

Elite Political Culture and Political Development of Iran in the Iranian-Islamic Model of Progress

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(Received: December 5, 2021 - Accepted: January 20, 2022)

Abstract

The Islamic and Iranian model of progress is an indigenous document based on the Iranian-Islamic fundamentals and values of society, which follows the fulfilling the final step of the modern civilisation of Islamic Iran in the future. The basis of this model is a systematic view of the development and provision of mechanisms for active-voluntary participation and competition of social groups in the general sphere of society. Therefore, the attitude of the governing political elite is critical. The present study aimed to answer the question 'How can the political culture of the ruling elites lead to the fulfilling political development in the Iranian-Islamic model of progress?' The hypothesis is that the political culture of the governing group is the source of political action and behaviour in society. Therefore, reforming and improving the attitude of the ruling political elites towards political development within the framework of political and jurisprudential capacities in the religious discourse and the Islamic Revolution provides the ground for fulfilling political development in Iran as a model.

Keywords: Political Culture, Ruling Elites, Islamic-Iranian Model of Progress, Islamic Revolution Discourse.

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Introduction

Development in today's world is very vital. Political progress among the development branches in the modern era has special conditions regarding its role and position in society. Although political development has entered the discussion of growth in the last half-century, especially in the Western world, its elements and components were the ideals and public aspirations of nations and the agenda of democratic governments. Its elements are freedom, legalism, the existence and possibility of the activity of civil institutions, pluralism, stability, competition and political participation (Nazari and Eivazi, 2017 AD/1396 SH: 10). However, Western progress models are often instructive and valuable for Western countries. Their use and application for other countries, including Iran, as the only appropriate model of progress and development, is not rational. Most Western models have faced obstacles and limitations regarding being non-indigenous and not paying proper attention to the issues and problems of our society. Hence, experts and ideators have proposed various approaches to modernisation and development.

We assume that the political culture of the governing group will be the source of political action and behaviour in society. Iran has the discourse capacity to achieve progress based on Iranian culture in the 20-year perspective and upstream documents (Iranian-Islamic model of progress or cultural engineering plan). Therefore, it should pay to the governing elites' political culture to accurately describe people's behaviour in a developing way. Iranian culture combines Iranian, Islamic, liberal and socialistic culture (Haghighat, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 301). When we consider the prevailing political culture, we must also consider these dimensions of culture. Compared to popular political culture, the attitude and knowledge type of the elites play an essential role in advancing or weakening the elements of development.

When we talk about the political culture of a society, we regard the political system as recognitions, feelings and evaluating its members in their minds and souls. Every country depends on the role of its elites, especially the political elites. Their thoughts and ideas influence political and social programs and how fulfilling people's demands determinatively (Abedi Ardakani, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 135). The present study aimed to offer techniques, with collecting data, to improve the country's political development process. The main question is 'How can the political culture of the ruling elites lead to the fulfilling political development in the Iranian-Islamic model of progress?'. The authors claim that the political culture of political elites is the source of political action and behaviour in society. Therefore, the quality of attitudes and mental ideas of this type of elites to political development in the framework of governing capacities

in the religious discourse and the Islamic Revolution will create ground for fulfilling the political development of Islamic Iran in the future. To explain the above hypothesis, the present paper is divided into several sections. The first part discussed the discussion background of the works of domestic and foreign writers. Then the conceptual framework of elites and political development is examined. Then, it mentioned the Iranian Islamic model of progress and the position of political action and its elements in this model. In the next part of the article, the function of political elites in political development will be evaluated. Finally, it discussed the pathology and requirements of political action in the Iranian Islamic progress model.

1. Research Background

Iran's political development has undergone significant changes over the past century, including:

- The rise of the constitution in 1906-1911;
- The period of absolute rule and hidden modernisation under Reza Shah and Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi;
- The brief period of parliamentary democracy under Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh;
- The Islamic Revolution in 1979 with different approaches to fundamentalism, pragmatism, reformism, justice-based fundamentalism and the moderation discourse.

