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¹ Professor of Philosophy,
Tarbiat Modares University,
Tehran, Iran
E-mail: saeedi@modares.ac.ir

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The Compensation Theodicy: A Brief Examination of the Shiite Approach to the Problem of Suffering

Mohammad Saeedimehr¹ 

Abstract: Throughout the history of philosophy and theology, diverse versions of the problem of evil have raised different solutions in the form of different theodicies. In this paper, I first offer an exposition of one of these solutions developed by Shiite theologians. Since the core notion of this solution is “God’s compensation for the sufferings” I call it the “compensation theodicy.” Based on some theological principles such as rational goodness and badness and the principle of lutf (God’s grace), and some preliminary remarks about pain and its classifications, the compensation theodicy shows that since God is totally wise and just, He compensates for all undeserved (both human’s and animal’s) sufferings He is responsible for. Thus, the presence of undeserved suffering is not at odds with Divine justice. After explaining the relevant issue of God’s litigation (intisaf) and discussing some main aspects of compensation, I then make a brief comparison between the compensation theodicy and the so-called afterlife theodicy. I finally argue that the compensation theodicy is cable of providing good response to the challenge of the lack of moral justification.

Keywords: Problem of Evil; Undeserved Suffering; Compensation Theodicy; God’s Compensation; Afterlife Theodicy; Moral Justification; Shiite Theology.

Introduction

Philosophers and theologians have dealt with different dimensions of the so-called “problem of evil”. The difference between these dimensions is so serious and essential that it seems quite reasonable to consider this problem not as a single one but as a cluster of problems and talk about the “*problems of evil*.” One of these problems relates to the consistency of Divine justice and the existence

of evil. The main question here is whether the existence of evils is compatible with God’s being absolutely just. This question seems to be very popular to the extent that it is usually asked by the majority (if not all) of those people who believe in Divine justice.

Those Muslim theologians (*al-mutikallimun*) who believe in God’s justice in an independent moral framework have been

usually interested in this problem and tried to develop a mature and comprehensive response to it. Their theory seeks to show that the existence of evils never disproves God's justice. Since the notion of Divine compensation (*'Iwadh*) plays a vital role in their solution as a kind of theodicy¹, we can call it "the compensation theodicy". In what follows, I first explore briefly two theological principles, namely 'the principle of rational goodness/rightness and badness/wrongness' (*al-Husn wa al-Qubh al-aqliyan*) and 'the principle of *Lutf*' (Divine Grace or favor) as the most significant theoretical foundations of the compensation theodicy. Then I will explicate this theodicy in a somehow more detailed fashion.

Two Principles

In the history of Islamic Theology, the Mu'tazilite and the Shi'ite have been known as *'Adliyah* (the proponents of Divine justice). Both of these schools accommodate the belief in God's Justice among their principal tenets. This does not mean that the third party, namely the *Asha'rites*, notoriously reject the principle of Divine Justice; the essential difference stems from interpretation. The so-called *'Adliyah*' take God's justice as one of the

aspects of Divine wisdom. For them, one of the meanings of a 'wise' (*hakim*) person is one who does not commit (morally) bad doings and does not refrain from any (moral) obligation. Since one of the most obvious instances of a morally bad action is the performance of an unjust action, a wise agent in the above sense must be a just one. According to this view, the belief in God's wisdom (*hikmah*) entails the belief in His justice. Yet God's justice, on this view, should be understood in a way consistent with the acceptance of a criterion for distinguishing right actions from wrong ones, which is independent of divinity. On the opposite side, the *Asha'rites*' attitude is to reject any independent frameworks of moral values like justice to the extent that whatever God actually does becomes to be just. According to this view, for instance, it is quite possible for God to punish pious people in the hereafter and if this possibility becomes actual, the punishment will be totally just.

