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Gnostics consider the world and multiple being as mentally-positedness, their impression of mentally-positedness is Gnostic one. By mentally-positedness they do not mean illusion and unreal, but they mean apart from the manifestation of God nothing will appear (Āshtīyānī, 2003, p. 237). Mullah Sadrā denies real existence of possible beings, rather than their shadowy existence which are tantamount to the rays of real being. As a result, those who are unaware of mystical terms think that they consider multiple being as mentally-positedness and possible being as illusion and unreal.

Concluding that in his final view Mullah Sadrā considers the existing differences as the difference in the loci of manifestations and theophanies rather than the difference in the very being. Being is only one but its theophanies are many. He considers the Necessity by itself as the real in which case possibilities are a mode of his modes and its effect is nothing other than "change of maker in his modes and that is nothing other than descent in his acts" (Sadrā, 1984, p. 179). Effect is the lower level of the cause, but this difference does not exist in the levels of being but in its manifestations and shadows. Therefore, in Mullah Sadrā's view both unity and multiplicity are real, yet unity in being and multiplicity in the loci of manifestations of being.

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the copulative being in a way to pave the ground for clarifying the Gnostic doctrine of the oneness of being. Hence, he is forced to go beyond the doctrine of the possibility by indigence and copulative existence, for "according to the mystics, not only it has nothing to do with quiddative possibility of the peripatetic and illuminationist philosophies, but also there is no reference to the Transcendent Theosophy concept of possibility by indigence, since possibility by indigence is identical with copula of copulative existence and whatever lack any share of existence, though like relation to a pure independence possesses no philosophical possibility by indigence, but possibility by indigence in gnosis is meant a pure appearance and only sign that shares nothing from being." (ibid, 1993, pp. 52-53). As it was said, effect has no essence other than dependence and neediness. Now if we wish to consider an essence for effect we can say that it is like a mirror, that is, it only represents and indicates a cause. Here the opposition between indigence and richness is like the opposition of negation and affirmation rather than the opposition of privation and faculty or habit. For indigence has nothing to do with richness. Therefore, being is restricted to the reality of the individual unity, and such reality has no partner, and since such partner is other than him, so its existence is impossible. So, anything other than Necessary Being has no existence. In this case, effect will be descended from the level of being to the level of the manifestation of being. This is the same view of the Gnostics (Sadrā, 1990, vol. 2, p. 292). In this approach, other than God, namely, the world is like a shadow, and the relation of God with the world is like the relation of the possessor of shadow with shadow or like the possessor of an image on the mirror with the image on the mirror. As the shadow in comparison to the possession of a shadow has no independent identity, the world too is as such. Other than God or the world is the locus of the manifestation of the divine attributes.

Now a question may arise as does Mullah Sadrā deny any multiplicity? If the reply is in positive, then how does he justify the existence of multiplicity in the world? The answer is that he denies the existence of multiplicity in being. For the existence of multiplicity in being contradicts the Gnostic's doctrine of the oneness of being. "While individual oneness of being does not deny any kind of multiplicity, but excludes only the multiplicity of being both differential multiplicity and gradational multiplicity, otherwise the very multiplicity which is the locus of being, that is, the appearance rather than being, is proved and never consider it as mirage." (Javādī Āmolī, 1993, p. 37). Hence, though

at an individual unity, for there is no room for any kind of multiplicity in individual unity. The gradational multiplicity suffers from the same criticism that different multiplicity of existence suffers. While, there is no room for multiplicity in gnosis. According to gnosis, the Exalted Necessary is the only being and nothing else. Hence, Mullah Sadrā says that whatever was stated in the beginning about causation was not precise enough, and so it should be treated on the basis of gnostical approach (Sadrā, 1990, vol. 2, pp. 300-301). In fact, he put forwards the theory of gradation as preliminary steps and is of the view that it is not at odd with his final view of the unity of existence and existent which is the same Gnostic's view (ibid, vol. 1, p. 71).

