faced with two distinct types of encounters, one is a dialogue encounter and the other is a monologue encounter. From this perspective, in the realm of politics, monologue confrontation leads to a relationship based on domination. This domination has a hierarchical and vertical essence. In this type of confrontation, one side is thought of as the lower side and the other side as the higher side. The reason for this transcendence and inferiority can be related to the different sources of power that each of

them has. These resources include military, economic power, knowledge, information, age, social status, gender, physical strength, skills and expertise, and the like. This wide range of sources of power will turn politics into a phenomenon that is present in all the wisdom of human actions. This kind of confrontation between oneself and another is an evolving and old-fashioned one that needs to be reconsidered. Bakhtin has introduced another type of confrontation, which he considers more recent and evolved, called dialogue confrontation.

In the form of dialogue, different traditions, textures, and sounds have the chance to have an equal right to be expressed and heard. Their relationship with each other is external, and in this mode of confrontation, decentralization takes place instead of verbal and ideological centralism. Here the "other" is recognized, not as the subject of identification, but as another agent of identification. In fact, in this type of confrontation, a horizontal and two-way relationship is formed between oneself and another. Other consciousness is not within the framework of the author's consciousness, but manifests itself from within the work and is presented in close proximity to the author's consciousness.

In this type of confrontation between ourselves and the other, instead of an oppressive and hierarchical relationship, we are dealing with a kind of equal relationship. The dialogue type of confrontation is very similar to the consultative dialogue type. Here, dialogue takes place with the aim of reaching an understanding. But it should be noted that the Bakhtin dialogue does not necessarily lead to understanding. It can also remain at the level of debate, controversy, conflict, flaw. It is important that the two sides of the confrontation have a separate position and are not pressured to merge into each other (Pourzaki,

2011, p. 74). Thus, Bakhtin's dialogical view of his relationship with the other is reminiscent of the relationship between the two mentioned above in Hannah Arendt's thought; Where the other, always in constant dialogue and outside the domineering circle, can be a creative approach that stimulates thinking and thought through free and level dialogue.

C- Types of confrontation between "self" and "other" in politics

In The Political Thing, Chantal Mouffe describes one of the most important possible relations between the "self" and the "other" in the realm of politics. In the same book, he formulates the types of encounters with the "other" in three aspects: post-political, agonist and antagonistic.

According to Mouffe, post-political confrontation is placed in the liberal paradigm and indirectly considers Habermas's theory; She points out that in this type of confrontation, attempts are made to resolve conflicts through dialogue, leading to "mutual understanding" or even "consensus."

Chantal Mouffe takes this view seriously and considers the post-political relationship to be non-political. A relationship that, even if implemented in the political arena, will lead to serious problems for society. By reading Mouffe's arguments, his arguments can be summarized in the following three areas:

A) The moralization of politics: According to Mouffe, conflict with another, at least in the realm of politics, is unresolved and irreconcilable. Therefore, referring to Habermas, he believes that the ideal of social consensus can be an idealistic and fundamentally dangerous idea (Emran, 2009, p. 2). According to Chantal Mouffe if the principle of conflict is not accepted, then the aim will be to resolve the disputes of the parties in any way.

The principle is to resolve the conflict and reach peace and understanding. Anyone or persons who disrupt this path are considered irrational, unifying, disruptive, evil, immoral, morally ill, or influential and traitorous; Therefore, the issue enters the realm of politics from the realm of politics and the parties are divided into the forces of good and evil.

This means that according to Mouffe, if the standards of ethics in politics are opened, the confrontation between discourse is based on the moral categories of good versus evil instead of being based on political principles (Mouffe, 2012). And this perspective will potentially lead to violence. Whereas in to-day's fragmented, diverse and pluralistic societies it is better to accept these differences; Instead of denying it or trying to resolve and absorb it, he thought of the institutions or arrangements and structures by which these conflicts could take a controlled form. Thus, Mouffe's view is that the "self" becomes one with the "other" instead of modifying its different positions and beliefs; Or it is better to accept the inherent distinctions and conflicts in this realm by forcing another persuasive or imposed one to modify their positions and approach or even identify with them. And instead of trying to create artificial unity between beliefs and religions, the principle of pluralism and difference should be accepted.