The *'Adliyah*'s interpretation of God's justice manifests itself in several theological issues including the principle of rational goodness/rightness and badness/wrongness (*al-Husn wa al-Qubh al-aqliyan*) (hereafter: PRGB) as a principle of the epistemology of ethical values.² According to PRGB, the human

¹In contemporary literature on the problem of evil the solutions are usually divided into theodicy and defense. There are several interpretations of the difference between theodicy and defense. According to one view, a theodicy tells us why God (actually) permits evil while a defense tells us what God's reason for permitting evil might possibly be. (see: Plantinga, 1974: 28)

²PRGB should not be identified with a similar principle known as "intrinsic/essential goodness and badness" according to which at least some of the volitional actions are essentially (in themselves) or intrinsically good/right

or bad/wrong. Again, here we can refer to justice and cruelty as essentially good and bad respectively. This means that in no possible situation a just action could become wrong and a cruel action could become right. There are some actions, to be sure, that essentially and in themselves are neither right nor wrong. Rather, they are morally neutral. The specific instances of this kind of actions can remain morally neutral or become morally good or bad in terms of some external situations. It is worth noting that in some texts these two principles are taken as one or at least are not clearly distinguished. For instance, explaining the *Mu'tazilite*'s view on God's

(practical) reason is essentially capable of recognizing the moral value, i.e. the moral goodness/rightness and badness/wrongness of *at least some*³ volitional actions. The paradigms of these actions are justice and injustice-- the human reason clearly considers them as morally good and morally bad respectively.⁴

It should be pointed out that the '*Adliyah*' usually apply PRGB not only to human (volitional) actions but also to God's actions. It means that, according to PRGB, our reason first recognizes independently of Divine commands that some actions are morally good and others are morally bad and then, considering that God is *Hakim* and an absolutely good agent, it requires that He ought to do good actions and refrain doing bad actions. Interpreted in this broad fashion, PRGB possesses a very high and significant status in several parts of their theology including issues such as God's actions, the prophethood⁵ and the resurrection.

justice, Majid Fakhry writes: "Moreover, reason stipulates that God cannot be an evil-doer and that in holding out the promise of reward and the threat of punishment, God graciously recognizes human-kind's ability to discriminate between right and wrong, through the natural light of reason, even prior to the 'advent of revelation' (*sam*). In support of this thesis, the *Mu'tazilah* held that right and wrong were intrinsic qualities of human actions which were intuitively known to be either commendable or reprehensible, praiseworthy or blameworthy." (Fakhry, 2000: 16) The main difference is that the former is an epistemological principle about the capacity of the practical reason to discern the moral values while the second proposes something about the nature of the volitional actions and its relation to the moral values.

³It is worth noting that the adherents of this principle typically do not claim that the value of *all* volitional

The second principle which can be seen as a rational result of PRGB is the principle of *Lutf* (Divine Grace or Kindness). The theological concept of *lutf* can be best understood in the light of apprehending the notion of *taklif*. Roughly speaking, *Taklif*, as a theological term, means that God, who is the *mukallif*, informs His servant i.e. the *mukallaf*, about the nature of his religious duties such as performing the obligatory (*wajib*) acts and refraining from the prohibited (*haram*) acts.⁶ Now, what is *lutf* and what is its relation to *taklif*?

Lutf ... is that thing through which the *mukallaf*, by drawing closer to obedience and refraining from disobedience, attains *al-Thawab*. There is no place for *lutf* in enablement (*al-tamkin*), nor does it reach a degree of compulsion. The explanation of this point is that *lutf* is not an instrument by which a person is enabled to achieve a purpose, since if there were a share for an instrument in the enablement of a purpose, then it would not be *lutf*. At the same time, it cannot reach a degree of compulsion,

actions are accessible to the human reason. Accordingly, they believe that the goodness and badness of many actions which are obligatory or forbidden in the Islamic law (al-Shariah) are originally unknown by human beings.