Iranian society and politics had significant changes often imposed from above each period. These changes, along with Iran's geo-economic and geo-strategic position, which has been the motivating factor for the great powers, have affected Iran's political development. Many scientific works on the history of Iran as an ancient country and civilisation are available. Many of them are not dedicated to Iran's political development; instead, they proposed political action in their discussions. The following sources are the most authoritative and most cited works related to the political history of Iran. The Cambridge History Collection of Iran (Avery et al., 1968 AD:91), with the Frye works (1984) and Amanat (2018), provide a very general overview of Persian culture and politics over two and a half years of history. Amir Arjmand (1984) has dealt with this issue in detail. Nikk Keddie has reviewed the complex links between religion and politics in Iran by reviewing modern political developments in Iran. He evaluates the roots of the Islamic Revolution to the complex history of the 19th and 20th centuries in Iran. Finally, Roy Parviz Mottahedeh (1985) states some of the dynamics and contradictions in modern Iranian society through the complex links between religion, tradition, and politics in post-revolutionary Iran. In addition, there are many sources on political developments in the country. The most comprehensive, authoritative and well-known source is the Iranica

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Encyclopedia, which contains entries on all aspects of Iran's political, cultural and social life. A review of domestic and foreign sources on Iran's political development shows that the elite debate has received less attention from these sources. Here, we attempt to analyse the role of political elites in political action in Iran and its application in the Islamic-Iranian model of progress.

2. Conceptual Framework: Elites and Political Development

The concept of political elite was introduced in the early twentieth century by Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto. Mosca called the ruling group the "Political Class," while Pareto called it the "Ruling Class" and distinguished it from the "non-Ruling Elites." Mosca goes into detail:

"The first class, always in smaller numbers, performs all political functions, monopolises power and use its advantages. At the same time, the second class is more extensive and controlled by the first class in a way that is now more or less legal and arbitrary and violent. The first class is essential by providing material means for the livelihood and vitality of political systems." (Mosca, 1939 AD: 50)

The concept of "First Class" is a group that impose power over the masses. This class has such control due to the balance of political forces in society. Thus the balance of political parties determines the nature of its ruling class (Mosca, 1939 AD: 65). Regarding the verdict class concept of Mosca, Pareto proposed the idea of a "Circulation of Elites." Therefore, he implicitly acknowledges the existence of at least one elite or other potential elite in society.

Suppose an elite A controls the society, and another elite is B trying to replace it. Then, C represents the rest of the people, including displaced people, people without energy, low intelligence, etc. These groups only matter if they are led by A or B (Meisel, 1965 AD: 12-13).

According to these considerations, the criterion of being elite of political elites has three areas:

- 1) Having public fame;
- 2) Having a special place in decision-making;
- 3) Having official positions in political and administrative organisations (Khajeh Sarvy, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 191-192).

The political elites here means the ruling elite. That is, famous people and officials in political and administrative institutions who are directly and indirectly involved in the decision-making and policy-making of the country.

1.1. Political Culture

Political culture is the orientation of individuals in society towards politics and, to some extent, patterns of political behaviour. The system

of religious attitudes and beliefs, expressive symbols, social values, mental perception of history and politics, fundamental values, how to represent feelings, knowledge and political reflections that are the product of the specific historical experience of nations and groups and the framework of feedback and behaviour where the political system is, include in the relatively broad concept of political culture (Bashirieh, 1991 AD/1370 SH: 9). The political culture here refers to political elites' attitudes, values, and perceptions on various issues, including government and development.

1.2. Political Development

To understand the meaning of a term, we must begin with its literal meaning. The Oxford Dictionary defines politics as "the State Science and Art" and political as "Relating to the State or Body of Citizens, the State and its Politics, Especially in Civil and Secular Affairs or to this science." Development is "Coming Out of Secret Capabilities (anything)" or "Gradual Progress through Gradual Stages." (Oxford English Dictionary, 1971 AD: 228-707) Accordingly, political development has related to gradual progress through government, government, and political action. Political development is the transformation of the governing structures, systems, and institutions of a society to meet the perceived needs and influence the goals of that society. Organski defines political development as "Increasing the state efficiency in using the human and material resources of the country for national purposes." (Organski, 1965 AD: 7) However, this definition implicitly assumes the existence of a nation-state as a precondition for political development. He defines the first stage of the political development levels as "The policy of primitive unity that participates in nations' birth and childhood." In addition, according to him, the changes must take place before the formal creation of a nation-state, which is, in other words, an integral part of political development. However, such a position is inconsistent with his definition of political development.