In order to cast more light on Mullah Sadrā's final view of causation it is necessary to refer to the division of being into copulative and non-copulative being. According to Mullah Sadrā's philosophical principles, any being other than the Necessary Being is copula. A copulative being is a dependent being. In Mullah Sadrā's view, cause is a non-copulative (i.e. independent) being while, effect is a copulative being. When it is said that a being is copulative, it means effect is a being which pertains to a cause. Of course, copula or relation is in two kinds: categorical relation and illuminationist relation. The former is subordinated to two sides that is, without the two sides it cannot be realized, while illuminationist relation is one sided and need not two sides. It is very important to understand the copulative meaning of effect. When it is said that effect is a copulative being it does not mean that effect is an essence that possess copula, but its existence is identical with its relation to cause. So, there are no two things as an essence and an attribute of a relation. The existence and identity of an effect is nothing other than relation. If effect is essentially something other than relation, then it cannot be essentially depended on a cause, while, dependence on cause is merely a necessary quality of effect. The relation between cause and effect is tantamount to the relation of richness and poverty by indigence. The essence of effect is the same as indigence and neediness, while cause is essentially identical with richness and needlessness. Accordingly, causation is the same as the essence of cause and effecteness is the same as the essence of effect (Javādī Āmolī, 1997, vol. 2, p. 596). This, indeed, indicates the existence of possibility by indigence or existential poverty verses the essential possibility.

So far, Mullah Sadrā still is in the stage of the gradation of being. As already have been said, there is different between gradations and pure unity of being. In the course of his discussion, Mullah Sadrā interprets

the main principles of the Gnostics is that of the individual unity of being. Individual unity of being is Ibn Arabī's peculiar mystical approach towards the oneness of being. At times, he refers to this reality as a reality beyond the intellect to the effect that only heart is able to comprehend it (Ibn Arabī, vol. 1, p. 289). By delving into the issue of causation and attenuating it into theophany and mode (*Tashaun*) Mullah Sadrā tries to clarify this important gnostical principle and whatever a Gnostic perceives through his heart can express it in rational way.

In dealing with the issue of causation Mullah Sadrā bypasses any kind of multiplicity in order to attain unity. Therefore, he fails to clarify causation with reference to quiddity and quiddative possibility, for, quiddities are identical with multiplicities and it is not possible to attain unity through multiplicity. Moreover, the proof of the principiality of existence will rule out the way for granting any kind of reality to quiddity. Hence he makes attempt to deal with the issue of cause and effect on the basis of the principiality of existence. Mullah Sadrā, however, like the Prepatetics cannot believe in the multiplicity and difference in existents, for on the basis of the principle of gradational being, the differences will be gradational. Therefore, Mullah Sadrā treats the issue of cause and effect on the basis of the levels of being. In this way, the difference between cause and effect is considered to be a gradational difference. Though cause and effect are two things in reality, they are, at the same time, a single reality, that is, the strong level of the single reality is cause and its weak level is effect. Cause and effect are nothing other than existence. They are common, and enjoy unity in existence, and at the same time are different and possess multiplicity in existence.

That cause which enjoys an existential perfection on the basis of which it is distinguished from the effect is nothing other than an existential matter. Thus the difference between cause and effect is rooted in their existential strength and weakness. Indeed, the effect is the descended and weak level of the existence of the cause. So far Mullah Sadrā has not proceeded to treat the issue of causation in a gnostical way. Here an objection may be arisen, that is, so far as cause and effect are considered to be as two levels of being or as a gradational mater, then it means existence can be attributed to other than cause, namely effect. Still the division of being into cause and effect is considered to be valid. While, according to the gnosis doctrine of the oneness of being, existence or being cannot be attributed to other than cause. Mullah Sadrā tries to transcend from such multiplicity and arrive at a pure unity. Therefore, he is compelled to transcend the gradational unity and arrive

God as a real cause and rest of beings, i.e. possible beings as effect. In his view, the criterion of the dependence of things on a cause is nothing other than the imperfectness of beings (Sadrā, 1990, vol. 1, p. 206). By imperfectness in beings means the same existential poverty or possibility by indigence. But with reference to the views of the Gnostics and under the influence of Ibn Arabī's gnosis, he bypasses the view and does not consider it fit for the elites.