⁴For a discussion on PRGB and its rational grounds see: (Al-Hilli, 1417: 417-420)

⁵The Shi'ite theologians commonly maintain that assigning some people as Divine prophets to convey Divine revelation to the human societies is a morally good action and thus our reason requires that God must do this. This requirement is usually used as a ground for the necessity of the prophethood (*Dharurat al-Bi'thah*)

⁶For a more technical definition of '*taklif*' (see: Al-Suyuri, 1405: 271-2; Al-Hilli, 1415: 379-386). For a modern and comprehensive exposition of the status of *taklif* and *lutf* in the Imamate's theology (see: Sachedina, 1981: 112-130).

because compulsion nullifies *taklif*. This is known as *al-lutf al-muqarrib*, meaning the *lutf* that “causes a person to draw nearer” to obedience. There also exists *al-lutf al-muhassil*, which cause the *mukallaf* to perform the act of obedience without compulsion.... [T]he imamites contend that it is incumbent upon God to bestow *lutf*, because if God knows that the *mukallaf* will not obey except by means of *lutf*, and if He imposes *taklif* without it, then the purpose of creation would be invalidated. The situation resembles someone who has invited a person for a meal, when he knows that the person will not accept the invitation unless some kind of courteousness is demonstrated, and still does not do so; then he has certainly invalidated his purpose in inviting him. *Taklif*, in other words, resembles legislation, while *lutf* guarantees the execution of the law. (Sachedina, 1981: 121-122)

In sum, the principle of *lutf* says that, as far as our reason is able to judge, it is *necessary* that God bestows *lutf* to His servants. The rational ground of this necessity is that refraining from giving or making *lutf* would invalidate His purpose of creating the man (since this purpose is but guiding the man through his real happiness which is not accessible except by acting in accordance to religious duties and Divine *taklif*). Invalidating one’s own purpose, however, contradicts one’s being wise. Thus, if God is to be wise, He ought to bestow *lutf* to His servants.

Bearing these two principles in mind, we will be able to explore the compensation theory as has been introduced by the Shiite theologians. Since they usually start with a

discussion of pain and its classifications, let’s first have a look at this issue.

Pain and Suffering as Evil

According to a well-known categorization in the contemporary western philosophy of religion, evils are divided into two main kinds: *moral* evils and *natural* evils. Roughly speaking, the former kind, unlike the latter, stems from the will of a free agent (like a human being) (see. Hick, 1966: 12; Plantinga, 1974: 8). Thus, evils like murder are supposed to be moral evils while natural phenomena such as earthquakes and floods are seen as natural evils. Some add a third kind of evil as *emotional* evil which seems to be nothing but the very pain and suffering of sensible beings including the animals. Similar distinctions have been made by the Muslim philosophers. For example, Avicenna distinguished between four kinds of evil:

1. Immoral actions and wrongdoings.
2. Principles of these actions in the agent's dispositions.
3. Pains and distresses.
4. The lack of an expected perfection. (Avicenna, 2005: 343).

A brief survey will show that in the most classifications (if not all) pain and suffering (whether physical or mental) are treated as a specific kind of evils. According to our judgment based on the common sense, the evilness of pain and suffering seems to be beyond any doubt. Moreover, we may reasonably argue that at least from a popular point of view pains are the most important kind of evils and most cases (if not all) of other kinds of evils are seen as evil because they more or less result in pain and suffering. For

example, one may claim that a certain flood cannot be evaluated as evil if it doesn't amount to any loss of life and property and therefore never cause any physical or mental pain.

At any rate, the Shiite theologians usually neither try to define evil (in its broad sense) nor engage in the issue of classification. Instead, they exclusively deal with the phenomenon of pain (*alam*) and try to show that it is not at odds with Divine justice. Perhaps this is (at least partly) due to the fact that they support, though rather implicitly, the equation of evil with pain. It seems that for them all other alleged evils can be reduced to the category of pain.⁷ Thus, we may be justified to conclude that their proposed theodicy is "pain centered". In what follows, referring to some eminent Shiite theologians' views, I will try to present an analytic outline of what may be called "compensation theodicy."

