محمد لگنهاوزن

Relativism generally, and moral relativism in particular, continue to be topics of philosophical controversy. The controversy arises over general questions about the semantics, epistemology, and logic of the relativist’s position. With regard to moral relativism, there are also disagreements about whether moral relativism does not undermine the force of moral claims. Some of these disputes are due to the fact that the disputants differ in the ways they define or understand relativism. Since much of the current controversy about moral relativism has roots in earlier discussions that took place in the twentieth century which have been presented in the works of Leo Strauss, a critical analysis of some of Strauss’s views is presented. Relativism was an issue of paramount importance for Strauss, who nevertheless refused to define the object of his concern. Strauss argues that relativism is self-defeating in a manner designated here as the enfeeblement peritrope. Finally, a sketch of how equivocation on the issue of relativism can be avoided by distinguishing the value relativity from parameter parity. It is the latter that is responsible for the enfeeblement that is Strauss’s target.

In Reason and the Heart , William Wainwright defends a kind of religious evidentialism, one that takes int consideration the promptings of the heart, provided the heart is a virtuous one; and he claims that this view is able to avoid relativism. Here, Wainwright’s evidentialism is examined in relation to other views that have gone by that name. Wainwright’s position is briefly stated together with an expression of doubt about its ability to fend off relativism. Following this, an outline of the history of evidentialism is presented. It is concluded that Wainwright’s view is not really a form of evidentialism at all. Evidentialism may be weakened in two ways: (1) redefining “evidence” to include elements that are not recognized by objectifying inquiry; (2) allowing subjective factors, such as religious emotions, to govern the interpretation of the evidence. Wainwright describes his view as a form of evidentialism because it does not avail itself of (1); but it is only misleadingly called “evidentialism” because of (2). After making this case, several reasons are presented for rejecting evidentialism. It is argued that evidentialists focus attention of what the evidence is to determine whether beliefs are justified or rational, while how the evidence is treated is of no less importance when beliefs are supported by reasons. Furthermore, there are beliefs the justification of which is a practical matter of commitment to a more general framework rather than inference from some body of evidence. It is suggested that some religious beliefs may fall into this category.