IV. More precise glance at causation

We have hitherto referred to Mullah Sadrā's idea of causation. As we had said earlier here he speaks about causation to some extent like that of his predecessors but at the end of the issue of cause and effect he put forward his own views. By delving into the meaning of cause and effect we will find that it is not necessary to refer to most of the issues that were referred to in the beginning of this paper. Even most of them are not fit with his final view and some of the rules and principles in the final analysis of causation emerge in a new form. In many cases, he followed up his discussion of causation with reference to quiddity and its equality with existence and nonexistence, while with believing in the principiality of existence and mentally-positedness of quiddity there will be no room for discussing about quiddity. Though Mullah Sadrā and his follower referred to the issue of causation with reference to the quiddative possibility, this might be so due to the difficulty in understanding of causation on the basis of the Transcendent Theosophy. Indeed, the analysis of causation on the basis of the quiddative possibility prepares the mind for understanding causation. In his *al-Shawāhid al-rūbūbiyah*, Mullah Sadrā began his discussion with the division of being into cause and effect (Sadrā, 1981, p. 68), while, in his final view there is only one being which is identical with cause. Mullah Sadrā presents his final view about causation after the twenty fifth chapter of the 2nd volume of *al-Asfār* wherein he asserts that he succeeded to bring philosophy into its culmination and is of the view that God helped him in treading on this path (Sadrā, 1990, vol. 2, p. 292). In his glosses on *al-Asfār*, Sabzevārī considers this section as the best section of the book (ibid, p. 286). In this section, Mullah Sadrā was inclined towards gnosis, and by returning causation to mode (*Tashaun*) he tries to clarify a gnostical postulate, that is, individual unity of being. In his Transcendent Theosophy, he tries to present in the form of concepts and in a demonstrative way what the Gnostics find in an intuitive way. One of

existence is a dependent existence and identical with relation to the Necessary. The identity of this existence is the identity of dependence and connection, like the meaning of a letter that lack conceptual independence and are meaningless without sides (Sabzevārī, 1992, vol. 2, p. 242).

One of the important problems that is related to the issue of causation and Mullah Sadrā used a new expression for it on the basis of his philosophical foundations, is the issue of making (*ja'l*). In *al-Asfār* a separate section have been devoted to this issue and viewed it as one of the general problems of being. But in his *al-Shawāhīd al-rūbūbīyah* Mullah Sadrā subsumed this subject under the issue of causation. Hence, some of his commentators like Sabzevārī consider it as one of the general issues of being, while some others like Tabātabā'ī holds that it is related to causation. As a matter of fact, the issue of making is related to causation; and indeed, the issue of making is the issue of cause – effect relation. The issue of making is discussed about what a cause can give to effect. Whether making as causation is related to existence or quiddity or to becoming, in other words coming into being of quiddity? With reference to Mullah Sadrā's philosophical foundations it will be cleared that maker and made is nothing other than existence, and making is also related to existence. It is to be noted that making (*ja'l*) is of two kinds: simple and compound. By delving into the meaning of causation, it will be cleared that making (*ja'l*) cannot be compound, for compound making is possible only when there are two things one of which is occurring (*ārīz*) and the other occurred (*ma'rūz*), while relation of effect to cause is like the existence of copula. It dose not mean that effect is an entity and has a relation with cause but its all existence is identical with copula and dependence on the cause, that is, effect is identical with connection and dependence.

On the basis of the over-mentioned principles Mullah Sadrā proceeded to deal with the issue of causation. First he tries to explain the principle of causation with reference to the nature of effect and that quiddity is indifferent to existence and non-existence. Since the nature of effect does not require existence so, there should be something to prefer one of them and bring it into existence. What the nature of an effect requires is the same cause. But by believing in the principiality of existence and mentally-positedness of quiddity there is no room for quiddity and its dependence on cause. According to principiality of existence both causation and effectness belong to existence. As a result, with reference to the division of being into cause and effect, Mullah Sadrā considered

not familiar with Mullah Sadrā's method may ascribe all these views to him and consequently find some contradiction in his views, whereas the truth is something else. In a sense, it can be said that he is the best critic of his own views.

Since Mullah Sadrā was a philosopher with a gnostic disposition, he used to interpret the philosophical issues finally on the basis of gnostic principles and present gnostic issues by philosophical methods. He applied the same method in dealing with the issue of causation. I will try in this section, to indicate to the usual and common issue of causation and then in the next section, I will proceed to treat Mullah Sadrā's own view in this regard. For better treatment of Mullah Sadrā's ideas concerning the issue of causation, it is necessary to point to some of his fundamental ideas.