Classification of Pain

At the first stage, Shiite theologians divide pains into two main kinds: *good* pain (*al-alam al-hasan*) and *bad* or *ugly* pain (*al-alam al-qabih*). The second kind includes several types. One type is the purposeless and futile pain such as the pain one has to endure because one is employed to carry some water from the sea and then bring it back to the sea! Another type is the pain brought about in an unjust manner like that caused by an undeserved punishment. Moreover, some pains are bad because they amount to a very unpleasant result. One example for this type is the pain of a dictator

which motivates him to increase his unfair and immoral deeds (Al-Suyuri, 1405: 279).

Good pains too can be divided into several types. The *deserved* pain like the pain of a fair punishment undoubtedly is regarded as good pain. Also, the pains which bring about a greater good (like a patient's suffering of taking bitter medicine which leads to his or her health) or prevent a greater evil (like the pain of surgery) are seen as good pains (Al-Suyuri, 1405: 280).

Bad pains (in the above sense) can be produced only by God's creatures for, according to PRGB, it is impossible for God to be the agent of bad deeds. Good pains, however, can be made by God as well as by His creatures. Furthermore, human practical reason judges that any agent who causes an *undeserved* pain has the moral responsibility to give proper compensation. If a person deliberately causes a bad pain for someone else, he is clearly responsible for preparing the compensation. As was mentioned above some of the good pains are those which are deserved. It is obvious that our reason never obligates anyone (whether God or one of His creatures) to compensate for one's deserved suffering. A murderer never deserves any reward or compensation for his being punished. However, the case for undeserved suffering is quite different. When God is the agent of undeserved suffering, he ought to pay the compensation to the sufferer. This should be true of the human agents too; if one causes undeserved pain in another person one is

⁷Pain, as opposite to pleasure, is usually defined as one's apprehension of something that is agreeable with one's nature (See: Al-Hilli, 1417: 357).

reasonably responsible for repairing it (Al-Suyuri, 1405: 280)

According to the above classification, one kind of good pain embraces undeserved suffering brought about by God. Now one may wonder how undeserved suffering could be seen as a good pain. According to the Shiite theologians, this kind of pain which is sometimes called “initial pain” (*al-alam al-mubtada*) could be good only when two conditions are satisfied: first, it should be compensated by God so that the sufferer eventually (i.e., after receiving the compensation) becomes totally satisfied⁸ and second, it must be subject of Divine Grace (*lutf*) in the sense already explained. The fulfillment of the first condition makes this pain just and the second prevents its being pointless and absurd. Here we can find a mutual relation between the goodness of an undeserved pain and its being fairly rewarded by God (Al-Suyuri, 1405: 281).

Clarification of “Compensation”

After making some primary classifications of pain and suffering, Shiite theologians usually move on to provide an accurate definition of “compensation.” According to a well-known definition compensation is a *deserved* benefit which is given not by the way of *appreciation* (Alamulhuda, 1411: 239; al-Hilli, 1417: 453). The word “deserved” excludes undeserved benevolence (which is called “*tafadhu*”) and the qualification “given not by the way of appreciation” brings recompense or spiritual reward (*thawaab*) out of the definition. That the sufferer deserves a benefit seems quite clear. The second qualification, however, needs

a bit more clarification. *Thawab*, in its theological sense, is a deserved benefit which is given by God to man in response to his or her obedience and is accompanied with appreciation (see: al-Tusi, 1406: 108; al-Suyuri, 1380: 433). The idea here seems to be that in the case of *thawab*, since the man *voluntarily* chooses to obey God in his religious commands he or she deserves (more than Divine benefit) to be appreciated and honoured by God while in the case of compensation the sufferer typically does not initially choose to suffer.

It is obvious from the previous issues that whenever a human being is responsible for one’s undeserved suffering our reason obligates him/her to pay the compensation and in other cases of unmerited suffering this is God who compensate for it. Here Shiite theologians usually refer to a significant difference between these two kinds of compensations. A human compensation (namely that which is paid by a man) needs not to outweigh the relevant suffering but should be equal to it. The reason is that requiring a greater or smaller amount of compensation seems not to be fair to the compensator and the sufferer respectively. However, this is not the case about Divine compensation. Regarding His exalted attributes, our reason judges that He ought to pay a greater amount of reward so that (as I mentioned before) leads to the sufferer’s complete satisfaction in the sense that *if* the sufferer initially had two options; namely not to undertake the pain and to suffer it with acquiring the compensation, he would prefer the second option without the slightest hesitation.