B) The ideal of consensus and the undemocratic nature of politics: Mouffe thinks that the post-political approach may seem attractive in the wind. Because the goal of this approach is understanding, conflict resolution, dialogue, peace, unity and non-conflict. But this view has at least two problems in practice:

First, this ideal is impractical and unrealistic. Given the scale and complexity of the modern world, the desire for consensus as expressed by Habermas and his counterparts; It is only suitable for personal and romantic relationships between individuals, or at least in Greek city-states or small, limited forums where long-term, persuasive discussions are possible. And at the same time have the training and political knowledge to be able to think about the public good and public issues and to persuade and be persuaded by reasoning.

At the same time, Habermas's conditions for a non-distorted and ideal dialogue have not yet been met from Mouffe's point of view; Because these conditions are ontologically impossible and hinder dialogue. Conflict is an ontological part of politics. Denial of this ontological element is a sign of a lack of understanding of the nature of politics (Mouffe, 1999, p. 725). In other words, politics finds its identity and meaning in the essence of this conflict, and without such a political conflict, it finds a new identity that is in conflict with its nature and what it is.

The second problem is that even if this ideal is possible, it is not desirable because it can ironically find an imposing direction. Many thinkers before Habermas aspired to consensus, the public will (Jean-Jacques Rousseau), or the general spirit (Hegel). Meditation on Rousseau's thoughts is frightening; Especially where he says that the task of the founder or great legislator of the republic is to change human nature; And make each person a part of a larger whole from which he somehow takes his life and existence (Sandel, 2018, p. 40). According to Mouffe, Habermas's conservative post-political attitude can also lead to undemocratic policies and become pregnant.

C) Elimination of another: If the existence of conflict is denied, then there is not much way left until the idea of elimination of

another. Mouffe argues that a post-political approach that does not recognize conflict in politics ultimately leads to a kind of artificial, or coercive, unification in which the existence of the other and his conflicting interests are denied. According to Buber, it can be said that confrontation with another will be in the form of me-me and us-us; And the other is completely ignored and a delusional "we" or a naive unity is propagated and believed. Contrary to this post-political view, Mouffe proposes another approach called "agonism".

Confrontation of antagonism: According to Chantal Mouffe, antagonism is not a real contradiction between A and B who are independent of each other. There is no antagonism between two cars that collide with each other. Antagonism is different: the presence of another prevents me from being completely myself. Antagonism is a sign that I cannot be completely present for myself. My identity is formed by distinction and opposition to one another (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p. 125). In other words, we are not independent of each other, but the identity of ourselves and the other is interdependent. The logic of Mouffe's theory is that there is always a boundary between those who are "from us" and those who are not.

Since antagonism is indelible and indelible, antagonism should not be considered merely a reality, as liberals such as Rawls or Habermas do, but should be regarded as a value principle. Therefore, antagonism should not be seen as a disorder that we have unfortunately not been able to resolve so far. At the same time, it should not be considered as an empirical barrier that prevents rational consensus. Unlike Habermas, Mouffe argues that antagonism will never go away, and that these factors are not obstacles to consensus; on the contrary, it is consensus itself that is

an impossible concept (Mouffe, 1999, pp. 99-100).

In fact, Mouffe's view is that consultative efforts to deny or resolve antagonism with the help of rational consensus are a real threat to democracy; Because it does not take into account that the goal of politics is always to create a united "us" by defining "them" in the context of a conflict. Based on this ontological assumption about the nature of politics, Mouffe concludes that democratic theory can never be free of conflict; Because it is impossible to overcome us / them.