One of his basic ideas pertains to his belief in the principiality of existence. According to Mullah Sadrā, human mind abstracts two aspects from an external objects namely, existence and quiddity. The external world is the extension of existence, while quiddity has no extension in the outside; as a result, it is mental-positedness. Therefore, existence is the source of effects rather than quiddity. The other important doctrine of Mullah Sadrā is that of the gradational unity of being. In his view, the existence of reality is not more than one, but this reality is in such a way that it is not in contradiction with multiplicity. The reality of being is like light which starts from the weakest level and continues to the strongest level, but the various levels of light does not impede its unity. In a similar way, being or existence is a unified reality that ranges from the weakest level, that is, first matter to the strongest, that is, God. Existence constitutes the common and different points of all these levels, for according to the doctrine of the principiality of existence, nothing exist beyond existence to be the source of difference and multiplicity. In this system, the characteristics of each level of existence constitutes the same level, in a way when an existence is placed in a level, the existence of each level is not perceivable in early and later level (Sadrā, 1990, vol. 1, p. 36). One of the Mullah Sadrā's innovative ideas is that of the possibility by indigence. As against the quiddative possibility of the earlier philosophers he used the existential possibility or possibility by indigence. Existence is divided into two parts: Necessary and possible. The Necessary Existence or Being is identical with needlessness while possible existence is identical with poverty and neediness. The possible existence is not poor, for in a poor thing essence and poverty are two things. A possible being is identical with poverty. Therefore, a possible

perception. This part is quite true, and Islamic philosophers have indicated to this point too. For instance, Avicenna argues that there is no causation between bodies; a body can affect another body when it has a certain physical position toward that body, while in a real causation, position is completely irrelevant (Ibn Sīnā, 1996, vol. 3, p. 237). Sense-perception only deals with bodies and finds nothing other than sequence of this and that bodies. There is nothing in sense-perception indicating that one of two bodies is cause and the other one is effect (Ibn Sīnā, 1984, p. 8). Hume's erro is that he holds that since it is not possible to perceive cause and effect through experience, there is no other way for recognizing causal relations, and in this way, he denies the causation. Therefore, our disagreement with Hume is not about the first part of his view, that is, it is not possible to attain causation through experience, but it is about the second part of his view, namely, since it is not possible to attain causation through experience, there is no other way to do so. Kant also disagrees with Hume regarding this point.

III. The early interpretation of causation

In his various works, particularly in his most important work *al-Asfār al-arba'ah*, Mullah Sadrā dealt with the issue of causation. He devoted a major portion of the second volume of this book to the issue of causation. The term cause has two senses: particular and general. According to the former, the cause is something that from existence of which existence of some other thingand from non-existence of which non-existence of the other thing is obtained. So, there is an existential necessary relation between these two things. While, in the case of the latter, cause is something that on which some other thing depends in a way that non-existence of the cause leads to the non-existence of the effect, but existence of the cause dose not lead necessarily to the existence of the effect. The former case is considered as cause and effect relation in its real sense, and considering the latter case as cause is a kind of equivocation. The cause in the second sense is divided into perfect cause and imperfect cause. The imperfect cause also is dividable into formal, material, final, and efficient causes (Sadrā, 1990, vol. 2, p. 127). In his other works, Mullah Sadrā points to these two meanings of causation too (ibid, 1981, p. 68).

Mullah Sadrā's method in dealing with different issues is as following. He used to discuss the issues with refering to the views of his predecessors and then he put forward his own views. So, those who are

II. Two points

Before proceeding with dealing with the issue of causation in the Transcendent Theosophy, it is necessary to indicate to following points:

1. Considering the kind of discussion among the Muslim philosophers and theologians concerning the issue of causation and comparing them with those of the Modern Western philosophers such as Hume and Kant, we can find out that Muslim philosopher's approach towards the principle of causation was an ontological approach, while the Western philosophers like Hume and Kant pursued an epistemological approach. Muslim philosophers had assumed that causation is an ontological and objective relation, while Hume and Kant denied such objective relation in the case of causation. By denying causation as an ontological relation, Hume tried to find the origin of concepts of cause and effect and causal necessity. On the basis of his empirical perspective, he considers the necessity of causation as rooted in the association of ideas and the origin of the concept of cause and effect in sequence and succession. In order to universalize and necessitate these concepts, Kant places them within his categories as mental concepts. Muslim philosophers had different approaches towards the mentioned concepts. Except certain contemporary philosophers such as Tabātabā'ī (1981, vol. 2, ch. 5), no one sought to find out the origin and the way of acquiring such concepts.