⁸Later I shall discuss this condition a bit more.

The fascinating point here is that Shiite theologians are ready to consider the pains of animals as something which ought to be compensated for by God provided that our reason finds God responsible for them. For example, when God commands the believers to slaughter some animals in a certain religious ritual then He should compensate for the pain of slaughtering. One of the more controversial cases, however, is that an animal brings about someone's suffering. Some Shiite theologians argue that in this case, God should compensate for the suffering because He is responsible for creating the animal with the power and the instinct to attack a man and cause a painful injury. However, there are other views as well. Some theologians think that in such cases the compensation should be taken from the animal and still a third group say that nobody (neither God nor that animal) is responsible for paying any reward to the wounded person. (see: Al-Hilli, 1415: 394)

Divine Litigation

Up to this point we may conclude that given that God compensates for all sufferings and pains He is responsible for, the existence of these evils cannot challenge the doctrine of Divine justice. However, an important problem still remains. This problem is related to the cases that someone other than God is morally responsible to pay the compensation but he actually refrains from performing his moral task. Does such a situation encompass justice in respect to the poor victim? Apparently not but how can we remedy this problem?

In order to solve this problem, the Shiite theologians appeal to the principle of Divine litigation (*intisaf*). According to this principle,

since God is morally responsible for providing the cruel agent with all facilities needed for performing the unjust action, God should litigate in behalf of the oppressed person. The course of litigation here is undoubtedly different from what happens in our daily life. Because of His omnipotence, God directly takes an equal amount of the benefits of the cruel man and transfers it to the oppressed person. (al-Soyuri, 1405, 285) This can simply occur when the benefits of the cruel man are sufficient for such a transfer. But is it possible that this balance does not take place? According to some theologians, the answer is negative. In this view, God does permit a man to do a specific cruel action only when he actually possesses enough benefits to be transferred to the oppressed person as the compensation. (Ibid., 285-286)

Some Features of Compensation

Besides explaining the nature of compensation, Shi'ite theologians usually discuss some characteristics of it, knowledge of them helps us to gain a more comprehensive picture of their idea of compensation theodicy. Let's take a brief look at some of these characteristics:

1. Must the Divine compensation be continual and permanent? Some Muslim theologians argue that the Divine compensation must be permanent in the sense that it must continue all over the life of the oppressed person and even during the afterlife. Others do not endorse this view. They argue that (as mentioned before) all that our reason requires is that the amount of God's compensation should be so enormous that the receiver becomes totally satisfied. It seems clear that at least

in some cases this condition can be met with temporary compensation. So, our reason does not take permanency as a necessary condition of God's compensation (Al-Hilli, 1417: 458-459).

2. Is the person who deserves compensation authorized to waive his right to receive that compensation or to transfer his right to another person as a gift? Also, here there is no consensus of opinions among the theologians. Some maintain that the victim who deserves compensation is not permitted to waive or transfer his compensation in all cases in which God or another person has the duty to pay it. Some theologians, however, think that the victim has the legal and moral right to waive his right of gaining compensation (Ibid., 459).
3. It is not necessary for the compensation to be limited to certain types of benefits. The reason is that, as it was already mentioned; all that is reasonably necessary is that the victim becomes totally content when he receives compensation. So, there is no prior restriction on the kind of benefits bestowed as compensation (Ibid).
4. It is also not necessary that the sufferer becomes informed of receiving compensation. It should be noted that compensation differs from *thawab* in this respect for the latter, in contrary to the former, contains a form of appreciation and the idea is that in order to be really appreciated, one need to be aware of it (Ibid).

Up till now, I tried to give an exposition of what I called the compensation theodicy. In the rest of the paper, I shall compare this theodicy with a similar one, the afterlife theodicy proposed by some western philosophers.