Other authors define political development as the ability of political elites to handle demands through political institutions (La Palombara, 1974 AD: 48-49). Or political development refers to certain conditions, such as "The acquisition of conscious political capacity from a defined political system, or patterns of participation and equal distribution of resources." (Coleman, 1965 AD: 15)

Regarding such definitions, political development means greater participation and equality. These terms are Western concepts and are not necessarily the target of selectness who are themselves in the process of change. Political elites may be involved in addressing demands through changing political institutions, or they may be confronted with orders arising from egalitarian and participatory motives. But in all these cases,

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the signs and consequences of political development do not define any concept.

1.3. The Relationship between Elites and Political Development

Political culture and development theories say that political action transfers the values and feelings that hold people together in traditional societies and political structures to developed values and emotions and increases the ability to organise grassroots associations and manage complex systems. The power of leaders and community members, which depends on individuals' cultural and psychological characteristics, is involved. In political systems, there are at least two types of political culture: the political culture of the elite and the political culture of the masses. In political systems, there are at least two types of political culture: the political culture of the nobility and the political culture of the groups. The culture of political elites deals with the privileges, feelings, and patterns of behaviour of those who influence political employment and have a significant impact on system outputs. Mass political culture is shaped regarding the attitudes and tendencies of the people (for example, as a whole) towards politics, which do not significantly affect the system's outputs (Pai et al., 2001 AD). Thus, political culture is the sum of the interactions between the four elements of mass culture, elite culture, the historical and political experience of the nation, and the prevailing political structure. According to Nafisi (2000), the perception of elites and masses of political reality, the behaviour of leaders, the performance of institutions, the beliefs of political leaders and nobility, the modernisation and development of industrial societies, the status of independent groups and the implementation of mass media in shaping and establishing the political culture have a critical role. Various sources have influenced Iranian political culture.

On the one hand, there are historical, geographical, demographic and economic conditions, and on the other, religions and beliefs, family education. Iranian public culture is rooted in Iranian history, continued by an authoritarian political system. Each of these sources has impacted the development and maintaining such a subordinate and limited political culture in Iranian society.

The social situation of Iran plays a vital role in shaping the identity, power structure and political system of Iranians. One of the sources is all the competitive beliefs and different behaviours of Iranians derived from this country's geographical and historical conditions. From this perspective, Iranian society, which has been on the path of history and civilisation, has people with positive and negative aspects of personality. On the one hand, Iranians have an open and flexible view of the new

situation. Therefore, the country is more compatible with other cultures in the face of cultural transformation.

The development of Iranian society regarding the political culture of the Iranian elites in different historical periods has shown the decisive and influential role of political elites in this process. Historically, the development process in Iran started from the Qajar period, especially from the constitutional movement onwards. During the Qajar period, the development process accelerated with the initiative of constitutionalist intellectuals and court reformers. In particular, during this period, Amir Kabir's actions played an essential role in introducing modern manifestations into society. Amir Kabir's reformist efforts remained unfinished following the malice of rivals and those around him, the short-sightedness of the rulers and political leaders of the time, and the assassination of Amir Kabir by his ill-wishers. During the Pahlavi regime, Reza Shah and Mohammad Reza Shah tried to modernise the Iranian society using comprehensive procedures. After the Revolution, government officials sought to develop Iranian culture.

2. Islamic-Iranian Model of Progress

In 1385, Ayatollah Khamenei proposed designing and codifying the Iranian-Islamic progress model. Regarding this necessity, the Iranian-Islamic Model of Progress Center was established in 1390, whose task is to formulate the desired horizon of the country in the next five decades. After seven years, communicated in 1397, a document of the Iranian-Islamic model of progress to Iran's institutions and country's agencies becomes the origin of the "Modern Islamic-Iranian Civilization."

This document, which outlines the "Most important principles and ideals of development and the desired horizon of the country in the next five decades," is to be implemented from the beginning of the fifteenth century AH (the year 1400). All policy-makings, documents and visions, even the twenty-year and ten-year visions that will be compiled in the future, should be based on this model. According to the Supreme Leader, the "Historical, geographical, cultural, climatic and political geographical conditions" of Iran influenced the formation of this model. "Iranian thinkers" have prepared this model, but the ends, goals, values, and work methods are derived from Islam teachings (Khamenei, Sayyid Ali, 89/9/10).