2. If we wish to carry out a comparative study of this issue in Hume's thoughts and Islamic philosophy, we should first discern the locus of dispute. That is, first we should make clear that whether Hume refutes something that Muslim philosophers' proves or the subject of dispute is quite different. It, sometimes, happens that a great deal of disputes take place due to the heedlessness towards the point of dispute. Principally, since Hume is an empiricist, he tries to reduce all concepts to sense-perception and finally concludes that the necessary relation between cause and effect is inadmissible. In his view, it is possible only to find out contiguity, succession, and conjunction through sense-perception, and we cannot infer the logical necessity of cause and effect. One of the main and plain objections to Hume's idea is that he reduces all concepts to sense-perception, while there are many concepts which are not justifiable through sense-perception. If we agree with Hume's idea then we should concede that we cannot give a general statement about the cause-effect necessary relation. Hume's idea is that it is not possible to reach the law of causation and cause-effect necessary relation through sense-

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1. Introduction

Sadruddin Muhammad Shirazi known as Mullah Sadrā or Sadr al-Muteallehīn (979-1050 AH/1571–1640 AD) is one of the great philosophers of Islam world. He is also the founder of a great deal of philosophical principles. His philosophical research is known as the "Transcendent Theosophy" in the light of which he succeeded to introduce new approaches about many philosophical issues such as the principle of causation. This article is an attempt to explain the principle of causation on the basis of the Transcendent Theosophy.

One of the important issues or perhaps, the most important philosophical issue is the problem of causation. It is very difficult to find a philosopher in the history of philosophy who has not treated this principle. That is, it is impossible to know the world without having a proper conception of the problem of causation. An imperfect understanding about the issue of causation may lead to the suspension of the intellection. Any kind of discussion, speaking, experience, or any human act is based on some kind of understanding of causation and acceptance of its reality. Accordingly, a great deal of Muslim philosophers considers causation as an evident matter, which means that it is impossible to deny such principle. Concerning those who tried to challenge and questioned such necessary principle - a principle that in Mullah Sadrā's view, is rooted in children's souls and is inherent in beast's nature - Mullah Sadrā said that their words are not enough worthwhile to spoil one's life for their sake (Sadrā, 1990, vol. 1, p. 206). In Mullah Sadrā's view, the law of causation is a natural law, so it is neither demonstrable nor deniable, because one who tries to refute this principle can do so only with reference to the very principle, for in any reasoning premise is the cause of conclusion (Javādī Āmolī, 1997, vol. 2, p. 319). Owing to this reason, Mullah Sadrā says that if anybody denies the law of causation, it is useless to discuss with him, that is, there is no room for discussion (Sadrā, 1990, vol. 3, p. 164). Even the Asharites about whom it is said that they deny the causation if insist upon their views, cannot prove the existence of the Origin (i.e. God). Hence, they deny causation only in this world. In other words, they deny cause-effect relation only in God's acts rather than in proving God's essence.

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Mullah Sadrā on Causation

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Abstract

The issue of causation is one of the most important philosophical issues, so that without having a good understanding of this concept, it is impossible to understand the world. Any kind of discussion, speaking, and experience, or any human action is based on some kind of understanding of the concept of causation and accepting its reality. The issue of causation can be discussed from various aspects. Modern Western philosophers including Hume and Kant have treated this issue from epistemological point of view. But Muslim philosophers consider it as an ontological one.

Mullah Sadrā as a great Muslim philosopher has dealt with this issue and has given its correct meaning with reference to its various forms in his works particularly, in his main book al-Asfār. By proving the principality of existence and mentally-positedness of quiddity, he claimed that it is not possible to explain causation on the basis of quiddity and quiddative possibility. At first, he explained causation on the basis of gradational unity of existence, but since this unity may lead to the separation of cause and effect, he finally by following a mystical approach to this principle, shifted from gradational unity to the individual unity of existence. He explained the principle of causation with reference to the mystical oneness of being, since there is no room for multiplicity. In such an approach, effect will be nothing other than a symbol or sign and has no identity other than a kind of mirror.

Keywords: *Mullah Sadrā, causation, individual unity, gradational unity, existential poverty, copulative being*

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