Compensation Theodicy versus Afterlife Theodicy

As far as I know, a theodicy based on the principle of God's compensation has not been taken so seriously in the history of western philosophy and Christian theology. Aquinas suggested a version of compensation theodicy which is based on the idea that God will compensate for human sufferings in the afterlife. Relying on Aquinas's discussion in his commentary on Job, Eleonore Stump states the significance of the afterlife in his Theodicy in this way:

Aquinas's idea, then, is that things that happen to a person in this life can be justified only by reference to her or his state in the afterlife.... Because Aquinas has always in mind the thought that the days of our lives here are short while the afterlife is unending, he naturally supposes that things having to do with the afterlife are more important than the things having to do with this life (Stump, 2008: 51).

Stump then recognizes that the mere other-worldly compensation does not provide a justification for God's allowing evil in this world unless the evil in question produces a benefit for the sufferer so that God could not provide it without the suffering. However, she believes that Aquinas himself was aware of this constraint and thus thought "that (at least for creatures with minds) suffering is justified only in case it is a means to good for the sufferer herself" (Ibid., 52) Moreover, according to Stump, Aquinas apparently believed that we can and, in some cases, actually do know these justifying goods which have at least a natural, if not a necessary, connection with evils in question. His own examples are patience

brought about by affliction, humility brought about by the experience of sin and repentance (Ibid).

In sum, Aquinas, according to Stump's construal of his view, believes that, in order to be justified, God's permission of suffering in this world ought to be connected, either naturally or necessarily, to some goods for the sufferer. Thus, Aquinas's "afterlife theodicy" seemingly has two main components: First, God's compensation for the worldly sufferings in the afterlife and, second, the presence of some goods of the sufferer that are either natural or necessary outcomes of the suffering.

To be sure, dealing with this version of the afterlife theodicy in detail would be beyond the scope of this paper. I shall just refer briefly to some points.

One overt difference between the compensation theodicy presented by the Shiite theologians and the afterlife theodicy is this: the former sees that whenever possible God may recompense in this world for the sufferings of the sufferers while the latter restricts God's compensation to the afterlife. I contend that this restriction is not necessary regarding the variety of compensations in respect to both quality and quantity. If at least some cases of undeserved pains and sufferings could be compensated for by God during the worldly life, then what would be God's reason, if any, to postpone the compensation to the afterlife?

Moreover, it is not obvious in Stump interpretation of the afterlife theodicy that the justifying good is nothing but God's compensation or it is something besides His compensation. Regarding Aquinas's examples of the justifying goods namely the sufferer's patience and humility (as necessary results of

his or her suffering) these must be different things for according to the afterlife theodicy the involved Divine compensation will be paid in the hereafter while patience and humility assumingly are to be actualised before death. If so, however, one may wonder whether the requirement of adding the justifying goods to this theodicy makes it a complex of the compensation theodicy and the so-called "greater good theodicy" and whether we cannot provide any versions of the former totally independent of the latter. And if the compensation is the same as the justifying good, then what does it mean to say that mere compensation is not enough for justifying the suffering.

The Challenge of Moral Justification

The afterlife theodicy, just like other theodicies, has faced some objections. One of the main objections is that this theodicy conflates compensation and justification. Stephen Maitzen recently claimed that God's mere compensation of the sufferer, say, in a blissful afterlife, cannot justify God's permission of suffering unless the suffering bears a necessary connection to the good that compensates for it. "Without such a connection, the good may *compensate* for the suffering but can't *morally justify* God's permission of it" (Maitzen, 2009: 110).