The basic assumptions of this idea are that the current models of development can not answer society's needs and aspirations. Second, Islam has the intellectual capacity to support and provide a model of progress. Then, Iran's scientific and strategic capabilities can take a step in designing and developing the Iranian-Islamic model of progress as its primary and even vital necessity (Zoo Elm, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 6). This

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model is an upstream document and a unit for all planning documents, vision and policy-makings of the country. The Iranian-Islamic model of progress seeks to provide a suitable pattern for the development of Iranian society regarding the historical and geographical, cultural and social conditions and relying on Islamic concepts and teachings, national values and strategies. This pattern, like other models, has principles and requirements that are different from other models in terms of structure and purpose. However, there is no denying the similarities between this pattern and other patterns. The intellectual and philosophical system of the Iranian-Islamic model of progress has an exceptional epistemological and ontological basis. These principles analyse the relationship between man, society, individual, and government. The need for political, social, cultural and economic development in this model is influenced by basic concepts such as justice, independence, welfare, national dignity, cooperation, freedom and government. The Islamic content of this model is based on monotheism, resurrection, inseparability of this world and the hereafter. Progress in this model revolves around religion. In other words, achieving progress and development in a specific sense is the same as performing a good life and spiritual pleasures (Ghafouri, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 206).

3. Elements of Political Development in the Iranian-Islamic Model of Progress

The Iranian-Islamic model of progress, like other models, has characteristics that are mainly derived from its ontological and anthropological foundations. Although these elements may overlap with the features of other models, the philosophical foundations and, consequently, the reading of development is different from the Islamic model. In the following, we explain the essential features of the political product in the Iranian-Islamic model of progress.

3.1. Political Participation

In the Iranian-Islamic model, political participation is through Iranian-Islamic identity and the link between religion and government. Regarding the religious foundations of Islam and jurisprudential sources such as the Qur'an and the words of the Imams (AS), we can find the fields of participation, council and collective will and cooperation in the political, social and cultural areas. These categories are formulated and used to achieve political development in the Iranian-Islamic model (Kalantari et al., 2011 AD/1390 SH: 91-92). In addition, there are principles in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic that relate to the issue of participation in the political, social and cultural spheres (principles three, six, twenty, twenty-three, twenty-six and fifty-six). In general, and

according to the religious principles and the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, the essential foundations of political participation in this model are Islamic vision, legal regulations and laws, elections and political parties.

3.2. Religious Democracy

Religious democracy means the administration and control of society in the political area by the people's representatives, per religious values. This concept has central law, proper orientation, satisfaction, and central value components. In religious democracy, the government's legitimacy is in its religious acceptance, and then the people's happiness is meaningful in the form of law and its scope. In this model, the operation of the government requires the support of the people (Akhavan Kazemi, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 137). Religious democracy in the Iranian-Islamic progress model is based on a religious rule system with both divine and human dimensions. This system analyses the relationship between the government and the people by considering Islamic principles (Nabavi, 2002 AD/1391 SH: 506). Accordingly, the Iranian-Islamic model must be based on the conditions and necessities of religious democracy.

3.3. Freedom

From the Islamic perspective, the index of freedom has a fundamental role in forming and continuing Islamic progress. The concept of freedom has its limits in Islam, and freedom has no place in its absolute and unbridled meaning. Islam has rights and laws in which freedom finds its subject and purpose as a political and social system. In Islam, freedom is valuable when it does not conflict with divine rights and limits. With conflict, freedom is invalidated because God has the right to legislative guardianship. Man has the right to freedom and authority within the framework of the rules and limits, and he should not go beyond that. Hence, the right to human freedom is limited and assigned by the divine right. Imam Khomeini says in this regard: "Freedom is within the limits of Islam, is within the limits of law and according to the Sharia, the nation is free, and man was created free by nature and should not follow others. On the other hand, humans should serve the Creator who gave them life and avoid the slavery of other than God. Freedom in the worship of God is worthy of Him".