Thus, in antagonism, there is a turbulent conflict between the two sides, and the political becomes an all-out conflict. As briefly mentioned above, one of those who strongly believed that politics was all about conflict and hostility was Carl Schmidt. The discussion of friend / enemy distinction should be considered as the central signifier and theme of the political matter in Schmidt's intellectual discourse (Nazari, 2015, p. 991).

Mouffe calls this state antagonism, but criticizes it as a traumatic situation. Antagonism, like post-political relations, is moral relations, but here there is no denying that he is but an evil that must be destroyed. This antagonistic relationship is full of monologue and thus unbridled violence. In fact, post-political and antagonistic confrontations start from different points of view, but both end in violence. Finally, by mentioning these two types of post-political and antagonistic encounters, Mouffe reaches from his relationship with the other to the third type, desirable and possible, which he considers as "agonist" encounters.

Agonist encounter: Mouffe's view of agonist theory is more realistic than Habermas's optimistic theory of consultation and post-politics. As a post-Marxist, he sees conflict as the engine of society and cannot be

eliminated. Therefore, the goal in this type of confrontation is not to resolve the conflict. The parties are not necessarily going to reach an agreement in the end. Rather, the goal is to control this conflict and manage it through political and democratic mechanisms. When A and B have no common symbolic space, it is an antagonistic relationship. While in the agonistic relationship A and B have a common symbolic space and want to organize their conflicts in possible ways. Thus, participants engage in a state of interaction, tolerating each other's principles, and can even reach common political agreements and decisions. In this view, conflicts are not denied but are domesticated through legal and political mechanisms. The positive points that Mouffe lists for this type of encounter with another include the following:

A: Acceptance of conflict as a fact in politics: In agony, conflict and opposition in the field of politics cannot be eliminated, and in principle, conflict is the engine of society and a necessity of politics. Instead of denying this principle, it is better to accept it.

B. Democratization of politics: If conflict is part of the nature of politics, and at the same time we want it not to escalate into conflict and violence, then managing and taming it requires mechanisms. These mechanisms put conflicts in a legal and democratic direction. But these agreements are temporary and have been reached with the help of hegemonic power and should always be considered as temporary interruptions in a constant confrontation (Mouffe, 1999, p. 755).

C: Identify the other and his different interests and interests: When there are democratic mechanisms to pursue the various interests and interests of the parties in the political arena, then there is no need to eliminate the other or deny it. Of course, this does not mean that all disputes and disputes are to be

resolved completely or that persuasion or dialogue will necessarily lead to understanding. In agonism, while recognizing the other and his different interests, the differences of interests between the parties may be so fundamental that the conflict between them is permanent and unresolved.

Conclusion

The relation of self and other in the course of the history of philosophy, although in general usage, goes back to the modern era and more to the postmodern situation; However, its signs can also be seen in the ancient tradition of philosophy in the West. Plato in his Sufi treatise, and especially by choosing the genre of "dialogue" for his treatises; He was the first philosopher to design a view of the world from a different perspective, and then Aristotle, by emphasizing the concept of "friendship," elevated the importance of another or dogma in Nicomachean ethics.

Thus, the relationship between oneself and the other in later periods became a serious field for thinking; Because the idea is basically a communication statistic, even if it is a connection between me and myself. However, it is obvious that the "relationship" that was established between the two aspects of the equation was not something that would create a consensus among thinkers in this field. Hence, some of them considered the "other" as paradise and others as their hell. What is clear is that one cannot live without the "other." I have no meaning without the other; But my situation has a fundamental relation with another view.

If someone else sees me as an enemy, misguided and deviant from the values he believes in, he may become a threat to me. But if the other sees me and the other as an ontological necessity for my life to which I owe a responsibility, and that I am an extension of

the other, then the other can be, as Gabriel Marcel puts it, my paradise. Therefore, in this research, an attempt was made to study this ratio from the perspective of different thinkers with a longitudinal and historical study.

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