Maitzen is clear enough about the fact that in order to provide a satisfying moral justification for God's permission of suffering, the afterlife theodicy must show that the compensation which is the same as the good in question has in fact a *necessary* connection to the suffering itself. We may put his idea in the form of the following principle:

God's permission of undeserved suffering is morally justified if and only if the involved suffering is necessarily connected with the compensation (the good or benefit for the sufferer) so that it is impossible for God to actualize the good without permitting the suffering.⁹

I contend that the above principle is not correct and the necessary connection is not a necessary condition for moral justification. As we saw in the outline of the compensation theodicy developed by the Shiite theologians, God's compensation must be, and actually is, so valuable that provides total satisfaction of the sufferer. Provided the existence of such a complete satisfaction due to a great benefit that outweighs the relevant suffering there seems no need to something additional as a "necessary connection." So, one may claim that according to our ordinary moral judgments the sufferer's final satisfaction suffices for meeting the requirement of moral justification for in this case in fact the sufferer has not been *overall* harmed.

One may still be reluctant to accept that the final and overall satisfaction of the sufferer due to God's compensation is sufficient for making the involved suffering morally justified. In response to this worry, we may add an additional consideration. As we remember that in order to be a good one, an undeserved pain must satisfy two conditions; the second is to include God's *lutf*. Fulfillment of this condition, besides the first one, may seem to be

enough for moral justification for the presence of *lutf* provides a good rational, as well as moral, *reason* for God's permission of undeserved suffering.

Conclusion

The compensation theodicy, developed by the Shiite theologians, addresses that version of the problem of evil which claims that the presence of evils in this world is inconsistent with Divine justice. God is *hakim* and Just in the sense that performs morally wrong actions including injustice. Since the compensation theodicy deals exclusively (among different types of evil) with pain and suffering, the problem it faces is that why and how an absolutely just god permits undeserved sufferings of humans and animals. The response of the compensation theodicy is that for every undeserved suffering for which God is responsible two conditions should be, and actually are, fulfilled. First, God bestows the sufferer a compensation (either in this world or in the hereafter) which far outweighs the suffering to the extent that brings about the overall satisfaction of the sufferer. Second, the suffering involves a case of Divine *lutf*. Fulfillment of these two conditions implies that God's permission of the undeserved suffering is morally justified.

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⁹Stump states a similar conditional as a constraint some contemporary philosophers insist on: "if a good God allows evil, it can only be because the evil in question produces a benefit for the sufferer and one that God

could not provide without the suffering." (Stump, 2008, 51) She believes, however, that Aquinas's view satisfies this condition.

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تئودیسه عوض: بررسی رویکرد متکلمان شیعه به مسئله رنج

محمد سعیدی مهر^۱ 

چکیده: در طول تاریخ فلسفه و الهیات، تقریرهای مختلف مسئله شر راه حل های مختلفی را در قالب تئودیسه های گوناگون پدید آورده است. در این مقاله، ابتدا شرحی از یکی از راه حل ها که از سوی متکلمان شیعه پرورانه شده می دهیم. از آنجاکه مفهوم محوری در این راه حل «عوض (جبران) خداوند در برابر رنج» است این راه حل را «تئودیسه عوض» می نامیم. بر پایه برخی اصول کلامی همچون اصل حسن و قبح عقلی و اصل لطف و نیز برخی نکات مقدماتی در باب درد و طبقه بندی آن، تئودیسه عوض نشان می دهد که چون خداوند حکیم مطلق و عادل مطلق است تمام رنج های غیر مستحق (چه در انسان ها و چه در حیوانات) را که در قبال آنها مسئول است جبران می کند. بنابراین، تحقق رنج غیر مستحق با عدل الهی ناسازگار نیست. پس از تشریح مبحث انتصاف الهی و بحث از ویژگی های اصلی جبران (عوض) مقایسه ای کوتاه بین تئودیسه عوض و تئودیسه آخرتی خواهیم کرد. در نهایت احتجاج خواهیم کرد که تئودیسه عوض می تواند پاسخ معقولی به چالش فقدان توجیه اخلاقی بدهد.

واژه های کلیدی: مسئله شر، درد غیر مستحق، تئودیسه عوض، تئودیسه آخرتی، توجیه اخلاقی، کلام شیعه



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^۱ استاد فلسفه، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران

E-mail: saeedi@modares.ac.ir

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