4. The Position of Political Elites in the Political Development of the Islamic Republic of Iran

In post-revolutionary Iran, the elites' commitment to Islam and the Islamic Revolution was one of the essential preconditions for development fulfilment. The main goal of political development in Islam is to achieve happiness and nearness to God, earning through materials. From Imam's view, the ultimate goal of political action is creating

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suitable conditions for human ascension and providing an environment of humanisation and closeness to God and the path of God (Khomeini, 2004 AD/1383 SH: 33 and 34). Regarding the differences in the ultimate goal of political development in the Western and Islamic perspectives, the position of elites in society is different. For example, legitimacy is one of the most critical indicators of political development, which has different definitions in the Islamic-Iranian and Western models.

The issue of legitimacy in Islam is the "Religious Justification for Imposing Ruling Power." That is, 'By what religious authority does the ruler have the right to impose power?'. That is, legitimacy means the capacity of the political system to create and maintain the belief in the principle that 'The political institutions in society are valid or not?'. Indeed, the legitimacy meaning in the term political science and the term religious meaning in the sense of religious rule is different. Legitimacy in political science is more in line with equations such as acceptability and legality than legitimacy. In Islam, the inherent source of legitimacy is God alone. Because the Creator of the world, man and the owner of the whole universe is the only independent, influential and governing (wise) the world power and the Lord of the universe and man. In Islam, government and political sovereignty, which control creatures' affairs, are considered matters of lordship. The basis of the government legitimacy in religious thought is different from the legitimacy in secular view, in that secular thought pays more attention to public acceptance. According to Imam Khomeini, Islam has established a government that has not an authoritarian manner in which the individual's desires are imposed on society, nor in the way of a constitutional or republican government established based on human rights and obliged the imposition of group votes of people on the community. Instead, he found a government inspired by divine law in every field. In this government, none of the governors has the right to rely on their vote in an authoritarian manner. Instead, everything related to government, even the people's obedience to rulers, must inevitably follow divine law. Of course, in the Muslim community's practicality, the ruler can decide on matters with all members. Their decision is not a tyranny of votes but expediency. Therefore, his vote and decision, like his work, will be subject to the interests of society (Nazari and Eivazi, 2017 AD/1396 SH: 21). Although it does not derive its direct legitimacy from the people, a religious system is obliged to ensure the maximum good and salvation of the people. One of the appropriate mechanisms embedded in the spiritual government is the direct and continuous communication between the government and the people. Such communication should not be merely superficial and formal. Still, contact should receive information from the government

and the people to know the government. General indicators of political development are political participation, religious democracy, equality and freedom. These characteristics are consistent with the Iranian-Islamic identity and local conditions and factors and are based on Sharia and national values. In Islam, political participation is one of the characteristics of an advanced Islamic society, which can be shown in the pattern of Islamic progress in the vision, structure and behaviour. The view of the Islamic school on political freedom is different from other schools of law. Islamic law has rights and rulings prescribed by revelation and explained by the prophets. In this system, to prevent tyranny and self-centeredness, important moral and sensual traits are necessary conditions for the religious leader and government officials, provided for the Prophet and the Imam through infallibility and justice and righteousness for others. The individuality of the elites in the Islamic system has no value in itself. What puts rulers on the path of progress is to move on the divine path and serve the people. Indeed, the political elites in Islamic society are the mediators of leading others to spiritual progress and material prosperity.

5. Lack of Political Development and Pathology of the Political Culture of the Ruling Elites

Regarding Iran's history, the ruling political culture on the political elites of Iran, after the Qajar period, has mainly been nationalistic and contentious. It means that many problems and obstacles to political development are derived from political elites' anti-development personality and culture, not their expertise and knowledge (Shahramnia and Eskandari, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 92). In the political culture of Iran's elites, politics is often seen as a hostile occupation, and the continuation of conflict and non-compromise is considered the best way to secure the interests of each side. Simultaneously, in the political culture of the Iranian elites, any dispute that caused negating principles governing politics is considered distasteful. The political elites believe that politics is an arena for the negation of another rather than an arena for cooperation (Bashirieh, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 31).

In examining the process of political development in Iran, we have encountered a kind of lack of institutionalisation of political action. After Constitutional time, modern concepts such as freedom, law, and participation entered the country's political arena. Some issues, such as adopting the constitution and establishing a parliamentary system, stabilised political development. However, political action has faced a steep path regarding institutionalising these concepts and teachings in the elite political culture.

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Iran's political culture throughout history indicates that there is not enough trust between individuals in society and consequently organisations and institutions. In such circumstances, roles in the social and political system are assigned based on kinship and ethnicity. The individual and the citizen are alone with the government and political institutions. It means that intermediary institutions and organisations that protect their rights and interests in the face of power and the power tools do not exist or are not permanent. Individual independence is not valid, and collective conscience limits the circle of individual conscience (Sari al-Qalam, 2016 AD/1397 SH: 115). Various factors affect creating such a culture. Many believe that Iranian political culture in general and elites, in particular, are the product of Iran's transitional conditions. Mahmoud Sari al-Qalam believes that the set of Iranian political attitudes, values, and behaviours is rooted in the tribal culture of Iran. In this regard, he says, the accumulated Iranian political culture is based on distrust, ambiguity in expression, irregularity, automatic behaviours, excessive emotions, harmful individualism, aversion to reality and the method of elimination and destruction in resolving disputes. These are serious and fundamental obstacles to collective rationale competition, especially in politics. Despite the change of political systems and the different class bases in these political systems from Safavid onwards, the accumulated Iranian political culture has maintained its incompatibility with the fixed rules and principles of development. This culture is rooted in the tribes and 'clans culture. The essential features have been kinship, the spirit of war and militancy, and the maintenance and expansion of the tribe through invasion and looting (Sari al-Qalam, 2016 AD/1397 SH: 7-8 and 56-58).

Alireza Gholi also considers the problem of underdevelopment in Iran regarding the continuation of traditional or tribal culture. In this regard, he points out many negative features such as "Criticism," "Rule of Mysterious Forces," "Closed Economy," "Immutability of Social Systems, Mental Texture of Magic Temperament," "Religion Inherent in Tribal Culture," "Lack of Change and Violence and Absolute Power and Hostility" are due to traditional Iranian culture (Reza Gholi, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 72). But in the meantime, Hossein Bashiriyeh believes that the political culture or ideology of contemporary Iranian political elites has been mostly a continuation of the old patrimonialism (patriarchal) political culture (Bashiriyeh, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 30).

Simultaneously with the Islamic Revolution, a new phase of political development and its components such as freedom, participation and legitimacy began. At the beginning of the Revolution, the people became acquainted with the true meaning of popular rule or democracy. Still,

with the outbreak of the imposed war, political development faced various obstacles, and indicators such as people's participation in politics became difficult. After the war, different governments had different approaches to political action. For example, in Hashemi Rafsanjani's government, technocratic managers designed a strategy of economic development at home and expediency abroad under the title of "Construction Agents." Thus, the policies pursued by the political elites of the Hashemi government led to a change in some of the attitudes and values, which were mainly secular and material (Ghorbadzadeh, 2002 AD/1381 SH: 132) and wealth was considered valuable. Thus, the political culture of the political elites was not appropriate with the capacity of the political system to answer the various demands and accept the opposition and tolerance of the opponent. The result was creating a closed atmosphere and reaction at any time (Abedi Ardakani, 153 and 154).

After the reform government, the new middle classes, mainly comprised of intellectual, scientific, and cultural forces and managers, lawyers, and technocrats, emerged within the power bloc (Bashiriyeh, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 103).

In such an atmosphere, efforts were made to change the political culture in political development. Signs of political action are the quantitative and qualitative increase of affiliations and parties, efforts to institutionalise the political system and oversee the implementation of the constitution and the transparency of covert political rivalries (Bashiriyeh, 2003 AD/1382 SH:188).

However, regarding the rule and continuity of the same political culture of the previous period over the political elites and the country's particular political and cultural situation, tensions and political and social conflicts arose in the society. During this period, the political community was increasingly faced with a lack of consensus among reformist and fundamentalist political elites and political conflicts. As a result, under Khatami's government, the slogan of reform became a challenging element and a factor in the unhealthy competition of the valley within the political elite (Keshavarz, 1996 AD/ 1375 SH: 8).

After the reform government, political development came under such concepts as social justice and slogans such as the fight against poverty, corruption, discrimination, inequality and the return to Islam. In such an atmosphere, the new political elites criticised the policies of the constructive and reformist governments and spoke of the "Islamic State" and the establishment of "Justice." In fact, in the conservative government, we witnessed the approach of the political and cultural atmosphere of the country to the era of idealism in the early days of the Revolution (Abedi Ardakani, 2015 AD/1394 SH: 160-161).

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The conservative state is the manifestation of populism. Groups of the lower classes of society were able to gain more or less political power and government and, as a result, formed the political elite of the period. Under these circumstances, the elites were quickly exposed to the mass's influence, and the groups of the people were easily accessible to the nobility (Kournhauser, 1959 AD: 22).

Later in the Rouhani era, the election of the majority of cabinet members from among those with security and military backgrounds indicated that the new government was willing to make politics in Iran security and military. The existence of an intolerant culture in political discourse can not resolve issues and problems, cause tensions, and create political unrest within society. Therefore, in this government, regarding the characteristics of the ruling 'elites political culture, even more than previous governments, there is an obstacle to the creation, growth, sustainability and stabilisation of the components of political development.

6. Requirements for Political Development in the Islamic-Iranian Model of Progress

An overview of the political development process in Iran, especially in post-revolutionary Iran, clearly shows that the Islamic Republic of Iran has not seen a growing trend in political development over the past few decades. All post-revolutionary governments have pursued their policies in political action. In other words, political progress has not continued a stable process and an efficient and unified model during these years. According to the elected governments' tendencies, political development has been accompanied by ups and downs.

The unknown and ambiguous trend of political development in the country is more than anything else derived from the lack of a political development model. According to the author, presenting a progress model based on domestic and indigenous capacities while improving the country's political development process can prevent the ambiguity of the policies governing development. The presentation and communication of the 20-year vision document of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the horizon of 1404 SH can be assessed based on this approach, which aims to provide a model of indigenous Islamic-Iranian development. However, the realisation of such a model depends on the fulfilment of the following requirements:

- Regarding the value nature of the Islamic Republic, the model proposed in the form of the "Islamic-Iranian Model of Progress", unlike other models of development in the Western world, can not be based on purely material values. Instead, beyond the temporal dimensions and approaches to progress, it includes techniques that provide human status

in the evolutionary path from the perspective of Islam. This model focuses on the "Justice Fulfilment" and "Material and Spiritual Development" of human society, which planners and decision-makers of Islamic-Iranian development should consider. In this view, the political development of communities reflects the development of human resources. Progress aims to strengthen the fundamental values, the balanced growth of material and spiritual needs, and in general, the pursuit of political, economic and cultural development based on religious matters;

- It is required to have a codified and defined national program to preserve the elite people and exploit these national assets considering the influence of the societies elites in the development and progress of the necessary societies;
- The most crucial principle and requirement of development are to reach a consensus at the elite level. Growth is not possible unless there is a method and quality between the elites, the coalition and the harmony. There are two essential groups in society: Powerman, thinkers and expertise. If there is an opinion unity and consensus between these two, the internal core of the community will be rich. Thus, society has demanded responsibility and efficiency from its best (Sari al-Qalam, 2003 AD/1382 SH: 80);
- The intelligent system of the Iranian Islamic model of progress and from the religious mechanisms embedded in the law should give the accountability of the elites to the people priority. To reform the political culture by establishing a connection between the masses and the nobilities. According to Imams Sirah, no one is an exception to this rule, and everyone should be present reasonably;
- In the Iranian-Islamic model of progress, there must be a deep connection between all aspects of development to achieve balanced growth and active political participation among members of society;
- In the context of the Iranian-Islamic model of progress, the law implementation by the elites should be based on correctness and trust.

Conclusion

In Iran, the political culture of political elites and their performance, which arises from this type of political culture, has not created the necessary structures for political development in society. In some cases, if there were a structure that could bring us closer to political progress, we would have tried to destroy it. However, to create development or change or solve a crisis or disease in a political system, we must pay attention to both the hardware and software dimensions. Political culture is the software aspect of political development and the underlying layer

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of a political system. Political progress first occurs in this mental political system or political culture. In other words, political culture is the crystallisation of the political system present in the minds of that society; then, we see its objective realisation in institutions and, ultimately, in the political and social system. Although political culture is always interrelated with the political structure, the two have a lasting effect. But historical experience and scientific theories have taught us that the transformation of the political culture valley is a prelude; otherwise, the emergence of social change and behavioural revolutions is not justified.

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